China-Russia Maritime Joint Exercise 2026 Moves from Qingdao to the Pacific, Burdening Japan's SLOC Defense

[Tokyo] In a brief announcement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Defense at 10 a.m. on July 5, what caught my attention the most was not the name of the location, Qingdao. It was the statement that "some military forces from both sides" would head to the Pacific-related maritime areas for a joint maritime cruise after the exercise. The "Maritime Joint Exercise 2026," conducted in the maritime airspace near Qingdao, appears to be an annual cooperation close to the port. However, from Japan's perspective, the issue lies not in the exercise itself but in the subsequent course of action.

Few Confirmed Facts

According to the announcement from the Chinese Ministry of Defense, the navies of China and Russia will conduct "Maritime Joint Exercise 2026" in July in the maritime airspace near Qingdao, Shandong Province. After the exercise, some military forces from both sides will conduct joint cruising in the Pacific-related maritime areas. Bloomberg also quoted this announcement on the same day, reporting that the timing, participating forces, and training details have not been disclosed. The English version of Xinhua News Agency has also reported the same content.

Therefore, at this stage, it is not possible to definitively state the names or numbers of the vessels involved. Caution is warranted here. However, the fact that this information is undisclosed does not imply that its operational significance is small. Rather, the remaining uncertainties themselves become a burden for Japan's monitoring plans.

Three Routes from Qingdao to the Pacific

If the forces departing from Qingdao head towards the Pacific, the geographical focus shifts to the Tsushima Strait, Tsugaru Strait, Soya Strait, or various waterways around the Nansei Islands. On any route, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) must combine patrol aircraft, escort ships, and coastal surveillance to maintain peacetime vigilance.

Unlike the Soviet Navy monitoring during the Cold War, the current target is not a single Russian fleet but a combination with the Chinese Navy. The Chinese side has gained experience in long-range training using Type 055 destroyers, Type 052D destroyers, Type 054A frigates, and supply ships. Although the Russian side is limited in scale, it is attempting to maintain the training value of anti-submarine, anti-air, and electronic warfare within the framework of China-Russia cooperation.

A Different Picture from the SLOC Perspective

Japanese readers tend to perceive "Pacific cruising" as a symbolic action of breaking through the first island chain. However, from the JMSDF's practical perspective, the more specific issues are the SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) and the allocation of surveillance resources. Japan's energy imports and commercial shipping traffic must be treated as a continuous space encompassing the East China Sea, Philippine Sea, and Western Pacific.

If China and Russia transition to joint cruising after the exercise, it is not enough to merely read the opponent's intentions. Confirmation of capabilities becomes necessary. To what extent will formation maintenance, at-sea replenishment, anti-submarine training, communication control, and integration with aircraft be conducted? These details are often not disclosed, but they manifest in the specifics picked up by escort ships and P-3C and P-1 patrol aircraft.

Japan's Challenges Extend Beyond Vessel Numbers

Japan is simultaneously dealing with the defense of the Nansei Islands, missile alerts from North Korea, and monitoring the movements of the Russian Far East Fleet. The addition of China-Russia joint cruising does not simply mean "one more mission" is added. The political significance of the monitoring targets becomes complex, and the speed of information judgment in Tokyo, Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Ominato is put to the test.

In my view, the key point to observe in this announcement is not the scale of the exercise off Qingdao but which waterways will be used afterward and for how long they will remain in the Pacific. The Chinese Ministry of Defense explains this as contributing to "regional peace and stability," but from Japan's perspective, it effectively extends the duration of peacetime vigilance thinly.

The joint actions of the China-Russia navies test Japan's surveillance resources in the pre-crisis phase. Pressure without gunfire is politically more difficult to handle.

In this regard, Maritime Joint Exercise 2026 should be evaluated more for the sustainability of its track rather than for flashy naval gunfire. The real risk is not that Japan misreads China and Russia's intentions. It lies in the inability of politics to decisively determine where, for how many days, and with what priority to deploy limited patrol aircraft and escort ships in peacetime.