400 thousand dead — Rosstat data leak changes the assessment of the personnel cost of war for Russia

Almost 392,700 death certificates that directly mention "military operation," shelling, or drones — this is not another figure from a Ukrainian briefing. This is a mass of Russian registration data relating to the period from February 24, 2022, to the end of August 2026 (Bloomberg, published November 9, 2026). Even if approached with the necessary caution, it shows the main point: the Russian system for replenishing losses has long been functioning not as a temporary mobilization measure, but as a permanent mechanism of demographic extraction.

What the documents say

The materials were obtained from the Cyber Partisans group and the Ukrainian operation Silent Crow after hacking Rosstat's infrastructure. The Russian agency acknowledged the fact of a targeted cyberattack but denies any compromise of databases. Therefore, this is not a verified state report, but a significant leak, the completeness of which has yet to be proven. However, the very structure of the dataset makes it substantial: it concerns more than 11 million certificates, and military deaths were coded both in formal fields and in free text.

The figure of around 400 thousand dead cannot be mechanically added to the Ukrainian estimate of 1,609,380 Russian losses. The Ukrainian General Staff considers total irrecoverable and sanitary losses, while Rosstat primarily records registered deaths. But the Rosstat figure is likely a lower boundary. It does not fully account for missing persons, unidentified bodies, those who died later from wounds, and fighters from occupied territories. Bloomberg cites an independent estimate from Silent Crow of about 450 thousand dead, while Mediazona and BBC Russian confirmed 285,881 deaths by name by November.

Personnel arithmetic instead of military doctrine

For the Russian army, the important issue is not the dispute over the exact number, but the ratio of losses to recruitment. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, on November 8 alone, Russian forces lost about 2,980 servicemen, 1,843 tactical drones, and 68 artillery systems. The General Staff's summary also indicates 140 combat engagements, 250 dropped guided bombs, and 8,690 kamikaze drone strikes. These figures do not prove every detail of frontline statistics, but they show the scale of daily personnel and equipment expenditure.

In October, according to data cited by Bloomberg referencing Ukrainian and Western intelligence agencies, Russian losses reached a record 54 thousand killed and seriously wounded. At the same time, territorial results remain limited. Thus, an unpleasant formula for Moscow arises: the army can maintain the intensity of fire but does not convert personnel expenditure into quick operational results. Military doctrine in such a mode turns into accounting — how many more months can an offensive be bought with signed payments.

Who exactly the war consumes

The Rosstat data is also important because it destroys the myth of a uniform cost of war. In the first half of 2022, only 146 deaths related to the war were registered among men aged 50–59. In the first half of 2025, for the same age group, the figure exceeded 12,600, meaning the war began to take a toll not only on young volunteers. For men aged 18–29, military causes accounted for about two-thirds of deaths during the period in question.

The burden is distributed extremely unevenly. In Buryatia, Tuva, and the Transbaikal region, about a third of men aged 18–49 who died from the beginning of the invasion until mid-2024 had military connections in their documents. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, the share was about ten times lower. This is a classic model of imperial war: the center maintains the appearance of normalcy, while the periphery supplies people and bears the burden of cemeteries. I remember the Soviet habit of describing such differences with the word "uniformly." Statistics, as usual, are less polite.

Why the Kremlin is currently avoiding new mobilization

The Russian authorities are trying to hold the front between two political risks. Open mobilization immediately translates the war from a television category into a personal experience for millions of families. Continuing contract recruitment is politically cheaper but requires increasingly higher bonuses and expanded coercion. Bloomberg notes that payments are already beginning to be cut due to budgetary pressure, although the digital infrastructure for calling up reservists has been created, and the decree on partial mobilization from 2022 has not been formally canceled.

In this sense, the Rosstat leak is dangerous for the Kremlin not only because it exposes the scale of deaths. It shows that the current model is not a sustainable replacement for mobilization. If monthly losses consistently exceed recruitment, and the offensive does not yield significant gains, the choice will boil down to three options: reduce the intensity of operations, increase dependence on foreigners and prisoners, or move towards more direct coercion. All three options imply an acknowledgment of the failure of the initial calculation for a short war.

Forecast

The leak cannot be considered a final census of Russian dead until independent researchers obtain the complete dataset and reproduce the methodology. However, the coincidence with demographic estimates from Mediazona, BBC Russian, and probate data makes the figure of around 400 thousand quite plausible for strategic analysis. Russia is still capable of continuing the war: it has a population, a repressive apparatus, and an industry converted to military rails. However, the ability to continue does not equal the ability to continue at the previous cost.

In the coming months, Moscow will likely expand covert mobilization and remote strikes while simultaneously avoiding the word "mobilization." This may preserve the front but will not solve the personnel problem. The Russian army can survive even with high losses if the Kremlin is willing to pay with the periphery; the question is when the cost will become noticeable in the center. The Rosstat leak shows that this moment has not yet arrived — but it has become measurable.

Sources

• Bloomberg / Sydney Morning Herald, "Hacked records show 400,000 Russians killed in war on Ukraine," November 9, 2026.
• Mediazona and BBC Russian, named count of Russian military deaths.
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, loss summary for November 9, 2026.
• EMPR, daily combat summary referencing the General Staff of Ukraine, November 9, 2026.