Between Atlantic Solidarity and Strategic Autonomy: Europe's Dilemma in the American-Iranian Conflict

# Between Atlantic Solidarity and Strategic Autonomy: Europe's Dilemma in the American-Iranian Conflict

The crisis in the Persian Gulf poses an existential question for Europe: How much transatlantic solidarity does the continent owe to an ally whose military actions jeopardize European security interests, threaten energy supplies, and undermine years of diplomacy? As two American aircraft carrier groups position themselves off the Iranian coast, the strategic divide within Europe is revealed—and the fundamental question arises whether the European Union and NATO can even develop a coherent position on issues of war and peace.

## The Diplomatic Legacy: The Nuclear Deal as a European Project

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015 was, in many ways, a European project. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom invested years of intensive diplomacy in negotiations that ultimately brought Iran, the USA, Russia, China, and the EU to the table. The agreement embodied the European approach to conflict resolution: multilateral, verifiable, based on incremental compromises.

America's unilateral withdrawal in 2018 under the first Trump administration was not only a political defeat but a humiliation. Europe had invested its limited foreign policy capital to achieve a deal that Washington then discredited—and European companies were forced to withdraw from the Iranian market due to the reintroduction of US sanctions, despite the formal validity of the JCPOA according to European understanding.

The creation of INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) in 2019—a mechanism to enable legitimate trade with Iran despite US sanctions—was a rare attempt at European strategic autonomy. However, INSTEX ultimately failed in the face of the reality of American financial hegemony: no European bank was willing to risk being excluded from the US dollar system.

Now, in February 2026, Europe faces the prospect that eight years of diplomatic investments could be destroyed by bombs. And while European capitals preach restraint, they lack both the military power and political cohesion to actually influence American actions.

## Energy Security: The Vulnerable Achilles' Heel

Europe's opposition to military action is not only principled—it is deeply material. The Strait of Hormuz, through which 21% of global oil supplies flow, is the maritime lifeline of the world economy. A disruption of this transit would obliterate Europe's fragile economic recovery following the energy crises of 2022-2024.

Germany, despite significant progress in renewable energy, continues to import 40% of its crude oil from the Middle East. France, heavily reliant on nuclear energy, is less exposed—but Spanish and Italian refineries process significant amounts of Gulf oil. An oil price of $150 per barrel, as would be plausible following a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, would trigger a continent-wide recession and plunge the already fragile public finances of several member states into crisis.

Even more concerning is the possibility of retaliatory attacks on Gulf oil infrastructure. The attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq facilities in September 2019 temporarily interrupted 5% of global oil production. A conflict that multiplies such attacks could disrupt supply chains for months.

The irony is bitter: Europe has desperately tried to free itself from dependence on Russian energy since 2022, only to potentially find itself drawn into a Gulf crisis that could cause an even more severe supply disruption.

## NATO and Alliance Solidarity: The Limits of Article 5

The North Atlantic Alliance faces a legitimacy crisis. Article 5 of the NATO treaty commits members to collective defense in the event of an attack. But what happens when a member initiates a conflict that then provokes retaliatory attacks on other members?

American military bases in Germany (Ramstein, Spangdahlem), Italy (Aviano, Sigonella), and the UK (Lakenheath, Fairford) could play logistical roles in air operations against Iran—tanker aircraft, reconnaissance, transit rights. Turkey, although President Erdoğan verbally rejects military actions, could grant (or deny) overflight rights.

If Iran conducts cyberattacks on European critical infrastructure or activates proxy groups in response to American attacks, would this trigger a NATO mutual defense case? The answer is legally unclear and politically explosive.

Germany and France have already signaled that they would reject any NATO involvement in offensive operations against Iran. The Chancellor (in this hypothetical 2026 scenario, as elections took place in 2025) has made it clear through private diplomatic channels that German air force bases cannot be used for operations against Iran. France has taken similar positions regarding its Mediterranean fleet.

This stance poses a fundamental challenge for NATO. If European members actively obstruct American military operations, what significance does the alliance retain? Conversely, if Europe is forced to support operations it deems strategically counterproductive, its remaining foreign policy credibility will be undermined.

## The British Special Role: Between Two Loyalties

The United Kingdom finds itself in a particularly delicate position. The "Special Relationship" with the USA has become even more important during the Brexit years, as the UK has sought to define its global influence outside the EU. However, Brexit has also made the UK more vulnerable to American demands—London can no longer count on EU backing when it wants to reject Washington.

