The United States Strikes Somalia 64 Times in 2026 — al-Shabaab Still Controls the Roads

In Jamaame, about eight kilometers inland from the coast of Lower Juba, the sound of drones came before the explosions. On November 15, 2025, according to an investigation published on June 16, 2026, by The Guardian, an American strike reportedly killed at least 12 civilians, including eight children. Washington does not acknowledge these deaths. This gap between the ground reality and the official statement summarizes the American war in Somalia today.

The number that matters this week is not just that of Jamaame. New America reports 64 alleged American strikes in Somalia since the beginning of 2026, while U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) acknowledges 63. At this rate, Somalia has become the most intensely struck African theater by the United States again. Yet, al-Shabaab retains large swathes of territory, controls roads, still threatens the approaches to Mogadishu, and forces the Somali army to fight as if American air superiority solves nothing.

A Strike Rate Without Visible Victory

The official logic remains known: weaken al-Shabaab, contain the Islamic State in Somalia in the North, support Somali federal forces. On paper, it looks clean. On the ground, it is less clear. Strikes can kill leaders, disrupt a camp, prevent a column from advancing. They do not hold a bridge, do not reopen a road, and do not replace a garrison that is short on ammunition.

The most severe operational data comes from New America: January saw 26 declared strikes, February 16, March 7, April 12, and then only two in May based on available announcements. Even with a possible slowdown in the spring, the total for 2026 already exceeds that of several recent presidential periods. The Guardian notes that Donald Trump's second term has already produced 190 strikes in Somalia, compared to 51 under the Biden administration.

But al-Shabaab is not a simple aerial target. It is a local control system. It collects, judges, recruits, punishes, and negotiates. When a drone strikes near Kismayo or in the Golis mountains, it acts on a point. The group, however, thinks in axes: the Jubba valley, access to the Shabelle, secondary routes to Mogadishu, rural areas where the state always arrives after the insurgents. From experience, a strike can change a day. A road is won with men who stay overnight.

The Transparency Problem

AFRICOM has stopped publishing detailed estimates of civilian casualties in Somalia since May 2025. The U.S. military acknowledges only six civilians killed since the beginning of its campaign in the country. Airwars, which compiles local reports and cross-references them, estimates that American strikes have caused between 93 and 170 civilian deaths, based on 103 incidents assessed as credible or confirmed. The gap is too wide to be a simple methodological disagreement.

This point is strategic, not just moral. A population that does not know who has died, who was targeted, and why a house was destroyed does not automatically become pro-American or pro-government. It becomes cautious, distrustful, sometimes silent. In southern Somalia, silence rarely benefits the state. It benefits those who return in the evening to ask for names, collect money, or punish a suspected informant.

One must remain cautious: some images and testimonies about Jamaame come from circuits close to al-Shabaab, and the exact timeline of the explosions remains incomplete. But the absence of a public American investigation leaves the field open to enemy propaganda.

Jamaame as a Tactical Symptom

Jamaame is not an isolated detail. The city is located in an area where geography serves al-Shabaab: agriculture, the Jubba river, dispersed habitats, difficult access, vulnerable human intelligence. A cell can blend into a neighborhood or cross fields before a Somali patrol arrives. For a drone operator, the image may be precise. For a commander, the interpretation may remain false.

According to the Guardian's investigation, witnesses describe at least fifteen explosions and houses hit in a family neighborhood. If these elements are confirmed, the problem is not just the munition. It is the targeting chain: who provided the intelligence, who validated the presence of a military target, who assessed the civil risk, who observed after the strike. A war conducted through a screen can give an illusion of control. The ground often takes care of correcting that.

Somalia is not the Sahel, but the lesson resembles what we have seen elsewhere. When an external force strikes a lot without explaining enough, it can help tactically and lose politically in the same movement. In Mali, abuses attributed to national forces and their Russian partners have fueled distrust. In Somalia, the American risk is different in form but similar in effect: transforming a counter-terrorism operation into a recruitment argument.

An American War Still Dependent on Somalis

The real question is not whether American drones are effective. They are, in the short term, against certain leaders and concentrations. The question is what they allow Somali forces to do the next day. If a strike opens a window to retake a village, secure a road, and establish minimal administration, it has operational meaning. If it produces only a statement, it becomes a statistic.

The Somali federal government accepts this cooperation because it lacks air resources, because al-Shabaab remains capable of major attacks, and because the Islamic State in Somalia represents a smaller but dangerous hotspot in Puntland. Washington, for its part, wants to avoid a return of jihadist sanctuary while limiting its footprint on the ground. It is the old Western temptation: strike hard, stay light, ask local partners to transform kinetic effect into political control.

On a staff map, this can be defended. On the road between Kismayo and Jamaame, it is another matter. It requires posts, fuel, paid salaries, local leaders who do not switch sides, a justice system less slow than al-Shabaab. Without this, 64 strikes in 2026 can produce a lot of noise and little lasting security.

What to Watch Now

The first indicator will be whether the strike rate resumes after the apparent slowdown in May. The second will be AFRICOM's ability to restore credible publication of civilian casualty reports. The third will be more concrete: the roads around Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Lower Shabelle. If al-Shabaab continues to tax vehicles and threaten convoys there, the air campaign will have failed in its main objective.

The next danger is not necessarily a large spectacular attack. It is more discreet: a succession of contested strikes, intimidated villages, Somali patrols arriving too late. It is in this space, between the drone above and the absent soldier on the ground, that al-Shabaab still knows how to operate.