Sahel: Two Regional Armies, One Battlefield – The Escalation of a Fragmented Counterterrorism War

The security architecture of West Africa is undergoing a profound transformation that could redefine the regional geopolitical balance for years to come. As jihadist violence reaches unprecedented levels, the region finds itself divided between two competing military blocs: the Standby Force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on one side, and the Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) on the other. This fragmentation, far from strengthening the counter-terrorism response, risks turning the Sahel into a theater of indirect confrontations between African states, at the very moment when armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are consolidating their territorial positions.

The decision made at the end of February 2026 by the chiefs of staff of ECOWAS during a security meeting in Sierra Leone marks a symbolic turning point. The regional bloc announced the activation of its intervention force with an initial goal of deploying 2,000 soldiers by the end of the year. This number, although modest compared to the personnel needed to cover such a vast territory, reflects ECOWAS's willingness to regain the initiative in the face of a terrorist threat that is now extending beyond the traditionally affected Sahelian states. Nigeria, historically contributing 75% of the Standby Force contingents during past interventions, is expected to once again play a central role, despite its own internal security challenges that mobilize its armed forces on multiple simultaneous fronts.

In response to this mobilization, the Alliance of Sahel States – composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – continues to develop its own unified force, reportedly consisting of 6,000 men according to official announcements. Officially created in January 2025 after the withdrawal of the three states from ECOWAS, the AES presents itself as a credible alternative to the regional intervention model promoted by ECOWAS. The military leaders of the three countries justify this break by what they perceive as a lack of commitment from ECOWAS in the fight against terrorism, accusing the regional bloc of focusing excessively on political and electoral issues at the expense of security priorities. This rhetoric resonates with Sahelian populations weary from decades of instability and disillusioned by previous foreign interventions.

However, on the ground, the results of the military juntas in power in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey remain at best mixed. The attack carried out on January 29, 2026, against Dori Hamani International Airport in Niamey starkly illustrates the limitations of the AES's security strategy. Thirty fighters from the Islamic State's Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) managed to infiltrate the Nigerien capital and launch a coordinated offensive using armed drones, light weapons, and mortars against the airport and the adjacent Air Base 101, the headquarters of the AES command. Although the assailants were killed or captured after two hours of fighting, the operation achieved its strategic objective: to demonstrate the vulnerability of Sahelian capitals and undermine confidence in the capabilities of security forces.

In Mali, the situation is hardly more encouraging. Since September 2025, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the main faction affiliated with al-Qaeda in the region, has been conducting a near-total blockade of fuel supplies to the capital Bamako. By intercepting and burning tanker truck convoys coming from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, JNIM has succeeded in paralyzing the urban economy and instilling a deep sense of psychological insecurity among the residents. This feeling of collective helplessness sharply contrasts with the promises made by military leaders who justified their coups by the supposed inability of their civilian predecessors to ensure security.

Burkina Faso may present the most alarming situation among the three AES countries. JNIM conducted over 500 attacks there in 2025, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, and is now believed to control up to 60% of the national territory. The capital Ouagadougou is thus gradually becoming encircled, while the Burkinabè armed forces and the pro-government militias of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) are forced to limit their movements to areas immediately adjacent to their bases. The devastating attack carried out in mid-February 2026 against the town of Titao in the north of the country resulted in the deaths of at least 80 soldiers and militiamen as well as 20 civilians. The insurgents simultaneously targeted a military camp, the local market, and communication facilities, revealing sophisticated tactical coordination.

This reality on the ground raises fundamental questions about the viability of the militarized strategy adopted by the AES. The three military regimes have gradually broken with France, their former colonial ally that maintained about 4,000 soldiers as part of counter-terrorism operations, to turn towards Russia. Approximately 2,000 Russian fighters, initially from the Wagner paramilitary group and then reorganized under the state control of the African Corps, have been deployed in the three countries. This major geopolitical reorientation is accompanied by growing concerns about human rights violations, particularly following the Moura massacre in Mali in March 2022, during which Malian soldiers and Wagner elements allegedly killed hundreds of civilians.

