F-35 and NATO 2026 — Kushner's five goals do not replace a European security order

Washington proposes an architecture

On November 6, Jared Kushner announced five goals for a new European security architecture, just days before the planned discussions about the war in Ukraine in Abu Dhabi. The crucial point is not the number five, but the sender. Washington is attempting to design a framework for order, involving Ukraine, European states, and NATO, whose political initiative lies outside European institutions. This is not a detail. Whoever designs the architecture later determines who defines guarantees, distributes burdens, and assesses violations.

The rapporteur describes the initiative as a return to the logic of Cold War diplomacy. Kyiv Post and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report consistently that the White House links the plan to the upcoming peace talks. This creates a remarkable institutional short circuit: A potential ceasefire is intended not only to end the war but also to reorganize Europe's security order. This is politically understandable but strategically risky.

Five goals are not yet five capabilities

In the European security debate, the formulation of a goal is too often confused with the establishment of a capability. A common architecture requires at least five robust components: a politically accepted threat analysis, military forces, secured industrial supply chains, a clear command structure, and a credible guarantee for crisis situations. Kushner's announcement mentions goals; however, it does not yet answer who will finance these components and under what command they will operate.

The F-35 serves as a useful litmus test for this. Several European NATO states are purchasing the aircraft because it consolidates capabilities for reconnaissance, air warfare, and nuclear sharing. However, the platform remains dependent on American software, spare parts supply, certification, and data infrastructure in essential areas. This highlights the difference between a joint procurement project and a common security order. An American system can enhance European forces; however, it does not replace European decision-making authority.

The same distinction applies to Ukraine. Kyiv is not merely a protection object in a future framework but a military experience and decision-maker. Ukrainian drone production, air defense, and combat operations have changed European planning more than many Brussels strategy papers. If Ukraine is involved in the talks, its role must go beyond political consultation. Otherwise, it will become a source of frontline knowledge without having the security guarantees that make this knowledge valuable in the first place.

The European problem lies with the institutions

The American proposal encounters a Europe that must simultaneously coordinate NATO, the EU, bilateral coalitions, and national defense planning. This multi-track approach does not automatically equate to resilience. Instead, it creates a diffusion of responsibility. NATO possesses the military command structure, the EU has the tools for financing, regulation, and industrial policy, while the critical capabilities lie with national armed forces. A new political agreement without rules of responsibility would only dress this weakness in new vocabulary.

Nevertheless, the current trend towards European cooperation shows that practical integration is possible. Defense News reports that Denmark and Lithuania are acquiring Finnish Blocker sea mines through a joint procurement model; Germany and Norway are involved in the framework. This is not a trivial matter. Joint procurement, training, logistics, and lifecycle planning create capabilities when linked with binding acceptance and industrial production. This very unremarkable work is lacking in many large security initiatives.

For Berlin, the uncomfortable question is therefore not whether Germany welcomes the American plan. It will do so. The question is whether Germany is willing to tie its defense planning to verifiable European priorities. An F-35 squadron, a European air defense network, or a NATO eastern flank brigade are only strategic contributions if ammunition, spare parts, reconnaissance, and political approvals function in a crisis. Percentages of gross domestic product say little about this.

The guarantee question remains unresolved

The central gap in the initiative is the guarantee. A security architecture does not become credible simply because it is announced at a summit. It needs a procedure for the day when Russia tests a red line, the USA changes its priorities, or a European state blocks the common position. Who decides then? Washington, the NATO Council, the European Council, or a coalition of the willing?

The reference to the Cold War exacerbates this problem. At that time, there was a clearer block structure, American troop presence in Europe, and a political expectation that Washington would lead in the event of an alliance. Today, Europe's military dependence is both greater and politically more contentious. The USA wants more European burden-sharing, while Europe cannot replace American reconnaissance, strategic mobility, and nuclear deterrence in the short term.

Kushner's five goals can therefore be a useful starting point, but they cannot replace institutional clarity. Europe should use the American impulse to codify responsibilities, capabilities, and industrial commitments. Otherwise, a security order will emerge in which Europe pays the bills, Ukraine bears the risks, and Washington retains the definition of the guarantee. That would not be a European security architecture but a new form of transatlantic administration. More summit diplomacy can make this contradiction visible; only the ability to act independently at the decisive moment can resolve it.

Sources

• Rapporteur, “Kushner invokes Cold War diplomacy for European security deal”, November 6, 2026.
• Kyiv Post, “US Proposes New European Security Framework”, November 6, 2026.
• Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “White House Outlines Broader European Security Plan Ahead Of Ukraine Peace Talks”, November 6, 2026.
• Defense News, “Denmark, Lithuania latest Baltic navies to buy ‘Blocker’ mines through Finnish scheme”, November 6, 2026.