Australian media: UK's "Hybrid Navy" plan faces challenges

Reference News Network reported on August 5 The Australian Lowy Interpreter website published an article titled "Unmanned and Unproven: The Misguided Experience of the 'Hybrid Navy'" on July 24, authored by Jennifer Parker. The full text is translated as follows:

When the UK launched its defense investment plan on June 30, the government committed to an "iterative transformation" of the military, drawing on the experiences of the Ukrainian and Russian militaries in combat, and arming the UK to respond to current and future wars.

For the Royal Navy, this means building a hybrid fleet that allows frigates to operate in coordination with surface and underwater unmanned vessels, and integrating artificial intelligence to create a cohesive combat entity.

This commitment amounts to a blueprint for a "hybrid navy": reducing the number of manned surface combat vessels, placing greater reliance on large unmanned vessels, and incorporating them as part of a distributed force.

For navies in countries like Australia, this seems to be an attractive—potentially lower-cost—way to bridge the capability gap.

But appearances can be deceiving.

From Australia to the United States, naval leaders use the term "hybrid fleet" to describe their ambitions for the future. However, this misreads the most important lessons from Ukraine's use of unmanned maritime vehicles in combat.

The issue is not the use of unmanned systems, but the erroneous assumption that they can serve as a cheap and reliable substitute for manned warships when operating in harsh maritime conditions far from home.

Ukraine's maritime challenge is maritime denial. It employed remote-controlled boats, 5 to 8 meters long and filled with explosives, in conjunction with cruise missiles to deny Russia freedom of movement in the Black Sea, forcing most of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's vessels to remain in port.

In contrast, nearly 90% of the UK's freight trade relies on maritime transport, making its maritime challenges far broader than those faced by Ukraine. It needs to deny adversaries freedom of movement in areas such as the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and must be able to seize and maintain maritime superiority.

Maritime superiority requires sustained maritime power projection, which in turn requires endurance and persistence. Enthusiasm for unmanned vehicle operations may overlook the practical challenges of operating large unmanned vessels at sea, especially in a highly contested electromagnetic environment. These challenges have yet to be resolved through testing and validation.

Due to the harsh marine environment, maintaining vessels' maritime deployments requires constant maintenance. These vessels may need to be deployed for months without maintenance. Missiles at sea also require strict environmental controls and regular maintenance, which is difficult to achieve without personnel on board.

In addition to maintenance challenges and likely reduced operational readiness, defense is also a concern. If these vessels cannot defend themselves, they become prime targets. If designed to rely on ship-to-air missiles and anti-unmanned vehicle capabilities for self-defense, their costs will be significantly higher, and the systems will be more complex.

Ukraine has demonstrated the value of small, expendable systems in achieving maritime denial, but it has yet to prove that large unmanned warships can ensure sustained maritime superiority across the North Atlantic.

The starting point for fleet design should be strategic missions, not enthusiasm for a specific technology. The UK may weaken its existing fleet configuration, which has been validated by reality, in exchange for unproven future fleet concepts. The Royal Australian Navy and other smaller navies should proceed with caution and not blindly imitate. (Translation/Ge Xuelai)