629 drones and the shutdown of refineries — Russian air defense enters a war of attrition in 2026

Scale is more important than the official count

On the night of September 18, Russian authorities announced the interception of 629 Ukrainian drones over the southern part of the country. Even if we accept this figure without adjustments, it describes not an episode, but a new mode of warfare. During the same period, Ukrainian strikes put the Syzran and Saratov oil refineries out of normal operation, Reuters sources reported. The Russian Ministry of Defense, for its part, announced the destruction of Ukrainian P-19MA radar stations and the "Kupol" electronic warfare complex by "Geran" strikes (TASS, September 18). We are not witnessing a competition of individual weapon systems, but a clash of two production and management cycles.

The number 629 requires cautious interpretation. Russian statistics typically mix destroyed targets, suppressed by electronic warfare means, and drones that fell due to fuel exhaustion. This does not make the raid insignificant: for air defense, not only the accuracy of the report matters, but also the number of calculations, missiles, barrels, and hours of duty that the attack required. If a significant portion of the drones indeed reached the southern regions, then the Russian layered defense was forced to distribute attention between military facilities, ports, oil infrastructure, and cities.

“Geran” as an industrial tool

The Russian "Geran-2," a localized version of the Iranian Shahed-136, remains a weapon with a relatively simple design, a range of thousands of kilometers, and a warhead weighing several dozen kilograms. Its strength lies not in the accuracy of an individual drone, but in its cost, assembly rate, and the ability to launch in waves. The P-19MA and "Kupol" mentioned in the TASS report are important for this reason. A strike on a radar and electronic warfare complex does not necessarily mean the collapse of the entire Ukrainian defense, but it illustrates the logic of the Russian campaign — first to blind or overload the detection contour, then to expend cheap platforms to find weak points.

However, this logic is mirrored. Ukrainian long-range drones attack oil refining, forcing Russia to defend not only the front but also the economic artery of the war. The shutdown of two refineries does not equate to an immediate fuel shortage: Russia has reserves, redistribution of flows, and backup capacities. But each such strike increases logistics costs, creates queues for repairs, and forces air defense units to be withdrawn from sites where they protect troops. A war of attrition is measured not by a dramatic photograph of a fire, but by how many days the industrial system takes to return to its previous productivity.

The legacy of Soviet air defense and its limits

The Russian military school inherited from the USSR the idea of zonal, multi-level defense: long-range S-300 and S-400 systems, medium systems, small-caliber means, and electronic suppression. This architecture is reasonable against a limited number of aircraft and missiles, but mass cheap drones change the economics of interception. A missile that costs significantly more than the target may be tactically justified, but its expenditure cannot be endlessly replenished. Therefore, Moscow is simultaneously developing automatic guns, mobile groups, and electronic warfare. The problem is that each layer requires communication, trained operators, and a unified picture of the air situation — precisely those institutional resources that the war gradually wears down.

It is also telling that the Russian announcement of 629 downed targets appeared during the days of the State Duma elections, taking place from September 18 to 20. This does not prove the staged nature of the figure, but explains its political function. The Kremlin needs to show the domestic audience that the war does not transfer vulnerability to Russian territory and that the state controls the sky. At the same time, the demonstration of "Geran" strikes on Ukrainian radars should convince military partners and the domestic industry that the campaign maintains the initiative. In the Soviet tradition, a report on air defense has always also been a report on the state's capability.

What will change on the front

The Institute for the Study of War, in assessments for September 16-17, continues to note the adaptation of both sides to mutual strikes on the rear. This is more important than loud statements about a "turning point." The Russian side will likely increase combined raids, linking "Gerans" with missiles and electronic warfare means. Ukraine will choose nodes where one fire stops the supply chain: refineries, warehouses, substations, and railway junctions. In such a conflict, the advantage goes not to the one who breaks through the defense once, but to the one who replenishes carriers faster, repairs damage, and changes routes.

For Russia, this is an unpleasant choice. Strengthening the defense of refineries reduces the available density of air defense on the front; increasing strikes on Ukraine requires more engines, navigation modules, and operators; expanding production increases the burden on the budget and import chains. Sanctions have not stopped the Russian military-industrial complex, and to speak of an imminent collapse would be as lazy as repeating its official reports. But the system is becoming more expensive, less flexible, and increasingly dependent on quantitative pressure.

Cold conclusion

The night attack on September 18 shows neither the collapse of Russian air defense nor the triumph of "Geran." It indicates a transition to a war of industrial endurance, where hundreds of cheap devices test the limits of expensive defense, and strikes on refineries test the limits of rear resilience. Russia will retain the ability to defend key centers if it can accelerate repairs, expand interceptor production, and not sever the front-line air defense network. But with the current pace of mutual attacks, its defense will not weaken instantly, but will become more expensive and slower — this is how empires typically discover the cost of their own confidence.