Two Chinese Navy Aircraft Carriers Advance into the Western Pacific, Challenging Japan's 2026 Surveillance Network

On November 12, Taiwanese authorities announced that Chinese naval and coast guard vessels have widely deployed in the Western Pacific, East China Sea, South China Sea, and Philippine Sea, with the number exceeding 100 ships. This operation, which includes two aircraft carriers, is characterized by the fact that it was not announced in advance as a large-scale exercise. It has been reported that Japan's Defense Minister expressed recognition of the limitations of the Self-Defense Forces' surveillance capabilities regarding the activities of Chinese aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

What the Advancement of Aircraft Carriers Means

The names and missions of the two aircraft carriers cannot be definitively determined from publicly available information. However, the importance lies in not concentrating the fleet in a single maritime area but rather allowing simultaneous operations across multiple maritime areas. From a capabilities perspective, the Chinese Navy is experimenting with operations that combine aircraft carrier strike groups, supply ships, and coast guard vessels, maintaining a continuum of peacetime navigation and wartime blockade. While caution is needed regarding intentions, it cannot be denied that this training may treat the area around Taiwan, as well as the southwestern islands of Japan to the Philippine Sea, as a single operational space.

Japan's Surveillance and Maritime Traffic Routes

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's P-1 patrol aircraft, escort ships, and Air Self-Defense Force early warning aircraft have the capability to track individual vessels. On the other hand, if the fleet operates simultaneously in multiple locations, the issue shifts from detection itself to the speed of continuously sharing identification information and creating a comprehensive picture that includes supply ships and coast guard vessels. From the standpoint of protecting SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication), it is more important to consider the intimidation of commercial shipping routes and the impact on insurance and operational decisions rather than assuming the destruction of an aircraft carrier.

Implications for the Japan-U.S. Alliance

On November 10, Japan and the United States agreed to strengthen the alliance's deterrence and response capabilities. However, whether political decisions, information sharing, and the operation of patrol aircraft can be synchronized on the same timeline in response to unannounced activities like this is a separate issue. In the author's view, the greatest blind spot is not losing sight of naval vessels. It is the time spent by Japan in determining whether it is an "exercise or intimidation," during which China can accumulate established facts. While there is still room for verification of the numbers in publicly available information, the acknowledgment of the limitations of surveillance capabilities carries more weight than the number of vessels.

Reference Information

• Reuters "China stages unannounced Pacific drills in 'silent intimidation' of Taiwan, officials say"
• Japan Times "Koizumi says China carrier drills in Pacific highlight Japan's limited surveillance capabilities"
• NHK WORLD "Japan, US agree to strengthen security cooperation"

Counting the size of the fleet alone does not measure the speed of pressure on maritime traffic routes.