Why the Transfer of Two NATO Commands to Europe Does Not Strengthen Transatlantic Security

On February 9, 2026, the Pentagon announced that the United States would transfer two of the most important NATO commands – the Allied Joint Force Command Naples in Italy and the Joint Force Command Norfolk in Virginia – to European officers. The announcement came just before the Munich Security Conference and is presented as a response to President Donald Trump's repeated demands that Europe must take more responsibility for its own defense.

At first glance, this seems to be a historic step. For decades, these two strategic commands have been led by U.S. generals. Naples is responsible for security in the southern Mediterranean and the Balkans, while Norfolk coordinates transatlantic sea connections and the protection of maritime lifelines between North America and Europe. The transfer to European officers could be interpreted as a sign of genuine burden-sharing.

The Illusion of Burden-Sharing

However, a closer look reveals that this is primarily symbolic politics. The transfer of command positions does not mean the transfer of military capability. A European general in Naples or Norfolk has the same resources as his American predecessor – namely, predominantly American ones. The 6th U.S. Fleet in the Mediterranean, anti-submarine capabilities in the Atlantic, reconnaissance and surveillance systems – all of this remains under American control and funding.

According to NATO, the Joint Force Command Naples has a multinational headquarters with officers from 20 NATO countries. However, the critical capabilities – strategic airlift, satellite reconnaissance, precision-guided munitions – are still provided by the U.S. at over 70 percent. A British or German four-star general cannot close this gap through leadership strength alone.

Europe's Structural Dilemma

The real problem runs deeper and cannot be solved by cosmetic reshuffles: Europe has failed to build the military capabilities necessary for a credible defense of the continent over the past three decades. EU member states are expected to spend around 340 billion euros on defense in 2026 – more than three times Russia's military budget. Nevertheless, they are unable to conduct a larger conventional conflict without American support.

Why? Because higher spending does not automatically mean better capabilities. European armed forces suffer from fragmentation, duplication, and lack of interoperability. Germany, France, Italy, and Poland each operate their own main battle tank programs, their own reconnaissance systems, their own munitions production. According to a study by the European Defence Agency, the efficiency of this spending is at best 60 percent compared to the U.S.

What Trump Really Demands

Trump is not just calling for symbolic gestures, but for structural changes. The U.S. wants to withdraw from the role of European security guarantor – not completely, but gradually. The transfer of command positions is the first step. The next could be a reduction of the U.S. troop presence in Europe, followed by a renegotiation of nuclear deterrence.

The U.S. ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, made it clear on February 9: “We expect our European allies to become stronger and share the burden of European security with the United States – and ultimately take over the conventional defense of the European continent.”

“Ultimately take over” – that is the crucial phrasing. The U.S. is planning its withdrawal, and Europe is not ready.

The Dangerous Gap

The greatest risk of this development lies in the transition phase. As long as Europe does not have the necessary capabilities, a dangerous gap will emerge between American withdrawal and European readiness. Russia is closely monitoring this development. Moscow has been testing NATO's responsiveness for years through cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and airspace violations.

A European commander in Naples or Norfolk may have the political legitimacy to make decisions. But does he also have the means? Can he deploy three battle groups to the Baltics within 48 hours? Can he protect sea routes in the Atlantic against submarine threats? Can he maintain air surveillance over the Black Sea?

The answer in all cases is: only with American support.

What Needs to Happen Now

Europe faces a choice. It can either accept the new reality and invest massively in the missing capabilities – strategic airlift, missile defense, munitions production, satellite-based reconnaissance – or it can accept a gradual marginalization of its security interests.

The transfer of command positions can be a first step – but only if it is accompanied by substantial investments and institutional reforms. This means: joint European procurement, standardization of equipment, expansion of the European defense industry, and – above all – the political willingness to use military power as well.

The Paradox of European Defense

In the end, this episode reveals the central paradox of European security policy: Europe wants strategic autonomy, but without the associated costs and risks. It wants to be less dependent on the U.S., but does not want to make the political and financial sacrifices that true independence requires.

The transfer of two NATO commands to Europe is therefore not a strengthening of transatlantic security, but a renegotiation of it – under unfavorable conditions for Europe. As long as the continent is not ready to close the gap between aspiration and reality, this gesture remains what it is: an expensive placeholder for a capability that Europe does not yet possess.