A Major Shift in the Takagi Administration's Defense: The "New Japan" Shaped by the Lifting of Weapons Export Bans and a Review of Security Strategy

On April 21, 2026, the cabinet of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi revised the operational guidelines for the "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment," effectively lifting the ban on the export of weapons with lethal capabilities. The significance of overturning the principle of "prohibition on arms exports," which has been the cornerstone of Japan's post-war foreign and security policy, through an administrative decision is extremely profound. Just ten days later, on May 1, Prime Minister Takaichi announced the establishment of an expert meeting to review the new security strategy, aiming for a comprehensive revision of the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Program Guidelines, and the Medium-Term Defense Force Build-Up Plan by the end of the year. This series of moves indicates that Japan's defense policy is at a historic turning point.

The core of this relaxation of weapon export regulations lies in the abolition of the previous "five categories" of export purpose restrictions. Until now, Japan had only permitted the export of defense equipment for five purposes: rescue, transport, security, surveillance, and decontamination. With the collapse of this framework, the export of all equipment with lethal capabilities, such as fighter jets, ships, and missiles, has become possible. However, exports to countries engaged in conflict are generally prohibited, with exceptions allowed only under "special circumstances." The countries eligible for this are limited to 17 nations with which Japan has signed defense cooperation agreements, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, India, and Australia.

The backdrop to this policy shift is the reality that the security environment in East Asia is facing "the most severe and complex situation since the post-war period" (as expressed by Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi). Since the revision of the National Security Strategy in 2019, China has been positioned as Japan's greatest security concern, compounded by North Korea's nuclear and missile development and Russia's expanding military presence in the Far East. Particularly after 2024, the activities of the Chinese Navy around the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait have become notably more active, prompting Japan to accelerate its "Southern Shield" strategy centered on the southwestern islands. In March 2026, long-range missile units were deployed in Kumamoto Prefecture, and the operational deployment of the improved Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile began in earnest. The southwestern islands are a chain of islands located about 100 kilometers from Kyushu to Taiwan, positioned at the forefront of the U.S.-China strategic competition as a critical point in the first island chain.

The defense budget for fiscal year 2026 reached a record high of approximately 8.9 trillion yen (about 58 billion dollars), marking a 3.8 percent increase from the previous year. This is the 12th consecutive year of increase, and Japan is on track to achieve its goal of raising defense spending to 2 percent of GDP ahead of schedule by the end of fiscal year 2027. As part of a five-year, 43 trillion yen defense force build-up plan, efforts are underway to establish a coastal defense network called "Shield" (Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defence), introduce MQ-9B Sea Guardian unmanned surveillance drones, and enhance stand-off defense capabilities. Focusing on the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, in March 2026, the largest organizational restructuring since its establishment in 1954 was implemented. The escort fleet was reorganized from four escort squadrons to three, beginning the transition to a more efficient operational system.

The order for 11 Mogami-class frigates for the Royal Australian Navy from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries marked the beginning of Japan's defense industry making a full-scale entry into the global market. On April 18, 2026, a contract signing ceremony held in Melbourne was attended by the defense ministers of both countries, symbolizing a new phase in Japan-Australia defense cooperation. The next-generation fighter (GCAP) project, jointly developed with the UK and Italy, is also progressing smoothly, and there is growing interest from Southeast Asian countries in acquiring used submarines and frigates. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), five Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, rank among the top 100 defense companies in the world, but the majority of their sales still depend on domestic demand. Ian Mar, an analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence, points out that Japanese companies need to "shift from a government-led procurement model to a business model driven by companies," recommending a strategy focused on high-tech fields such as naval systems, advanced missiles, and sensors/electronics.

There are also numerous concerns. The biggest challenge is production capacity and securing personnel. Japan's defense industry has been slow to establish mass production systems and global supply chains due to its long-standing focus on domestic demand. Additionally, the principle of prohibiting exports to countries engaged in conflict makes it legally difficult to provide equipment to Ukraine. According to a report by Reuters, the Ukrainian ambassador to Japan has evaluated the relaxation of export regulations as "opening the way for military equipment provision from Japan to Ukraine," but under current regulations, direct exports are not permitted, necessitating a form of indirect provision through third countries. Domestically, former defense bureaucrat Koji Yanagisawa has pointed out "logical contradictions and a lack of realism," and criticism of the deviation from pacifism remains strong. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also expressed a critical stance, describing it as a "deviation from Japan's post-war principle of exclusively defensive defense."

At the first meeting of the expert group on May 1, Prime Minister Takaichi stated, "The international situation has completely changed. The relatively stable international order after the Cold War is a thing of the past," emphasizing the need to respond to new forms of warfare, including drones, and to prepare for long-term conflicts based on lessons learned from the invasion of Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East. The comprehensive revision of the National Security Strategy is expected to be completed in the second half of 2026, and its content will define Japan's defense posture for the next decade. As the Trump administration in the United States adopts a more transactional stance toward its allies, Japan is being compelled to redefine its alliance relationships, including the U.S. military presence in Japan, while simultaneously strengthening its self-defense capabilities. Japan's trajectory toward becoming a "normal country" in the strict sense is bringing about irreversible changes in the security structure of Northeast Asia as a whole.