Washington Returns to the Sahel After the Failure of Its Conditional Strategy Against the Juntas

On February 7, Nick Checker, director of the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. State Department, visited Bamako to meet with Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop. This visit marks the highest level of U.S. engagement with the Malian junta in months.

This is new.

The Shift in Washington

For three years, the Biden administration maintained a hardline stance towards the three Sahelian juntas. Following the coups in Mali (2020-2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023), Washington suspended its military cooperation and demanded democratic transition timelines. The drone base in Agadez, where about 800 U.S. soldiers were stationed, was evacuated after the expulsion demanded by Niamey.

As a result: the three countries turned to Moscow. Approximately 1,000 Russian mercenaries are now operating in Mali, with smaller contingents in Burkina Faso and Niger. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has formed as an anti-Western bloc, with the three countries having left ECOWAS in January 2025.

The Trump administration drew conclusions from this failure. As Massad Boulos, senior advisor to the president for African affairs, stated to the newspaper Le Monde in October 2025: “Democracy is always appreciated, but our policy is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.”

What Washington Seeks

U.S. motivations are threefold:

• Security: The region now accounts for half of the terrorism-related deaths worldwide, according to some estimates. The attack on Niamey airport on February 4, claimed by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), highlighted the persistent threat. Washington fears the emergence of jihadist sanctuaries.
• Mining: Niger has significant uranium reserves, Mali produces lithium, and the region is a major gold producer. The Nigerien junta has regained control of the main uranium mine from the French company Orano and is negotiating with Russia.
• Geopolitics: Not allowing exclusive Russian influence to go unchallenged.

The Limits of Engagement

From experience, I can say that Washington's announcements will not translate into a return of ground troops. The Trump administration promised an end to “endless wars” abroad. General John Brennan, the number two at Africom, confirmed that support would be limited to intelligence and, potentially, arms deliveries.

On the ground, the situation remains critical. On February 6, at least 36 Nigerien soldiers were killed in an attack by JNIM near the Burkinabe border. In Mali, an ambush by the same group on a fuel convoy heading to Bamako resulted in at least 15 deaths among the drivers.

The coexistence of Russian and American forces also raises questions. During the attack on Niamey airport, Russia described the intervention as a “joint action” between Nigerien forces and Russian personnel. How does Washington plan to coordinate with Russian mercenaries accused of multiple abuses, particularly in Mali?

France, the Major Absentee

This American visit comes as France has definitively turned the page on its military presence in the Sahel. The last troops left Niger in December 2023, after being expelled from Mali and Burkina Faso. Paris maintains a presence in Chad and Côte d'Ivoire, but the “three borders” area is now beyond any direct French influence.

The European Union maintains development programs but struggles to define a coherent strategy. “Major crises are unfolding without the EU,” notes Ulf Laessing, head of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation office in Bamako.

Outlook

The American return to the Sahel resembles more a recognition of reality than a true strategic plan. Washington is now willing to engage with military regimes, but without the means or the will for an engagement comparable to Operation Barkhane.

The next step to watch: the response of the AES. A few weeks before Checker’s visit, the three juntas imposed reciprocal travel restrictions on American citizens following sanctions from Washington. This regional unity could well constitute, for the first time, an effective African geopolitical lever against the great powers.

Information on the coordination between American and Russian forces remains, for now, incomplete. It is precisely this gray area that will determine whether American engagement translates into concrete results or remains a dead letter.