Burkina Faso at the Heart of the Storm: When the Sahel Crisis Reaches Its Peak

While international attention traditionally focuses on Mali, it is in Burkina Faso that the most acute security crisis in the Sahel is currently unfolding. According to the latest Global Terrorism Index published in March 2025, Burkina Faso is now the country most affected by terrorism in the world, with a quarter of all global extremist attacks recorded on its territory in 2024. This brutal reality remains largely obscured by an increasingly locked information environment under the presidency of Ibrahim Traoré.

The period from February 7 to 20, 2026, strikingly illustrated the intensification of violence affecting the region. On February 9, the Malian army neutralized 35 jihadists during surveillance and strike operations conducted in the Ségou region. This large-scale operation reflects the growing pressure exerted by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Sahel, which is multiplying actions on several fronts simultaneously. The JNIM notably claimed responsibility for taking control of a military base belonging to the Dozo militia in Kendié in the Mopti region on February 6, and asserted that it had killed at least 50 Burkinabé soldiers during the attack on Tandjari, north of Fada Ngourma, in eastern Burkina Faso.

What stands out in the recent evolution of the Sahelian conflict is the increasing fragmentation of the jihadist landscape. On February 11, a major event disrupted regional balances: Saa'd, the JNIM commander in charge of an area in eastern Burkina Faso, defected to join the Islamic State in the Sahel province, taking with him a significant number of fighters. This defector highlights the internal tensions undermining the jihadist front, but it also considerably complicates the task of security forces, which must now face an increasingly multifaceted threat. On February 13, clashes between the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the JNIM in the localities of Djika and Bilehout, in northwestern Burkina Faso, resulted in 18 deaths among JNIM fighters, attesting to the violence of these internal rivalries.

The situation in Burkina Faso is all the more concerning as it unfolds in a context of increasing informational opacity. Since coming to power through a coup in 2022, Ibrahim Traoré has systematically eliminated dissenting voices and control mechanisms. In April 2023, a decree granted him broad powers to requisition individuals and suspend civil liberties. Since then, several critical journalists and activists have disappeared, reappearing only in clips on social media, dressed in military uniforms. At the end of January 2026, the regime announced the ban on all political parties, arguing that they "fostered division." This repression is accompanied by sophisticated digital propaganda, including AI-generated music videos featuring celebrities like Beyoncé, Justin Bieber, and R. Kelly praising Traoré.

Official statistics suggest that extremists now operate with relative freedom over nearly 80% of Burkinabé territory, although Ouagadougou disputes this figure. What is undeniable is the spectacular increase in violence: since Traoré came to power, extremists are reported to have killed 87% more civilians than in the previous three years, while government forces are said to have killed up to 132% more civilians according to several reports. The nine deadliest attacks in the world in 2024 occurred in Burkina Faso, a grim record that underscores the scale of the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe.

However, the threat is no longer limited to central Sahel. The JNIM is gradually extending its grip towards coastal countries, directly threatening Benin, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire. Aware of this danger, Burkina Faso and Ghana recently decided to strengthen intelligence sharing and security coordination to counter the regional terrorist threat. This cross-border cooperation, although belated, is an essential response to a threat that knows no borders. JNIM attacks in the border region between Burkina Faso and Ghana, particularly near Issakateng-Bausi, have caused massive population displacements since December 2022.

In Mali, the situation remains just as volatile. Beyond the 35 jihadists neutralized on February 9, the Malian army, the African Corps, and ASM militias have conducted demining operations between Ménaka and Ansongo, during which several improvised explosive devices detonated. On February 13, a suicide bomber belonging to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara targeted Malian forces in a car bomb attack between Ménaka and Ansongo. The JNIM, for its part, continues to target Malian army patrols with explosive devices, notably between Koury and Koutiala in the Sikasso region, and between Markala and Macina in the Ségou region.

Niger is not spared from this wave of violence. On February 9, terrorists from the Islamic State attacked the Nigerien customs office in the town of Kouré, less than 50 kilometers southeast of Niamey, killing two customs officers and leaving two others missing. On February 13, at least eight people were instantly killed and others injured when their mixed transport vehicle exploded on an improvised explosive device in the Diffa region. On the same day, militants from the Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice attacked the Dibella oil site, killing 24 soldiers from the FDS.

This escalation of violence occurs within a complex regional geopolitical context. Nigerien General Amadou Ibro stated on February 11: "We will go to war against France," reflecting the growing tensions between the military regimes of the Sahel and their former Western partners. Meanwhile, operations by the Russian Corps for Africa have resumed in the Boni region of Mali following the failure of the agreement between the population and the JNIM, with three JNIM militants already reported killed on February 18.

The Sahelian crisis has now reached a critical point. The inability to accurately track the evolution of the security situation in Burkina Faso, a country now at the heart of the turmoil, severely compromises the ability of international actors to anticipate threats, direct resources, and respond effectively to a crisis that already far exceeds national borders. Without a lifting of the informational veil and a substantial strengthening of regional cooperation, the Sahel risks descending into a spiral of violence whose repercussions will be felt well beyond the region.