When Allies Bomb Each Other in Yemen: Saudi Arabia and the UAE from Coalition to Confrontation

On January 2, 2026, the Saudi Air Force bombed the port of Mukalla in southern Yemen, targeting an Emirati arms shipment en route to the Southern Transitional Council forces. Twenty fighters from the Abu Dhabi-backed separatist forces were killed. For the first time in the history of the Gulf Cooperation Council, one of its members directly bombs the forces of another Gulf ally. Even in the darkest moments of the crisis with Qatar in 2017, we did not witness such military escalation.

Militarily, this is not just an airstrike. It is a declaration of the end of a decade-long alliance and the beginning of a new phase of regional competition that may redraw the map of alliances in the Middle East and East Africa.

The Three Fronts of the Saudi-Emirati Conflict

Yemen is merely the most obvious front. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are facing off in three main theaters:

Yemen: Dismantling the Alliance from Within

Since 2015, the Saudis and Emiratis have been fighting together against the Houthis. However, Abu Dhabi has been supporting the Southern Transitional Council, which seeks secession and control over strategic ports, while Riyadh supports the legitimate government that aims to maintain Yemen's unity. In late 2025, the Emirati-backed separatists took control of the oil-rich provinces of Hadramaut and Al-Mahra. The Saudi response was decisive: airstrikes, dissolving the Southern Transitional Council, and forcing the UAE to announce a complete withdrawal from Yemen.

Sudan: A Proxy War with a Horrific Human Cost

In Sudan, the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces led by Hemeti, while Saudi Arabia stands with the Sudanese army. Evidence of Emirati support for the Rapid Support Forces is mounting: flights through Egypt and Libya, using the Libyan Kufra airport as a logistical hub, and trading Sudanese gold through Dubai. Riyadh's response has been multilayered: coordinating with Cairo to close Egyptian airspace to Emirati shipments, pressuring Khalifa Haftar in Libya to cut supply lines, and negotiating a $4 billion deal with Pakistan to supply the Sudanese army with fighter jets.

Somalia and Somaliland: Israel Enters the Game

In December 2025, Israel recognized Somaliland as an independent state. Behind the scenes, it is widely believed that Abu Dhabi facilitated this move. The UAE has significant investments in the port of Berbera and its airport in Somaliland and has previously coordinated between Israel and Somaliland. The Israeli recognition is expected to pave the way for an Israeli military or intelligence presence to monitor Houthi activity in Yemen. Mogadishu's reaction was decisive: cutting ties with the UAE, canceling all agreements, and calling for Saudi military intervention in Somaliland.

Reshaping Alliances: An Emerging Saudi Axis

Riyadh is not content with a defensive response. It is building a broad regional alliance:

• Egypt: Coordination to choke off Emirati supply networks to the Rapid Support Forces, joint pressure on Haftar in Libya
• Turkey: Consultations on Yemen and Somalia, a trilateral military framework with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
• Pakistan: A $4 billion fighter jet deal for Sudan, a strategic military partnership
• Somalia: A Saudi-Egyptian-Somali military partnership against Emirati influence

In contrast, the Emirati axis appears more fragile: UAE + Israel + Ethiopia, with tactical support from Haftar in Libya.

Militarily: An Asymmetrical Power Equation

Any military officer who has served in the region knows that military power is not measured by the size of the arsenal alone. The UAE has an exceptional ability to mobilize proxy forces, but Saudi Arabia possesses what is more important in a long-term conflict:

• International Legitimacy: Saudi Arabia supports internationally recognized governments (Yemen, Sudan, Somalia), while the UAE supports militias and separatist movements
• Strategic Depth: Saudi Arabia is larger geographically and demographically, with deeper financial resources
• Economic Influence: Saudi Arabia's decision to require foreign companies to relocate their regional headquarters to Riyadh has harmed the Emirati economy
• Lessons Learned: Riyadh has learned from its failure in Yemen that proxy forces and firepower alone are not enough. Its new model focuses on deterrence, selective pressure, and political outcomes

The UAE, on the other hand, faces a structural problem: all the armed groups it has supported (the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, Haftar in Libya) have gained independent military capabilities. Abu Dhabi is losing control, and the likelihood of direct confrontation is increasing.

The Fundamental Paradox: $88 Billion in Defense Contracts and Fighting Allies

The painful irony: while Saudi Arabia and the UAE were signing defense contracts worth $88 billion at the World Defense Exhibition 2026 in Riyadh, their forces and those of their allies were clashing in Yemen and Sudan. This reveals the fundamental illusion of the Gulf's military strategy: buying weapons is not a substitute for building sustainable political alliances or developing real military capabilities.

In my estimation, this division is more dangerous than the Qatar crisis of 2017. That was a diplomatic crisis over the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood, resolved through Gulf and international mediation. This time, the disagreement is over competing regional strategies: Saudi Arabia seeks stability in the region and the maintenance of existing borders, while the UAE supports changing borders and the political reality by backing separatists and militias.

Strategic Risks: The Israeli-Emirati Encirclement

What concerns Riyadh is not only Emirati behavior but the deepening partnership between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv. Saudi Arabia now sees Israel as a direct security threat almost on par with Iran. The potential Israeli presence in Somaliland (following recognition), UAE-Israel cooperation in Yemen (joint listening posts in the Socotra and Perim Islands in 2021), and joint naval exercises in the Red Sea—all of this raises Saudi fears of strategic encirclement on its western flank.

This context explains why Riyadh is leading a regional coalition against the "UAE-Israel-Ethiopia Axis." The Saudi narrative benefits from the unprecedented levels of unpopularity that Israel faces in the Middle East and East Africa following the Gaza war.

Potential Outcomes: The Fragility of the Gulf Cooperation Council

This rift fundamentally undermines the credibility and cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Member states are competing for leadership roles in the region rather than coordinating. Divergent foreign policies have revealed a strategic lack of trust.

Economically, competition creates enormous duplication: parallel ports, competing transport corridors, separate supply chains. This increases transaction costs and weakens regional integration. Massive parallel infrastructure projects may generate short-term jobs, but they risk misallocating capital and creating excess capacity in the long term.

Security-wise, the arms race and economic aid between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have escalated conflicts that neither side can fully control. Arming competing allies in Yemen has reduced incentives for settlement, disrupted command and control, and increased the likelihood of clashes within the alliance itself.

Conclusion: Between Strategic Independence and Security Dependence

From my military experience, Gulf states face a contradiction that cannot be easily resolved: they seek strategic independence (through massive armament and regional influence), but at the same time, they are structurally dependent on external powers—America in the case of Saudi Arabia, and increasingly Israel in the case of the UAE.

The current Saudi escalation may be an attempt to redefine the terms of this dependence. But practically, as long as Gulf states lack the "second and third legs" of the military capability triangle—training and institutions—their massive military arsenals will remain more of a political tool than a usable military force.

The question now is not whether Saudi Arabia and the UAE will return to the alliance—but how this division will reshape the entire security architecture of the region. And the parties that will pay the highest price are not Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, but Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia—the countries that have turned into battlegrounds for a Gulf proxy war.