Europe's Strategic Realignment: From Nuclear Cooperation to the 5 Percent Target

The European defense architecture is currently undergoing the most significant transformation since the end of the Cold War. On March 2, 2026, President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Friedrich Merz marked a historic turning point in German-French defense cooperation with their Joint Declaration on Nuclear Deterrence. At the same time, NATO has raised its defense spending target to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 – a doubling of the previous 2 percent mark. These developments signal nothing less than the birth of a strategically more autonomous European defense identity, driven by geopolitical realities and diminishing trust in the American security guarantee.

The German-French initiative on nuclear deterrence represents a paradigm shift that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. In the spirit of the Aachen Treaty of 2019, both governments have decided to establish a bilateral working group to advance the "doctrinal dialogue and coordination of strategic cooperation." This explicitly includes consultations on the appropriate mix of conventional capabilities, missile defense, and French nuclear capacities. Germany, which has relied on the American nuclear umbrella for decades, is thus moving for the first time towards an independent nuclear security architecture – albeit under French leadership.

The strategic necessity of this realignment is driven by several factors. The statements of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in January 2026, that NATO must be "rethought" and Europe must rapidly expand its defense capabilities to provide real security guarantees even without American reassurance, have set alarm bells ringing in European capitals. At the same time, the ongoing peace talks under U.S. President Trump regarding Ukraine – with the "Coalition of the Willing" led by the UK and France working on robust security guarantees for Ukraine following a peace agreement with Russia – highlight that Europe must increasingly take care of its own security.

The financial dimensions of this strategic shift are considerable. Germany has already lifted constitutional debt brakes on defense spending in 2025 and plans to spend more than 500 billion euros on defense between 2025 and 2029. This stands in stark contrast to France, which, despite its nuclear leadership role, currently spends only about 2 percent of its GDP on defense. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul publicly called in mid-February 2026 for Paris to increase its defense spending, even if it meant cuts in other areas – an unusually direct tone between traditional partners that underscores the urgency of the situation.

The new NATO target of 5 percent of GDP by 2035 reflects the changed threat landscape and the erosion of transatlantic burden-sharing. While EU-wide defense spending, according to the European Defence Agency, has risen from 1.6 percent of GDP in 2023 to 2.1 percent in 2025, the average still falls far short of the new requirements. Poland, which traditionally has high defense spending, is expected to exceed 3 percent by 2026. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, caused irritation when its parliament passed a budget in March 2026 that cuts defense spending – leading to sharp criticism from the U.S. ambassador to NATO, who emphasized that all allies must "pull their weight."

European support for Ukraine serves as a concrete test for the new strategic direction. In December 2025, the European Council approved a loan of 90 billion euros for the years 2026 to 2027, which is intended to cover both civilian and military needs of Ukraine. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, European military aid in 2026 increased by 67 percent over the average of the years 2022 to 2024, while non-military aid rose by 59 percent. These figures demonstrate that Europe is indeed beginning to fill the gap created by the partial American withdrawal – a remarkable achievement given the economic challenges in several EU member states.

The institutional framework for European defense integration is being expanded in parallel. The European Defense Industry Program, adopted by the Council in December 2025, aims to consolidate the fragmented European arms landscape. The Military Mobility Action Plan 2.0 for the years 2022 to 2026 invests in multimodal corridors and logistics centers, supports the digitization of administrative processes, and strengthens cooperation with NATO. The four flagship initiatives – Eastern Flank Watch, Drone Defense, Air Shield, and Space Shield – as outlined in the European Defence White Paper, are led by member states, while the European Defence Agency takes on the coordination.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized at the Brussels European Defense Exhibition (BEDEX) on March 12, 2026, the crucial role of the defense industry for ongoing security in Europe and North America. His speech underscored the need for a close integration between state defense planning and industrial capacities – an area where Europe has traditionally lagged behind the U.S. According to the European Defence Agency, research and development spending by EU member states is expected to reach about 17 billion euros in 2025, which, while an increase, is considered insufficient given the technological challenges posed by hypersonic weapons, AI-driven systems, and space capabilities.

The strategic implications of these developments are far-reaching. Europe is clearly moving from a stance of "strategic dependence" to a policy of "de-risking" – not decoupling from the U.S., but creating independent capabilities in case American support is not available or reliable. The German-French nuclear cooperation could lead to a European nuclear deterrence architecture in the medium term that also includes other states – possibly Poland, the Baltic states, or Italy. This would represent a fundamental reordering of the European security order.

At the same time, significant challenges remain. The fiscal burdens of the 5 percent target are enormous: For Germany, this would mean annual defense spending of 200 billion euros based on a GDP of about 4 trillion euros – more than three times the current budget. The political feasibility of such increases in democracies with competing spending priorities – health, education, climate protection, social security – is by no means guaranteed. France's reluctance to increase its defense spending points to these tensions.

Moreover, there is a risk of a fragmented European defense landscape. While Germany and France deepen their bilateral cooperation, other states may feel excluded or form alternative coalitions. The "Coalition of the Willing" led by the UK and France for Ukraine security guarantees operates partly outside EU and NATO structures, which could raise coordination issues. The role of the UK post-Brexit remains an open question: How closely can and should a non-EU member be integrated into European defense integration?

The coming months will show whether Europe can indeed muster the political will and financial resources to realize its strategic autonomy. The German-French nuclear cooperation and the NATO 5 percent target are important milestones, but their implementation will determine the credibility of European defense ambitions. The Ukraine crisis has abruptly awakened Europe from its security policy slumber. Now the continent must prove that it is willing and able to take responsibility for its own security – in a world where the American guarantee can no longer be taken for granted.