The Unified Force of the AES Facing the Challenge of the Sahel: Strategic Ambitions and Operational Challenges

Launched in December 2025 in Niamey, the Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) represents the third attempt by the central Sahel states — Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — to build a functional collective security mechanism. With 6,000 personnel, according to statements from the Nigerien president at the beginning of 2026, this force is presented by its promoters as a decisive break from past failures. However, recent history calls for caution: its predecessors, the Multinational Joint Force (FMM) of the Liptako-Gourma area announced in January 2017, and the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel created in July of the same year, never succeeded in halting the jihadist expansion in the region.

The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel has been the symbol of a systemic failure that the Unified Force of the AES is now trying to overcome. In five years of existence, this structure, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, has conducted 25 security operations, neutralizing, according to its commander in 2021, General Oumarou Namata, "hundreds of terrorists." Yet, the expansion of armed groups has not been stopped. The main reason lies in funding: its annual budget, initially set at 423 million euros, far exceeded the contributions from member states, making the force chronically dependent on external partners — primarily France and its Operation Barkhane. This financial dependence was accompanied by a structural deficiency in air capabilities and tactical intelligence, two essential pillars of any modern counter-terrorism operation.

The Unified Force of the AES distinguishes itself from its predecessors on several fundamental points. First, it is driven by a strong political will and an ideological convergence among the three military governments, which share a common rejection of Western oversight — particularly French — symbolized by their successive coups between 2021 and 2023. Unlike the G5, whose funding primarily came from the European Union and France, the AES strives to mobilize internal resources: the Patriotic Support Fund in Burkina Faso, the Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland in Niger, and the Basic Infrastructure Support Fund in Mali constitute the three main mechanisms. The precise amounts of their respective contributions have not been made public, but the founding charter of the Alliance stipulates that funding must rely on contributions from member states.

From an operational perspective, the Unified Force can rely on an encouraging precedent: Operation Yereko 2, conducted jointly by the armies of the three countries between February and March 2025 in the Three Borders area — the border triangle between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, long considered the heart of the jihadist sanctuary. This tripartite operation allowed for testing inter-army coordination mechanisms and validating certain command protocols. Its operational results, although modest in terms of lasting effects on the ground, provided an unprecedented learning base for Sahelian forces operating outside the Western framework.

The security context surrounding the rise of the Unified Force remains extremely concerning. At the end of January 2026, a group affiliated with the Islamic State targeted the international airport of Niamey, the very headquarters of the new force, in a bold demonstration of capability. Since September 2025, a faction affiliated with Al-Qaeda — the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) — has blocked fuel supplies to Bamako, paralyzing the Malian capital and severely testing the mobility capabilities of the Malian armed forces. These two events reveal the increasing sophistication of armed groups and their ability to strike high-value strategic targets.

On the ECOWAS side, a meeting of chiefs of staff in Sierra Leone in early March 2026 resulted in the decision to activate the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). The plan calls for the initial deployment of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026 to address what analysts describe as an "existential threat" to the stability of West Africa. Armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda and Daesh have significantly expanded their geographical reach, from Mali to Nigeria, and are now beginning to infiltrate coastal states like Togo and Benin. However, this ECOWAS initiative immediately faces two major obstacles: insufficient funding and political tensions with the AES countries, which left the regional organization in January 2025.

The relationship between the Unified Force of the AES and the ECOWAS Standby Force raises complex strategic questions. The two structures coexist in the same geographical space without a formalized coordination mechanism, even in a context of open political rivalry. For coastal states like Togo and Benin, now exposed to jihadist contagion, the lack of interoperability between these two security architectures represents a real vulnerability. Beverly Ochieng, an analyst at the Control Risks firm based in Dakar, emphasizes that "any sustainable response must integrate social interventions to counter the influence of armed groups that allow them to recruit" — a reminder that the military response, however necessary, cannot be sufficient.

The Unified Force of the AES thus presents itself as an ambitious bet on sovereignty and strategic coherence. To succeed where the G5 Sahel has failed, it must address three fundamental challenges: ensure its funding independently of external contributions; develop autonomous intelligence and air support capabilities, particularly in terms of drones, in the face of adversaries increasingly using this technology; and finally, rebuild bridges with neighboring ECOWAS member countries, whose cooperation remains essential for any coherent regional approach to the jihadist threat. The time for results will come quickly: in a Sahel where each month brings its share of massacres and population displacements, the political window to demonstrate real effectiveness is narrow.