Why France's Call for European Sovereignty Remains Unconvincing Without Higher Defense Spending

Germany plans to spend more than 500 billion euros on defense between 2025 and 2029. France, the country that most loudly demands "European sovereignty," ranks third in the EU in terms of debt – directly behind Greece and Italy – and is struggling with bitter budget battles. This discrepancy is not a statistical coincidence. It reveals a fundamental problem in European defense policy: Those who make grand statements about strategic autonomy must also write large checks. France is not doing the latter.

Wadephul's Criticism Hits a Nerve

Johann Wadephul, Germany's Foreign Minister, made it clear on February 16, 2026, in Deutschlandfunk: "Those who talk about [European sovereignty] must also act accordingly in their own country." The statement was directed straight at Emmanuel Macron, who has cultivated the rhetoric of European defense autonomy for years without Paris mobilizing the financial resources to make this vision a reality.

Wadephul's criticism did not come out of nowhere. NATO member states had committed in June 2025 to increase their defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. "Unfortunately, the efforts in the French Republic have not been sufficient to achieve this so far," said Wadephul. "France must also do what we are doing here in difficult discussions."

The Structural Asymmetry in the German-French Partnership

Germany has exempted the majority of its defense spending from its constitutional "debt brake" in 2025. More than half a trillion euros between 2025 and 2029 – this is not just a political signal, but a turning point in industrial policy. France, on the other hand, is trapped in the shackles of its state finances. With a debt level surpassed only by Greece and Italy, Paris simply lacks the fiscal space for a comparable mobilization.

Macron's response? A call for joint EU bonds – so-called Eurobonds – to finance European defense. Germany has repeatedly rejected this proposal. Wadephul reaffirmed this position: NATO members had agreed to achieve the 5% target "through their own efforts." The subtext is clear: Joint debt is not a solution when the cause of the problem is not shared poverty, but differing priorities.

Eurobonds as a Symptom, Not a Cure

The Eurobonds debate is a distraction. It suggests that Europe's defense problem is a liquidity problem – as if more joint debt would automatically lead to more collective security. But the opposite is true. Eurobonds would subsidize the structural inefficiencies of European defense systems without creating incentives for reform.

Germany rightly fears that joint EU debt would lead to "open subsidies for member states with weak finances." This is not a German "greed is good" mentality, but a sober assessment of political economy: Those who are liable for the debts of others lose the leverage to demand spending discipline. France would then continue to talk more about sovereignty than to spend for sovereignty – only on Germany's credit.

The Nuclear Weapons Discussion as Symbolic Politics

In parallel to the debate on defense spending, Merz and Macron have initiated initial talks about a possible German involvement in France's nuclear umbrella. Thomas Röwekamp, CDU chairman of the Defense Committee in the Bundestag, called for a "European complement within NATO" to the American nuclear arsenal in the Augsburger Allgemeine.

That sounds like strategic thinking. But it is primarily symbolic politics. As Armin Laschet, a senior CDU politician, noted: Macron will not grant the German Chancellor a say in the use of French nuclear weapons. France's nuclear Force de frappe is the last bastion of national sovereignty – and Paris will not share it, especially not with a country that is not even willing to bear the financial burdens of conventional rearmament in solidarity.

Wadephul himself expressed skepticism: "There are enough nuclear weapons in the world." And Lars Klingbeil, Germany's Vice Chancellor, made it clear: Berlin continues to rely on NATO's nuclear deterrence and has no plans to acquire its own nuclear weapons. Thus, the nuclear weapons discussion distracts from the real task: building the conventional military capabilities that Europe truly needs.

Why Higher Spending Does Not Automatically Mean More Capabilities

Even if France were to increase its defense spending, it would not guarantee that Europe would actually become more defensible. Higher spending is a necessary but not sufficient condition. What Europe lacks is not just money, but also the institutional architecture to efficiently translate that money into capabilities.

The European Defense Agency (EDA) has a budget of just 343 million euros – less than 0.4% of what Germany alone spent on defense in 2025. As long as European defense cooperation is organized on a voluntary basis and with minimal common institutions, every euro will be spent multiple times – for national champions, for competing weapon systems, for redundant command structures.

France could lead by example by not only mobilizing more money but also being willing to cede more national sovereignty to common European structures. But that is exactly what Macron is not doing. Instead, he calls for European solidarity in financing – while retaining control over strategic decisions nationally.

The Dilemma of the German-French Axis

The tensions between Berlin and Paris are symptomatic of a larger problem: The German-French axis, traditionally the engine of European integration, has come to a standstill. Not only in defense spending but also in the planned next-generation European fighter jet (FCAS) and the EU trade agreement with South American countries, there is disagreement.

At the Munich Security Conference last week, Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned of the threat from Russia and attempted to draw the U.S. back into firm mutual security commitments. "In the era of great power rivalry, even the United States will not be powerful enough to go it alone," he said. "Dear friends, being part of NATO is not just Europe's competitive advantage. It is also the competitive advantage of the United States."

But while Merz wants to repair transatlantic trust, Macron preaches European autonomy – without the financial means to realize it. This incoherence weakens Europe. It signals to Washington that Europe has no common strategy, and it signals to Moscow that Europe is not willing to pay the price for its own security.

The Conclusion: Rhetoric Without Reality

European sovereignty is not a question of rhetoric, but of resources. France cannot simultaneously rank third on the EU debt list and claim leadership in European defense. Germany cannot simultaneously spend 500 billion euros on defense and be accused by France of not doing enough for European autonomy.

The truth is uncomfortable: Europe must spend more – and each member state must do so individually, not through joint debt that creates the illusion of collective security but cements structural problems. Wadephul's criticism of France is not German finger-pointing. It is a long-overdue reality check. Those who want European sovereignty must be willing to pay for it. And that means out of their own pockets.