Alliance of Sahel States: A New Security Architecture in Response to the Failure of Western Strategies

The operationalization of the Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in December 2025 marks a historic turning point in the geopolitical and military reconfiguration of West Africa. Composed of a contingent of 5,000 to 6,000 men, this joint force brings together the armies of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger under the command of Burkinabè General Daouda Traoré, with its headquarters established in Niamey. This initiative represents much more than mere military coordination: it embodies the emergence of a Sahelian bloc asserting its strategic autonomy in the face of two decades of international engagement largely perceived as unsuccessful.

The creation of this force occurs in a context of unprecedented security escalation. Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) document a significant increase in attacks by armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the region since August 2025. The Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, has consolidated its territorial control in northern and central Mali, while the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) maintains a strategic presence in northern Burkina Faso and western Niger. This deterioration occurs paradoxically after years of massive international intervention, notably the French Barkhane operation, which deployed up to 5,100 soldiers, and American assistance that has invested more than $3.3 billion over two decades according to the Security Assistance Monitor.

The operational architecture of the Unified Force of the AES is partially inspired by the model of the now-defunct Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, while seeking to avoid its pitfalls. The G5 Sahel, which also included Mauritania and Chad, never reached its full operational capacity due to insufficient funding, political divergences among members, and excessive dependence on external partners. The AES distinguishes itself by a seemingly more autonomous approach: the three member states severed their defense agreements with France between 2022 and 2023, withdrew their countries from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2024, and diversified their security partnerships towards Russia, notably through the presence of the Wagner Group, now known as Africa Corps.

This strategic reorientation nonetheless raises major questions about the operational viability of the Unified Force. The three national armies face considerable structural challenges: aging equipment, gaps in aerial intelligence, limited logistical capabilities to project force beyond main road axes, and troop morale affected by repeated attacks on fixed positions. The attack on the Mossipaga military camp in Niger, which allowed armed groups to seize significant military equipment, illustrates the persistent vulnerability of Sahelian forces against insurgents with superior tactical mobility and intimate knowledge of the terrain.

The political dimension of the AES cannot be dissociated from its military component. The three member states are led by military juntas resulting from coups: Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali (2020-2021), Captain Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso (2022), and General Abdourahamane Tiani in Niger (2023). This convergence of anti-democratic military regimes has led to international sanctions and increasing diplomatic isolation, particularly from ECOWAS and the European Union. The AES's counter-terrorism positioning thus fits into a broader strategy of internal and regional legitimization, where the promise of security serves to justify the maintenance of military regimes in power and to divert attention from worsening economic and humanitarian crises.

Regionally, the AES initiative has provoked a mirror response from ECOWAS, which announced in August 2025 an ambitious project for a regional counter-terrorism force of 260,000 men, supported by a proposed annual budget of $2.5 billion. A first phase of rapid deployment of 1,650 personnel is planned for 2026, with an initial mobilization of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026. This parallel race towards militarization reflects the absence of regional consensus on stabilization strategies and risks further fragmenting a Sahelian space already characterized by porous borders and the transnational movement of armed groups.

Extrarregional actors also maintain a significant presence that complicates the security equation. U.S. President Donald Trump announced in December 2025 a "powerful and deadly" strike against the Islamic State in northwestern Nigeria, promising "many more" to come as part of his counter-terrorism rhetoric. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) confirmed an airstrike against the Islamic State in Somalia on March 8, 2026, demonstrating the continuity of U.S. military engagement on the continent despite local political reconfigurations. Russia, through Africa Corps, is providing increasing support to Sahelian juntas, including military equipment, training, and information warfare support, in exchange for access to natural resources and geopolitical influence.

The potential effectiveness of the Unified Force of the AES will depend on critical factors rarely addressed in official discourse. First, the ability to overcome bureaucratic rivalries and divergent national interests among the three member states, particularly regarding resource allocation and operational priorities. Second, the establishment of command and control mechanisms that allow for effective coordination of cross-border operations, an area where the G5 Sahel failed despite substantial international support. Third, the development of shared intelligence capabilities and threat analysis, essential for anticipating the movements of armed groups rather than reacting after attacks.

Beyond purely military aspects, the fundamental question remains that of governance and the relationship with civilian populations. Two decades of security approaches centered on lethal force have demonstrated that an exclusively military strategy cannot eradicate insurgencies rooted in deep local grievances: economic marginalization, land injustices, lack of state services, and the perception of impunity for abuses committed by security forces. Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International document serious human rights violations by government forces in the three AES countries, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and population displacements, practices that fuel the cycle of resentment and facilitate recruitment by armed groups.

The Sahelian dynamic is also part of a broader transformation of power balances in Africa. The African Land Forces Summit 2026, taking place in Rome from March 22 to 24, brings together about 40 nations and over 300 senior military leaders to discuss continental security challenges, including the proliferation of asymmetric threats and the role of the private sector in supporting defense capabilities. The notable absence or limited participation of AES representatives at such traditional multilateral forums illustrates the growing polarization between two visions of African security architecture: an inclusive approach favoring established regional institutions, and a sovereignist approach favoring ad hoc alliances among regimes sharing similar political trajectories.

The medium-term prospects for the Unified Force of the AES remain uncertain. Historical experience with regional security initiatives in Africa suggests that sustainability depends less on the announced troop numbers than on the political coherence of member states, the durability of funding, and above all, the adoption of integrated strategies combining security, development, and inclusive governance. The main risk is that the Unified Force becomes an additional instrument of coercion in service of maintaining military juntas in power, thereby perpetuating the very dynamics that have facilitated the expansion of armed groups over the past decade. Conversely, if the initiative manages to establish effective operational coordination and anchor itself in a broader strategic vision that includes local reconciliation and the restoration of trust between the state and citizens, it could represent a new model of cooperative security adapted to Sahelian realities.