Europe's Strategic Dilemma: Between Nuclear Uncertainty and Structural Defense Weaknesses

The expiration of the New START treaty on February 5, 2026, marks a turning point for the European security architecture. While Brussels and NATO capitals are still discussing President Trump's Five Percent Doctrine, a breaking point is opening up in the transatlantic security partnership, the implications of which go far beyond budgetary questions. Europe faces a double dilemma: on one hand, nuclear arms control threatens European security interests, while on the other hand, the previous focus on percentage-based defense spending proves inadequate for building real military capabilities.

## The Nuclear Dimension: Europe's Marginalized Position

The decline of the New START treaty comes at an extremely unfavorable time. Unlike under the Biden administration, which consistently coordinated closely with European allies, the Trump administration pursues a transactional approach, where European security interests could become bargaining chips. The parallels to the Helmut Schmidt era of the 1970s are concerning: back then, Bonn feared that Washington might accept an imbalance in weapon systems that were particularly relevant to Europe during the SALT negotiations.

Today, the situation is even more precarious. Putin's demands are on the table: the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and restrictions on British and French arsenals. This directly targets the core of nuclear deterrence in Europe. NATO's nuclear sharing is not only a military capacity but primarily a symbol of shared risks. The withdrawal of American nuclear weapons would fundamentally undermine the credibility of extended deterrence.

However, the real problem lies deeper: Europe has not developed a coherent negotiating position. While Trump publicly signals that the expiration of the treaty is not a drama – they will simply negotiate a better deal – Europe remains reactive. This passivity is strategically fatal. If Washington and Moscow negotiate bilaterally, there is a real danger that Europe will be presented with a fait accompli.

The participation promised by France and the UK in a multilateral transparency regime is an important but insufficient step. Quantitative restrictions on the French and British nuclear arsenals are excluded given the geopolitical situation – and rightly so. But Europe must do more: it needs a united position involving Germany, France, and the UK that not only defends against American-Russian agreements but proactively defines and enforces European security interests.

## The Five Percent Doctrine: Quantity Without Quality

In parallel to the nuclear dilemma, the debate over defense spending reveals a fundamental problem in European security policy: the fixation on GDP percentages obscures structural deficits and can even be counterproductive in countries with low threat perception.

Italy provides a case in point. Rome reported a defense budget of about 45 billion euros to NATO for 2025 – thus formally reaching the two percent mark. However, the actual defense spending was only around 31 billion euros. The difference arose from the reclassification of expenditures from other ministries, particularly for military mobility and cyber defense. This accounting acrobatics allows for formal compliance with NATO obligations without actually strengthening the armed forces.

Even more problematic is the use of funds. Nearly 23 billion euros have been invested since 2022 in major investment programs for armored land forces – an unprecedented initiative with significant economic and political benefits: domestic production, jobs, industrial growth. However, this focus on capital-intensive programs has come at the expense of far less costly but militarily essential measures.

Expenditures for operations, maintenance, and training – historically underfunded and central to readiness – have not increased but are stagnating or even declining. Italy has not taken initiatives to rejuvenate its armed forces, which are among the oldest in Europe. There is a lack of a real operational reserve that could be quickly mobilized in a crisis. The recruitment rules, which heavily rely on permanent positions and contribute to aging, have hardly been reformed.

At the same time, Italy continues to allocate around 250 million euros annually for domestic tasks of the army – such as supporting the police. These missions are politically visible but reduce the time for combat training and weaken military effectiveness.

The pattern is clear: Italy has increased defense spending where it is politically acceptable – domestic missions and large industrial programs with economic returns. The politically difficult but militarily essential areas have been avoided: training, readiness, the creation of a reserve force, and reform of the recruitment system. The result is a defense expansion that satisfies political and industrial priorities while Italy's core military capabilities remain largely unchanged.

## The Structural Cause: The Gap Between Society and Armed Forces

The Italian example points to a deeper problem that also affects Germany, Spain, and other Western European states: the gap between society and the armed forces. In Italy, this gap has been shaped by the legacy of World War II. As a defeated nation, the Italian armed forces lost significant prestige, authority, and societal relevance – similar to Germany and Japan.

For decades, Italian society rejected the use of military force in international relations and struggled to understand the purpose of armed forces at all. This attitude led to widespread ignorance, indifference, and partial distrust towards military institutions. After the Cold War, the armed forces gradually earned public trust through extensive foreign deployments – but only under strict conditions: restrictive rules of engagement, obscuring the combat dimension, and a strong emphasis on humanitarian and aid functions.

