Zhang Shengmin Uses Jiang Zemin's Centenary to Discuss Party Command of the Gun: A Political Signal for the PLA's 2027 Centenary

On August 18, the People's Daily published an article by Zhang Shengmin, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, ostensibly commemorating the centenary of Jiang Zemin's birth, but focusing on the issue of loyalty within the military. The article references the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the Gulf War to argue that "the Party's absolute leadership over the military" is the foundation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), explicitly criticizing three trends: "depoliticization," "non-partisanship," and "nationalization"—in the context of the PLA, these three terms are almost synonymous with "militarization of the state."

Who is Speaking, and What is Being Said

Zhang Shengmin is not an ordinary general. At 67 years old, he currently serves as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and has previously held the position of Secretary of the Military Commission's Discipline Inspection Commission, making him the highest authority in the PLA's anti-corruption system. A person responsible for discipline and investigating corruption personally discussing "loyalty" and "military building principles" is noteworthy in itself.

The core logic of the article is not new: it attributes the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the Communist Party's loss of leadership over the military and considers the 1991 Gulf War as the starting point for the PLA to confront high-tech warfare. These two events indeed serve as coordinates for military policy during Jiang Zemin's era—the former prompted a renewed emphasis on "the Party commands the gun," while the latter marked the PLA's first encounter with the generational gap of precision-guided weapons. The military's cessation of business operations in 1998, subsequent large-scale troop reductions, and the push for technological advancement can all be traced back to these origins.

Why Now

The timing is the most interesting aspect. On August 17, Beijing held a commemorative conference for Jiang Zemin's centenary, during which Xi Jinping delivered a 40-minute speech; and with less than a year and a half remaining until the PLA's centenary in 2027, Zhang Shengmin's choice to revisit 1991 is tantamount to saying: the external shocks of that year propelled the PLA's transformation, and today, facing new external pressures, loyalty and reform must continue to be intertwined.

Another background detail that cannot be overlooked is that Zhang Shengmin has long been in charge of military discipline inspection, and multiple units, including the Rocket Force, have undergone extensive purges in recent years. The parallel of anti-corruption and political military building has been a main theme within the PLA over the past decade.

An Easily Overlooked Detail

Zhang Shengmin himself comes from a political work background, having served in the Political Department of the Second Artillery Corps (now the Rocket Force). Having a political cadre discuss "modernization" precisely exposes a long-standing structural tension within the PLA: which takes precedence, political loyalty or technical capability? Loyalty education can be mobilized and spread quickly, but the goal for the PLA's centenary in 2027 is stated as "mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization"—this relies on equipment, production capacity, and systems engineering, not merely on meetings.

In simple terms, Zhang Shengmin's article answers the question of "who does the military listen to," while the outside world truly wants to know, "can the military fight?"

So What Does This Mean

For observers, the signal of this People's Daily article lies not in the content itself, but in who issued it and when. It reaffirms that the PLA's modernization always has a political red line: any technological transformation must submit to "the Party's absolute leadership over the military." This is both a means of stabilizing military morale and a signal released to the outside world—before the sensitive milestone of 2027 arrives, Beijing's primary concern is to ensure that the military does not falter, and only then to make the military stronger.

What is truly worth questioning is another matter: when Zhang Shengmin commemorates the 1991 Gulf War as the starting point for the PLA's modernization, he deliberately overlooks an earlier, more painful lesson from that history. Over thirty years ago, the PLA learned from the Gulf War about the technological gap; but today, what will determine the outcome of the next "Gulf War" is ultimately the strength of loyalty education, or the engines, chips, and advanced composite materials that are still in development?