The unified force of the AES increases to 6,000 men — the military bet of the three capitals in the face of security chaos

On February 14, in Niamey, Nigerien President Abdourahamane Tiani announced during a televised interview the increase in the personnel of the joint force of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), raising the total from 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers. This decision, presented as a "reorganization to face any eventuality," reveals both the strategic ambition of the three military regimes — Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso — and the fragility of their position in the face of an unrelenting jihadist threat.

A force born from the break with the West

The AES is not just a military alliance. It is primarily a political act: the response of three juntas to the pressures from ECOWAS and the withdrawal of French forces. Established on September 16, 2023, after the threat of ECOWAS intervention to restore constitutional order in Niger, the alliance was officially recognized as a confederation in January 2024. The three countries then left ECOWAS and denounced their defense agreements with Paris.

The unified force itself was inaugurated in December 2025 in Bamako, during a ceremony attended by the heads of state of the three countries. At that time, the planned strength was 5,000 men. Six weeks later, Tiani announced 6,000. Not a radical transformation, but a signal: the AES wants to show that it exists on the ground, not just in press releases.

6,000 men for three simultaneous theaters

This number remains modest in the face of the vast territory to be covered. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso represent over 3 million square kilometers, with porous borders and areas under jihadist control or out of reach of the capitals. JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) operates freely in the Liptako-Gourma, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) has bases in the tri-border area, and criminal groups mingle with insurgents.

By comparison, Operation Barkhane had around 5,100 French military personnel at its peak, supported by attack helicopters, Reaper drones, and integrated logistics. The G5 Sahel force, which was also supposed to number 5,000 men, never reached that operational level. The AES inherits this reality: an announcement of personnel does not guarantee availability, mobility, or tactical coherence.

Operational challenges remain intact

From experience, three structural problems arise for any regional force in the Sahel.

The first: cross-border logistics. Moving 1,000 soldiers from Niger to central Mali requires fuel, vehicle maintenance, ammunition, and above all, a command chain that functions between Niamey and Bamako. This requires resources that the three countries have never demonstrated they possess autonomously.

The second: interoperability. The Malian, Nigerien, and Burkinabe armies use varied equipment — French, Russian, Chinese, Turkish — with different doctrines and training. Coordinating joint operations in this context is complicated. This was seen with the G5 Sahel, where joint interventions often limited themselves to symbolic patrols.

The third: intelligence. Effective strikes against JNIM or EIGS require knowing where the targets are. The ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities of the three countries remain limited. France provided this through its drones and satellites. Russia promises to fill this gap, but so far, the results remain to be demonstrated.

The Russian turning point and the geopolitics of the Sahel

Tiani's announcement comes in a context of strategic rapprochement between the AES and Moscow. On February 12, the press confirmed that a ministerial format "Russia – Alliance of Sahel States" would be established in 2026. Burkina Faso signed an agreement in January on the "foundations of relations" with Russia. The Russian African Corps — successor to the Wagner Group — now has bases in Niamey and Bamako.

This shift towards Moscow is not without cost. It is accompanied by increasingly hostile rhetoric towards Paris and Washington. On February 13, the chief of staff of President Tiani stated that Niger was "at war with France." These statements resonate well with local public opinion, but they close doors in terms of intelligence and technical cooperation that the three countries could still utilize.

What this buildup reveals

Increasing a force from 5,000 to 6,000 men is not a military revolution. But it is a sign that the leaders of the AES are seeking to institutionalize their alliance beyond the political realm. They want to prove that they can secure their territory without France, without ECOWAS, and with the support of Moscow.

The problem is that the jihadist threat is not receding. JNIM has carried out 69 drone attacks in two years. EIGS struck Niamey airport in January. Rural areas of Burkina Faso are increasingly out of control. In the face of this, an additional 1,000 soldiers will change nothing without a coherent strategy, transport means, and operational intelligence.

The future of the unified force

The question is not whether the AES can muster 6,000 men on paper. It is whether these men can deploy quickly, operate together, and hold key areas without exhausting themselves. For now, nothing guarantees that.

What is certain is that the Sahel is entering a phase where the three military regimes are betting everything on their ability to manage security alone. If they fail, chaos will spread. If they succeed, it will be a major geopolitical turning point. But on the ground, the coming months will tell whether this unified force is an operational reality or just another political symbol.