The core problem lies in the very limited understanding of military institutions and their operational requirements – not only in the general public but also in academia and politics. In Italy, there are very few experts who truly understand how the armed forces are organized. The consequence is a lack of awareness of what is actually required for effective combat performance.

The second element is the reluctance – shared by the public and politics – to accept the associated costs. Increasing military effectiveness requires higher spending on training, shooting ranges, and ammunition – decisions that have hardly visible impacts on domestically relevant issues such as employment, internal security, and economic development.

This issue is not limited to Italy. In Germany, too, academic engagement with military affairs, security dynamics, and defense policy remains marginal and is often viewed with ideological distrust. As long as the study of military effectiveness and defense industrial cooperation is not recognized as a legitimate field of research, higher defense spending will not translate into real military capabilities.

## Ways Out of the Dilemma: Strategic Autonomy Requires Societal Transformation

Europe faces the necessity of addressing both dimensions of the strategic dilemma simultaneously. At the nuclear level, Europe needs a coherent negotiating position that must be developed through the German-French-British axis. Chancellor Merz should use the existing dialogue with Macron and Starmer to clarify:

First, quantitative restrictions on French and British nuclear arsenals are unacceptable given the geopolitical situation. Instead, Paris and London should take the lead in a multilateral transparency regime that provides regular information on the number of operational nuclear weapons.

Second, Europe must make it unequivocally clear that any arms control agreement that reduces nuclear weapons on NATO territory in Europe, while Russia's thousands of tactical nuclear weapons continue to threaten Europe, will be categorically rejected.

Third, Europe should proactively advocate for the strengthening of established nuclear norms: clear condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear threats, and explosive tests. A broad multilateral alliance – for example, in the G20 format or at the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – could generate momentum here.

At the conventional level, NATO must expand its assessment criteria. Percentage-based GDP shares for defense are a necessary but not sufficient criterion. The alliance should introduce additional indicators:

- Share of expenditures for operations, maintenance, and training
- Average age of the armed forces
- Existence and scope of deployable reserve forces
- Recruitment efficiency in technical specializations
- Share of troops available for NATO defense planning (versus domestic missions)

However, the crucial transformation must occur at the societal level. As long as the gap between society and the armed forces is not bridged, increases in spending will largely be ineffective. Three approaches are required:

First, an honest, non-ideological public debate about defense must be promoted, which does not obscure the true purpose of armed forces – namely, to fight. This debate must involve universities, think tanks, the armed forces themselves, and the broader public.

Second, investment should be made in the creation or strengthening of regionally based reserve forces: voluntary commitments that allow individuals to maintain a normal lifestyle while gaining direct experience with the military. This would be more effective than the controversial reintroduction of conscription, whose effect on the civil-military gap is disputed.

Third, sustainable investments are needed in funded university and think tank projects, public lectures and workshops, school projects, open days at barracks, internships, and scholarships. Without a more intellectually open academic environment that treats military effectiveness and defense industrial cooperation as legitimate fields of research, higher defense spending will not translate into real military capabilities.

## Conclusion: Europe at a Crossroads

Europe is at a strategic crossroads. The combination of nuclear uncertainty due to the expiration of New START, American unpredictability under Trump, and structural weaknesses in its own defense capabilities creates a dangerous security vacuum. The previous responses – percentage-based spending increases and reactive diplomacy – are insufficient.

The Five Percent Doctrine may send a political signal, but without qualitative reforms, it remains largely symbolic. The Italian example shows that spending increases without addressing structural deficits – aging, lack of reserves, inadequate training – hardly improve military effectiveness.

At the same time, Europe must not remain passive while Washington and Moscow negotiate over the European security architecture. A coherent, proactive position on nuclear arms control is essential – not as a blockade against disarmament but to ensure that European security interests are not sacrificed.

The real challenge, however, lies deeper: Europe must bridge the gap between society and the armed forces. Without an informed, engaged public that understands and accepts the purpose and requirements of military defense, neither budget increases nor diplomatic initiatives will suffice. Strategic autonomy does not begin in the Ministry of Defense or NATO headquarters – it begins in public discourse, in universities, in how societies think about security, defense, and the role of armed forces.

Time is of the essence. The expiration of New START is not an isolated event but a symptom of a broader erosion of the transatlantic security architecture. Europe must now decide whether to help shape this architecture or passively accept its decline. The choice is clear – but the path is rocky and requires political courage, societal transformation, and strategic clarity. Only by addressing all three levels can Europe overcome the double dilemma and achieve genuine strategic autonomy.