The Unprecedented Purge in the People's Liberation Army: The Readiness Crisis Behind the Fall of 101 Senior Military Officers

The latest report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on February 24, 2026, reveals a shocking fact: since 2022, 101 senior officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have been purged or are likely to be purged. This military rectification campaign led by Xi Jinping is of a scale and depth far beyond previous external perceptions. This is not only the largest personnel purge in the history of the PLA but has also raised serious doubts about the current state of readiness and future combat capabilities of the Chinese military.

According to the purge database established by CSIS, 36 generals and lieutenant generals have been officially purged in the past four years, while another 65 officers are missing or may be under investigation. This means that 52% of the 176 senior leadership positions in the PLA have been affected—an astonishingly high percentage. The report's author, Flaviel, director of the Security Studies Program at MIT, pointed out that this figure is "shocking and unprecedented," fully demonstrating the depth of Xi Jinping's purge and the unprecedented turmoil within the PLA leadership.

The targets of the purge cover various levels and departments of the PLA. At the highest level, six members of the Central Military Commission have fallen, including former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, Vice Chairman He Weidong, Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, Joint Staff Department Chief Liu Zhenli, and the most shocking case—Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, who was investigated in January 2026. As a member of the "red second generation" with deep ties to the Xi family, Zhang's downfall breaks the so-called "ironclad relationship" myth, indicating that no one can escape this purge.

From the perspective of military branches, the Rocket Force has suffered the most severe blow. All four of its former commanders have been purged, and key positions such as deputy commanders and political commissars have also seen widespread vacancies. This thorough purge of the Rocket Force is related to systemic corruption in the weapon procurement process since the unit's establishment in 2015. As a key branch controlling China's strategic nuclear weapons, the Rocket Force's special status has subjected it to particularly stringent scrutiny.

The Army, traditionally the strongest branch of the PLA, has also been heavily impacted. Between 2024 and 2025, two commanders, two political commissars, four deputy commanders, and one chief of staff were successively purged. The Navy is in a similarly dire situation, with corruption issues laid bare during its rapid expansion—such as the sinking of China's first Type 052D nuclear submarine during trials at a shipyard in Wuhan in April 2024, and the latest domestically produced aircraft carrier Fujian being criticized by Chinese analysts for design flaws, both reflecting deep-seated problems in the procurement system.

At the theater level, the leadership of the Southern Theater Command has been almost completely hollowed out. The commander, political commissar, and five deputy commanders (four of whom also serve as commanders of the theater's land, sea, and air forces) have been purged or are likely to be purged, leaving the two highest positions in the Southern Theater Command still vacant. The other four theater commands have also suffered heavy losses, with former Eastern Theater Command commander Lin Xiangyang being the only theater commander officially expelled from the Party.

This large-scale purge has significantly impacted the PLA's state of readiness. The CSIS report notes that among the purged active-duty senior officers, 61% come from the operational command sequence rather than the political work system. At the Central Military Commission level, 80% of the purged officials held key operational positions, resulting in the current commission having no military leaders from the operational sequence—an extremely rare situation in PLA history.

Of the 176 key leadership positions, only about 21% are currently held by officially appointed generals, 44% are filled by acting or temporary commanders, and another 12 positions are completely vacant. Although the PLA's centralized system and bureaucratic mechanisms are still operational, and political orders and military directives can still be issued and executed, the significant vacancies in leadership have begun to affect the organization of complex military operations.

The most obvious example comes from military exercises related to Taiwan. In 2024, the PLA was able to initiate the "Joint Sword" exercise within three to four days after "problematic behavior" from Taiwan. However, in 2025, the time required to launch large-scale military exercises significantly increased—April's "Strait Thunder-2025A" exercise took 19 days to start after Lai Ching-te's speech, and December's "Mission of Justice 2025" exercise also took 12 days. Notably, the April exercise was hastily organized, with the Eastern Theater Command only announcing the exercise name the next day, and it was defined as a "drill" rather than the usual "exercise," with both scale and complexity significantly reduced.

Changes in Sino-Russian joint military exercises are also noteworthy. In 2025, China and Russia conducted only six joint exercises, less than half of the 14 held in 2024, and completely missing the multi-domain joint exercises that had been held at least once a year since 2018. This is likely related to the purge affecting the Joint Staff Department, which is responsible for military diplomacy and complex exercise planning—three deputy chiefs of staff, Xu Qiling, Cao Qingfeng, and Jing Jianfeng, may have been purged in 2025, followed by Minister Liu Zhenli's downfall in early 2026.

For Xi Jinping, rebuilding the high-level command structure of the military faces dual considerations of political loyalty and military capability. The PLA Daily stated that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were dismissed because their actions "seriously violated and undermined" Xi's authority as chairman of the Central Military Commission, indicating that political loyalty will be the primary criterion. With the pool of available generals significantly reduced, Xi must find candidates who are both loyal and capable among the few remaining unscathed generals.

Currently, there are only three generals available for immediate selection: Defense Minister Dong Jun (former Navy commander), Eastern Theater Command commander Yang Zhibin, and Central Theater Command commander Han Shengyan. The latter two were both promoted to general in 2025 and come from the Air Force—this may explain why only two generals were promoted in 2025, both from the Air Force, breaking with past traditions.

In the short term, the purge undoubtedly weakens the PLA's ability to execute complex military operations, especially for large-scale invasions of Taiwan, which are considered "extremely complex and dangerous" actions. However, the CSIS report also warns that this impact may be temporary. By the end of the 2020s, newly promoted officers will accumulate more experience in using modern weaponry, and their working rapport with Xi will strengthen, potentially enhancing their confidence and expectations for success.

How this unprecedented purge will ultimately reshape the PLA remains uncertain. Xi may choose to refill the Central Military Commission or maintain its streamlined structure while granting more power to subordinate departments, and he may even consider abolishing the commission in favor of a command system similar to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regardless of the approach taken, this purge will have profound and lasting effects on the organizational structure, command system, and combat capabilities of the Chinese military.