Central Military Commission Power Restructuring: The Dilemma of Military Modernization Behind Zhang Youxia's Downfall

On January 24, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced a "serious disciplinary and legal" investigation into Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, Director of the Joint Staff Department. This shocking news marks a new peak in the most intense power restructuring within the PLA since 2023. It is not merely a simple anti-corruption action but a deep-seated crisis concerning the modernization process of the PLA, the stability of its command system, and the quality of military decision-making.

The downfall of Zhang Youxia carries multiple historical significances. As the First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the 75-year-old Zhang Youxia is the second most important figure in the PLA after Xi Jinping, with his status being compared by several media outlets to the highest-ranking military leader to fall since the Lin Biao incident in 1971. More uniquely, Zhang Youxia is a "red second generation" family friend of Xi Jinping; his father, Zhang Zongxun, was one of the founding generals of the PLA. This special relationship allowed Zhang Youxia to rise rapidly after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, and he became the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the age of 72 in 2017, which is extremely rare in the CCP leadership.

According to an editorial in the PLA Daily on January 26, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were accused of "five serious" political issues: severely betraying the trust and expectations of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, severely trampling and undermining the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission, severely fostering political issues and corruption that threaten the Party's absolute leadership over the military and endanger the Party's ruling foundation, severely damaging the image and authority of the Central Military Commission, and severely impacting the political ideological foundation of unity and progress among all military officers and soldiers. The severity of this wording exceeds that of previous fallen generals such as He Weidong and Miao Hua, indicating that this case is not merely a corruption issue but involves "forming cliques for personal gain" and political betrayal challenging the leadership of the Chairman of the Military Commission.

From a timeline perspective, the rift between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia can be traced back to after the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022. In early 2023, a corruption case involving the Rocket Force's equipment procurement broke out, leading to the downfall of several senior generals associated with Zhang Youxia, including then-Defense Minister Li Shangfu. Li Shangfu had served as Zhang Youxia's deputy in the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission from 2013 to 2017, and the two had a close relationship. In retaliation, Zhang Youxia's faction began targeting Xi Jinping's "Fujian clique"—the military connections Xi cultivated during his work in Fujian from 1985 to 2002. In November 2024, Central Military Commission member Miao Hua was arrested; in March 2025, Vice Chairman He Weidong fell from power. Both had long served in the former 31st Group Army stationed in Fujian and had close ties to Xi Jinping. By October 2025, both Miao Hua and He Weidong had been expelled from the Party and the military.

The uniqueness of the Zhang Youxia case lies in the speed of its handling. His last public appearance was on January 12 at the fifth plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. He was absent from scheduled activities at the National Defense University and the Central Party School on January 20-21, and the investigation was announced on January 24—only 12 days from his disappearance to the public announcement, much faster than previous cases. This urgency indicates the severity of the situation and the concern within Xi Jinping's camp about leaving a time window for opponents to counterattack.

The downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli leaves only two members in the Central Military Commission, the highest decision-making body of the PLA: Chairman Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin. Notably, Zhang Shengmin is a political commissar lacking combat command experience, having spent his entire military career in political departments and the discipline inspection system. With five out of seven members of the Military Commission purged, the stability of the PLA's command chain and the quality of decision-making are under serious scrutiny.

Several analysts point out that this power struggle will have far-reaching implications for the modernization of the PLA. First, there is a significant loss of experienced senior generals. Zhang Youxia participated in the 1979 self-defense counterattack against Vietnam and the 1984 Battle of Laoshan, making him one of the few generals in the PLA with combat experience; He Weidong, Liu Zhenli, and others also rose through the ranks as professional officers. Their departure means a gap in combat experience and professional competence at the senior levels of the PLA.

Second, the "loyalty over ability" doctrine has replaced "ability over loyalty" as the dominant standard for officer promotion. According to multiple foreign media reports, a Chinese recruitment video released by the CIA in February capitalized on dissatisfaction within the PLA regarding the promotion system, featuring a fictional Chinese officer complaining that "promotions depend on connections rather than ability." While this is a propaganda effort by a U.S. intelligence agency, it reflects existing contradictions within the PLA.

Third, the ongoing anti-corruption campaign may affect military readiness. Since 2023, 13 senior generals have been purged or investigated, involving core departments such as the Rocket Force, the Equipment Development Department, and theater command headquarters. Frequent personnel changes and investigations inevitably distract the military from normal training and modernization processes.

From an international perspective, U.S. intelligence agencies quickly seized this opportunity. In February, the CIA released a recruitment video targeting PLA officers, disseminated through the dark web and Tor network, attempting to exploit the instability within the military. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian strongly condemned this, stating that they would "take all necessary measures to thwart foreign infiltration and sabotage activities." This indicates that the internal purges within the military are not only a domestic political issue but have also become a battleground in the Sino-U.S. strategic competition.

It is noteworthy to consider the potential impact of this purge on the Taiwan Strait situation. The Washington Times reported on February 19 that China is strengthening the protection of its nuclear facilities, fearing threats from U.S. bombers, with modernization efforts underway for nuclear warhead and missile storage facilities and command and control systems. In the context of turmoil at the senior levels of the PLA and an unstable command system, Xi Jinping may adopt a more cautious stance on Taiwan. However, some analysts worry that the lack of objective advice from experienced generals may increase the risk of misjudgment.

The New York Times, on February 4, cited assessments from U.S. intelligence officials, suggesting that Xi Jinping exhibits "paranoid" traits, ensuring absolute control over the military through large-scale purges. However, whether this "revolutionary tempering" (Xi's own words) will genuinely enhance the PLA's combat effectiveness or lead to a loss of morale and talent remains to be seen.

From a broader perspective, the Zhang Youxia incident reflects deep-seated contradictions in the modernization process of the Chinese military: the tension between professionalization and politicization. On one hand, a modern military requires a professional and capable officer corps that advances based on ability and performance; on the other hand, the principle of "the Party commands the gun" demands absolute loyalty to the Party's leaders. When these two goals conflict, political loyalty often takes precedence over professional competence.

Currently, the five vacant positions in the Central Military Commission have yet to see new appointments, indicating the complexity of the selection process. Xi Jinping needs to find suitable candidates across multiple dimensions, including political reliability, professional capability, age structure, and balance among military branches. It is foreseeable that the newly appointed members of the Military Commission will be younger and more reliant on Xi Jinping's promotion, but whether they can shoulder the heavy responsibility of leading the modernization transformation of over two million PLA troops remains a question.

With the 21st National Congress of the CCP approaching in 2027, Xi Jinping clearly hopes to completely eliminate potential challenges within the military before then, ensuring absolute control over the armed forces. However, this unprecedented military purge may come at the cost of stagnation in the PLA's combat capability development, instability in the command system, and damage to morale. For a military undergoing profound modernization and tasked with the goal of "achieving the capability to unify Taiwan by 2027," whether such a cost is worthwhile will be answered by history.