Europe's Double Strategy: Contingency Plan for NATO Without the USA and the Struggle for Defense Industry Policy

The European security architecture is undergoing its most profound transformation since the end of the Cold War in April 2026. At the same time, European NATO members are accelerating an emergency plan in the event of an American withdrawal from the alliance and are engaged in an intense struggle with NATO leadership for control over a new iteration of the European defense industry, valued at one trillion dollars annually. These two developments, which are closely intertwined, mark a historic turning point for the transatlantic security order.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal on April 15, 2026, citing high diplomatic circles, a contingency plan to ensure European defense capability using existing NATO structures without American involvement is gaining momentum. Crucially, Germany, long a staunch opponent of such an independent European path within the alliance, has changed its position and now supports the initiative. This shift in Berlin's stance is symptomatic of the growing uncertainty among European governments regarding the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor.

The plans, which were first developed last year, are being informally advanced in side discussions and dinners on the margins of NATO activities. Their goal is not to compete with the existing alliance but to maintain deterrence against Russia, ensure operational continuity, and preserve nuclear credibility, even in the event that Washington withdraws its forces from Europe or refuses to respond to a collective defense situation, as President Trump has repeatedly threatened. This would require extensive changes across the entire NATO structure, from logistics to intelligence services to command systems, all of which currently rely heavily on the United States.

In parallel to these strategic considerations, a significant conflict is emerging: the struggle between the European Union and NATO for control over European defense spending. As reported by the Financial Times on April 16, citing insiders, a fierce dispute has erupted over how the additional annual defense spending of around one trillion dollars should be allocated. Brussels is currently fundamentally revising its defense industrial policy and pushing for production to meet both American demands for higher military spending and the threat posed by Russia.

In this context, the EU is pursuing an explicit buy-European approach aimed at reducing dependence on American defense goods. NATO leadership, in which Washington traditionally plays a dominant role, views this development with skepticism. The conflict reveals a fundamental tension: NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte advocates for the maintenance of transatlantic procurement structures, while European governments, under the impression of Trump's hostility, increasingly push for strategic autonomy.

The financial flows are already significant. A $90 billion loan from the EU to Ukraine is expected to be approved soon, after the new Hungarian government under Prime Minister Peter Magyar abandoned its blockade stance. This breakthrough after months of stagnation is a clear signal that the political landscape in Europe is shifting. At the same time, Germany has concluded defense deals, including an order worth $300 million for Rheinmetall drones, underscoring the unprecedented acceleration of German defense spending.

The debate is further intensified by statements from Belgian Chief of Staff General Frederic Vansina, who mentioned that the EU aims to extend the conflict in Ukraine until 2030 to prepare for a possible military confrontation with Russia without American involvement. This statement highlights the seriousness of the strategic considerations in European capitals.

The issue of nuclear deterrence remains the most sensitive topic. Currently, the nuclear component of NATO's deterrence relies almost entirely on American forces, supplemented by the British and French arsenals. A functioning European deterrence system without the United States would require significantly closer cooperation between London and Paris on nuclear issues, which would present both political and technical challenges of unprecedented scale.

The industrial policy dimension of the conflict is also not to be underestimated. The European defense industry is undergoing a profound transformation. Companies like Rheinmetall, KNDS, Leonardo, and Saab are experiencing record orders, while the pressure to expand production capacities more quickly and secure supply chains is growing. The EU's procurement approach aims to accelerate this development and create strategic independence, but it faces resistance from those who advocate for a fragmentation of the Western defense market.

The current developments pose an existential question for NATO: Can the alliance maintain its cohesion if its largest member is increasingly perceived as a factor of uncertainty? The fact that European states are now openly discussing contingency plans for an alliance without the United States would have been considered unthinkable just two years ago. That Germany, traditionally the closest European ally of Washington, agrees to this shift underscores the significance of the change.

The coming weeks and months will show whether these plans will evolve from informal discussions into concrete structural reforms. The NATO summit, expected in early summer 2026, is likely to become the crucial test. It will have to be determined whether the transatlantic partnership can continue in a new, more balanced form or whether European states will definitively embark on the path toward an independent defense architecture. The decisions made now will shape the European security order for decades to come.