The Unified Force of the AES: A New Security Era in Central Sahel, Between Hope and Uncertainties

Launched in December 2025 and based in Niamey, the Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States represents the third attempt by the central Sahel countries — Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — to build a joint security mechanism capable of addressing the expansion of the jihadist threat in the region. With a strength of 6,000 personnel, this force marks a break from previous regional initiatives, both structurally and politically, and embodies the sovereignist will of the three military regimes in power in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey.

The path leading to the creation of this force is marked by failures. The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, established in July 2017 with the support of France and the international community, was never able to deploy a decisive operational presence despite 25 security operations conducted over five years. General Oumarou Namata, who commanded the force in 2021, highlighted the neutralization of hundreds of terrorist fighters and the seizure of significant quantities of equipment. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat continued to expand, rising from approximately 2,000 violent events linked to extremist groups in 2019 to over 6,000 in 2024 according to ACLED program data. The G5 Sahel suffered from chronic underfunding: its annual operating budget, initially set at 423 million euros, far exceeded the contribution capacities of the member states, making the force dependent on external partners, primarily France and the European Union.

The Unified Force of the AES fundamentally differs from its predecessors through several structural innovations. Unlike the G5 Sahel battalions, which were confined to designated geographical sectors with a pursuit right limited to a radius of 100 kilometers on either side of national borders, the units of the new force are designed to operate across the entire territory of the three countries. The headquarters, based in Niamey, has full operational authority over the troops, allowing it to deploy and move them without prior approval from national headquarters — a major constraint that had paralyzed the G5 Sahel. This architecture is based on the belief that operational flexibility is essential in the face of non-state armed groups that ignore borders and exploit border areas as sanctuaries.

Financially, the AES states show an unprecedented determination to preserve their autonomy. The founding charter of the Alliance stipulates that funding must come from contributions from member states, and on March 28, 2025, the three countries agreed to institute a 0.5% tax on imports to finance the confederal institutions, including the Unified Force. Burkina Faso mobilizes its Patriotic Support Fund, Niger its Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland, and Mali its Fund for Support to Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects. While the precise amounts of individual contributions have not been made public, the effort symbolizes a break from the dependence on international donors that characterized the G5 Sahel.

The diversification of military partnerships is another pillar of the AES strategy. Equipment and armaments are now procured from Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China, thus avoiding dependence on a single supplier country. The Russian Africa Corps has established itself as the preferred security partner of the Alliance, although the terms of engagement vary significantly from country to country: in Mali, Russia provides military equipment and the Africa Corps participates directly in combat operations, while in Burkina Faso and Niger, cooperation is limited to training. This differentiated approach reflects the internal political realities of each state and their varying degrees of acceptance of a foreign presence on national soil.

Operation Yereko 2, conducted jointly by the armies of the three countries between February and March 2025 in the Liptako-Gourma area — the border crossroads between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — demonstrated the operational coordination capacity that serves as a model for the Unified Force. Several fighters affiliated with the Support Group for Islam and Muslims, linked to Al-Qaeda, were neutralized there. This operation proved that Sahelian armies could conduct large-scale coordinated actions without direct Western support, a major political argument for the regimes in power.

However, the effectiveness of the Unified Force will depend on its ability to overcome several structural challenges. The first concerns the integration between the operations of the joint force and those of the national defense and security forces that are not part of it. The risk of duplication, operational confusion, or even command tensions is real in a context where each national army is simultaneously conducting its own counter-insurgency operations. The second challenge, and perhaps the most critical, is the need to avoid the siloed approach that characterized the decade of international interventions in the Sahel. Illicit supply networks for weapons, motorcycles, fuel, and drones cross many regional borders, and long-term stability requires cooperation with the armies of neighboring non-AES states — Nigeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal. The Tarha Nakal exercise, conducted in May 2024 in Tillia, Niger, by the armed forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Togo, illustrated the possibility of expanded coordination beyond the AES framework.

The issue of air and intelligence capabilities remains a central question mark. The G5 Sahel suffered from a lack of adequate air support and a functional intelligence system, both critical elements for counter-terrorism operations in the vast Sahelian expanses. While the AES states have acquired Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones and Russian equipment, the ability to maintain sustained air coverage and an integrated intelligence network among the three countries remains to be demonstrated. The lack of transparency regarding funding also raises questions about the medium-term budgetary viability of this ambitious undertaking.

Geopolitically, the creation of the Unified Force is part of a profound reshaping of alliances in the region. The withdrawal of French forces, the end of Operation Barkhane, and the expulsion of UN forces from Mali have created a security vacuum that the new military regimes seek to fill themselves. The African Union, which could play a mediating role between the AES countries and their neighbors, has not yet taken an official position on the Unified Force, reflecting the internal divisions of the organization in the face of regime changes by force.

Ultimately, the Unified Force of the AES represents both a hope for renewed security in the central Sahel and a risky bet. Its success will depend not only on its operational capacity on the ground but also on the political will of its members to maintain internal cohesion while building bridges with neighboring states. Recent history in the Sahel shows that purely military solutions, no matter how well designed, are insufficient to eradicate the deep-rooted causes of instability: poverty, failing governance, and limited access to basic services. The Unified Force will only bear fruit if it is part of a broader vision of political stabilization and development.