Where Russia Will Find People for War in 2026 — Budget Crisis and Shift to Coercion

In November 2025, the authorities of the Perm Krai announced a reduction of the one-time payment for signing a contract from 1.5 million to 800 thousand rubles. By January 2026, similar measures were adopted by another eight regions. This detail speaks volumes about the state of the Russian military machine: the money that had been the main tool for mass mobilization for three years is running out. And in its place comes coercion.

Numbers That Don’t Lie

2025 became the bloodiest year for the Russian army since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The exact losses are not disclosed by the Ministry of Defense, but according to estimates from independent researchers and Ukrainian data, monthly irretrievable losses exceed 30,000 people. To maintain offensive operations, the Russian army must recruit between 25,000 and 40,000 new contract soldiers each month — a figure that is becoming increasingly unattainable purely through economic means against the backdrop of a budget crisis.

The problem is not only in the overall numbers. More important is the geographical distribution of losses and recruits. According to researcher Maria Vyushkova, who tracks regional disparities, the republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan consistently held the lead in 2025 for the absolute number of fatalities. Per capita, Tuva, Buryatia, Altai, and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug are ahead — regions where mobilization hit the hardest in 2022, and where, apparently, it will hit again.

An interesting anomaly: the republics of the North Caucasus (except for North Ossetia) show extremely low losses per capita — only Moscow and St. Petersburg have lower figures. It can be assumed that the Kremlin fears arming too many people with combat experience in a region that is traditionally volatile. But the question remains open: will this "privilege" remain in 2026 when the shortage of manpower at the front becomes critical?

The Economy of Incentives Has Broken

In 2023–2024, contract service was a lucrative deal for residents of subsidized regions. One-time payments of 1–2 million rubles plus a monthly salary of 200 to 400 thousand rubles created a powerful financial incentive. The authorities skillfully exploited regional economic inequality: poor republics and regions supplied soldiers, while Moscow and St. Petersburg remained relatively untouched.

But by the end of 2025, this system broke down. Federal and regional budgets faced serious difficulties. Spending on the war already exceeded 10% of GDP (according to unofficial estimates — up to 12%), sanctions pressure squeezed the revenue side, and inflation eroded the attractiveness of contract payments. In real terms, a payment of 1.5 million rubles in 2026 buys 30–40% less than in 2023.

And so the regions began to lower the bar. Initially cautiously, then more openly. But there are exceptions. The Republic of Buryatia, one of the poorest subjects of the Russian Federation, raised one-time payments in April 2025. The reason is simple: statistics showed a decline in the influx of contract soldiers, and the head of the republic, Alexey Tsidenov, understands that he has no other resource to demonstrate loyalty to Moscow. Buryatia has no oil, no critical industries — only people. The supply of "cannon fodder" has become the main indicator of governors' effectiveness.

Coercion as the New Norm

When money stops working, violence remains. In 2026, according to expert forecasts, Russia will transition to the systematic use of coercive recruitment methods:

• Pressure on Enterprises. Factories and corporations will be given informal quotas for "volunteers." Management, in turn, will exert pressure on male employees.
• Illegal Detentions. Men will be detained under formal pretexts (administrative violations, debts), and then coerced into signing contracts in exchange for their release.
• Hunting for Conscripts. In 2024, experts estimate that about 30% of conscripts ultimately signed contracts — voluntarily or under pressure. This figure could be significantly increased. Military service in Russia has become dangerous: physical violence, sleep deprivation, forgery of signatures, and even murders of those refusing to sign contracts — all of this is no longer isolated cases, but elements of a system.

It is important to understand: this is not a failure, but an evolution. The Russian mobilization machine in 2022–2024 operated on the principle of economic incentive. In 2026, it will shift to a model of coercion while maintaining the appearance of "voluntariness" in contract service. Formally, no new mobilization is announced, but de facto it is happening — just under a different name and with different methods.

Second Mobilization: The Question of "When," Not "If"

Experts agree on one thing: if the current rate of losses continues and Western aid to Ukraine increases, partial mobilization in one form or another will become inevitable by the end of 2026. The only question is how the authorities will frame it.

The formal announcement of a second wave of mobilization is politically toxic for the Kremlin. The first wave in September 2022 caused panic, a mass exodus of men abroad, and a drop in approval ratings. But the authorities have learned to mask forced conscription: through quotas for regions, through "voluntary-coercive" contract service, and through closing the possibility of leaving for conscripts.

If a second mobilization occurs, the geography of losses will change dramatically. Ethnic republics — Tuva, Buryatia, Bashkortostan, Dagestan — will again find themselves in the zone of maximum impact. Moscow and St. Petersburg will likely maintain relative security, but their complete invulnerability is no longer guaranteed.

Inevitability of Degradation

The Russian military machine will survive in 2026 — but at a cost that will not be immediately apparent. The transition from economic incentives to coercion means a degradation in the quality of personnel. Contract soldiers in 2023 joined the army for money, but at least formally of their own volition. Contract soldiers in 2026 will join under pressure, out of fear, out of desperation.

This means an increase in desertion, a decline in morale, and a rise in cases of disobedience. Russia will face the same problem that the USSR encountered in Afghanistan: an army made up of people who do not want to be there will sooner or later cease to be combat-ready.

There is also a deeper problem. The ethnic and regional composition of the Russian army in Ukraine is already disproportionately "non-white" and "non-urban." If this trend continues, in a decade Russia will have a class of war veterans concentrated in national republics and the poorest regions — people who are armed, traumatized, and embittered against the central authority. This will not necessarily lead to the collapse of the state, but it will certainly strengthen centrifugal tendencies.

Forecast for 2026

The Russian army will continue to receive new soldiers, but the methods of attracting them will become increasingly crude. The budget crisis will force the authorities to abandon generous payments in favor of administrative and physical violence. Regional authorities will fulfill quotas using all available levers of pressure — from threats of dismissal to outright abduction.

There may not be a formal second mobilization. But de facto it is already happening — just under different names. And if the situation at the front worsens, the Kremlin will be able to quickly transition from "hidden mobilization" to open mobilization, relying on already established mechanisms.

Russia will find people for war in 2026. The question is not whether it will find them — but at what cost. And what will happen when these people return home.