The fragmentation of the West African security landscape between ECOWAS and AES creates risks of an entirely new nature. As Beverly Ochieng, an analyst based in Dakar for the intelligence firm Control Risks, points out, ECOWAS forces would be deployed in member states located at the epicenter of terrorist violence, meaning that many combat engagements would take place in areas adjacent to AES territories. With AES troops also operating in these areas, military confrontations between the two camps become increasingly likely, particularly given the porosity of regional borders and the fluidity of combat environments.

This scenario of indirect conflict between African states is not purely theoretical. Terrorist groups operate precisely along the borders shared by AES countries and their ECOWAS neighbors. JNIM, estimated to have 5,000-6,000 fighters, maintains an active presence in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, and has even recorded attacks in Nigeria. IS-Sahel, with around 400 fighters according to 2018 estimates, but whose numbers have likely increased, primarily operates in Niger and Mali. These groups do not recognize the political divisions between ECOWAS and AES; rather, they exploit this fragmentation to consolidate their sanctuaries and expand their influence.

The strategy of coordination between the two military blocs currently appears nonexistent. ECOWAS has attempted to maintain dialogue with AES states, notably through Senegal, which has cordial relations with the Sahelian military regimes. The regional bloc has also adopted an open-door policy, regularly inviting AES representatives to its meetings. However, these diplomatic gestures have been met with the intransigence of military leaders who wish to demonstrate that the AES can function as a viable alternative to ECOWAS and succeed where previous regional structures have failed.

Ironically, ECOWAS's new focus on counter-terrorism could, in the long run, create common ground with the AES. One of the criticisms made by the AES upon their departure was precisely that ECOWAS was not sufficiently supporting the fight against terrorism and was focusing excessively on politics and elections. If ECOWAS can maintain the friendly ties cultivated by Senegal, Ghana, and Togo, limited cooperation in intelligence sharing, joint surveillance, and possibly coordinated operations could emerge in the long term.

Beyond intra-African dynamics, the international dimension of this crisis cannot be ignored. The United States, through the African Command (AFRICOM), has intensified its engagement in the region since early 2026, following a period of reduced presence due to the Sahelian coups. Washington is now providing intelligence support to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and is discussing the possibility of arms deliveries, while seeking to strengthen its partnerships with coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea where the terrorist threat is advancing. The American airstrikes conducted on Christmas Day 2025 against the Lakurawa group in northern Nigeria illustrate this desire for selective re-engagement.

The challenge facing the region extends far beyond the military dimension alone. Jihadist groups succeed precisely because they fill state voids in neglected rural areas. JNIM and its affiliates collect taxes, provide resources such as fertilizers, build mosques, and promise security to local populations. This substitute governance allows them to continuously recruit new fighters from marginalized communities. Any viable counter-terrorism strategy must therefore necessarily include robust social and economic interventions to counteract the appeal of these groups.

The issue of funding presents another major obstacle. Nigeria, traditionally the main financial contributor to ECOWAS, has been facing significant economic difficulties since the COVID-19 pandemic, with high inflation in 2023 eroding purchasing power and limiting the state's budgetary capabilities. The Nigerian armed forces are also spread across multiple fronts. In this context, mobilizing substantial resources for a regional intervention represents a significant challenge. External partners such as the United States or France could provide crucial financial support.

The urgency of the situation is beyond doubt. From January to June 2025, the region recorded 12,964 conflict-related deaths during 5,907 incidents, almost all concentrated in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, according to the Center for Democracy and Development. These already alarming figures reflect only part of the year and do not account for the intensification observed in the second half and early 2026. The displacement of tens of thousands of people creates cascading humanitarian crises, while local economies collapse under the combined effects of insecurity and the disruption of trade routes.

West Africa thus finds itself at a critical crossroads. The mobilization of two parallel regional military forces could, in the best-case scenario, create competitive emulation leading to intensified counter-terrorism efforts. In the worst case, it could result in direct or indirect confrontations between African forces, diverting valuable resources and attention from the common enemy posed by jihadist groups. The ability of regional leaders to transcend their political divisions and forge pragmatic coordination mechanisms will determine not only the outcome of the war against terrorism but also the future of stability and regional integration in West Africa for decades to come.