RAF bases like Fairford were central to US operations during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. B-2 stealth bombers, which could be used for strikes on deeply buried Iranian bunkers, could operate from Fairford (although Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean is more likely). Britain's signals intelligence capabilities (GCHQ) are deeply integrated with the NSA.

However, Prime Minister Starmer's Labour government is under significant domestic pressure to stay away from another Middle Eastern war. The wounds of the Iraq War are still present in British politics—Labour lost credibility for a generation due to Tony Blair's decision to participate in 2003.

London's most likely approach: rhetorical support for American security concerns, simultaneous refusal to directly involve British forces in combat operations, and intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent escalation. This would satisfy Washington (no open opposition), minimize domestic criticism (no combat involvement), but ultimately limit British influence over American decisions.

## The Franco-German Axis: Rhetorical Unity, Strategic Divergence

Berlin and Paris publicly present unity in opposition to military action. However, beneath this facade, significant strategic divergences exist.

Germany, traumatized by its history and constitutionally committed to restraint, sees diplomacy and multilateral institutions as the only legitimate tools of foreign policy. The Bundeswehr, despite recent modernization efforts, is designed for defense, not expeditionary operations. Germany's economy, deeply embedded in global supply chains, is particularly vulnerable to the economic shocks that a Gulf war would trigger.

France, with a more interventionist tradition and a permanent military presence in the Middle East (Djibouti base, Levant operations), is more pragmatic. Paris acknowledges that sometimes violence may be necessary—it has intervened militarily in Mali, Syria, and elsewhere. However, France also has no illusions about the effectiveness of American military actions and fears being drawn into a conflict it cannot control.

The divergence is evident in arms exports: France has historically sold weapons to Gulf states (Rafale jets to Qatar and the UAE), while Germany maintains stricter export controls. In a crisis, France might be willing to provide military support to Gulf partners (air defense, reconnaissance), while Germany would avoid any proximity to combat operations.

## Eastern European Perspectives: Transatlantic Loyalty over Regional Skepticism

The positions of Poland, the Baltic states, and other Eastern European NATO members regarding the Iran conflict are primarily shaped by their existential security concerns regarding Russia. These states view American military presence in Europe as a lifeline against Russian aggression. Anything that weakens this presence or questions American engagement is seen as threatening.

Therefore, Warsaw, Vilnius, and Tallinn are inclined to support Washington on Middle Eastern issues—not because they have strong views on Iran, but because maintaining the transatlantic link is a higher priority. If America asks Poland to provide political cover or modest logistical support, Warsaw is likely to agree.

This East-West divide within Europe underscores the impossibility of a coherent EU foreign policy on existential issues. Germany's and France's interest in de-escalation collides with Poland's interest in American alliance fidelity. Italy's economic vulnerability confronts Baltic strategic imperatives. These divergences are irreconcilable—they reflect fundamentally different geopolitical positions and historical experiences.

## Conclusion: Europe's Structural Powerlessness and the Search for Relevance

In February 2026, Europe discovers once again a painful truth: it can neither project military power in its neighborhood nor effectively contain it. The combination of fragmented decision-making, limited military capabilities, economic vulnerability, and transatlantic dependence means that European positions—no matter how morally or strategically justifiable—ultimately have marginal effects on American decisions.

What Europe can do: engage in intensive diplomacy for de-escalation, keep discreet channels open to Iran, develop reconstruction plans for the post-conflict period, and prepare to mitigate the economic and humanitarian consequences when violence erupts.

What Europe cannot do: prevent American military actions, guarantee the security of Gulf states, or keep the Strait of Hormuz open if Iran wants to close it.

The deeper lesson goes beyond the immediate crisis. Europe's rhetoric of strategic autonomy will sound hollow as long as the continent can neither achieve energy independence, military capability, nor political cohesion. The Iran conflict brutally exposes these gaps.

Whether serious reforms will ultimately arise from this humiliation—genuine common foreign policy, integrated armed forces, coordinated energy and industrial policy—remains to be seen. Historically, Europe's progress toward integration has always been driven by crises. Perhaps the realization of how powerless the continent is when Washington decides to go to war will generate the necessary political dynamics for profound change.

Or Europe will, as so often, endure this crisis, draw rhetorical lessons, and then return to fragmented normalcy—ready to repeat the same mistakes when the next crisis arises.