Foreign Media: Europe Deeply Engaged in the Struggle for Defense Technology Dominance

Reference News Network, August 20 report The Spanish magazine "Foreign Policy" recently published an article titled "The Struggle for Technological Dominance and the Construction of European Autonomous Defense," with the following content:

For many years, various sectors in Europe have recognized two realities: the EU has limited discourse power in global geopolitical conflict mediation; and excessive reliance on other countries for major decisions that directly affect its own interests poses significant risks. The birth of the EU was based on a vision of a rules-based, peaceful, and stable world order. This premise also explains why the EU has struggled to respond effectively to the collapse of the international order and the resurgence of great power competition.

The previous model of globalization was centered on maximizing the efficiency of global production and sales of goods and services, but this system is now on the verge of collapse. Unilateral tariffs, trade route blockades, shipping attacks, and various hybrid warfare tactics are emerging, with all kinds of tools becoming weapons in geopolitical games, significantly increasing the urgency of building resilience in global supply chains.

There is a common consensus in modern society: the digital services that the public and various institutions rely on for operation depend on mature and advanced technologies, which should be stably supplied. However, large-scale power outages, disconnections of networks and digital platforms, and frequent cybersecurity incidents all prove that this stability is not absolute. Against the backdrop of escalating hybrid confrontations, various technological shortcomings have risen to the level of strategic security.

The core contradiction lies in the fact that when crises arise, Europe as a whole lacks the technological resilience to withstand risks, especially lacking autonomous control over the underlying technologies that support core public services, infrastructure, and critical capabilities. In addition, a large number of dual-use components, products, digital services, and processes are subject to geopolitical export controls and unilateral sanctions. Moreover, the problem continues to expand: almost all emerging technologies have dual-use attributes.

The EU is currently in an unprecedented situation, as the United States is no longer willing to underwrite European security under the previously accepted conditions. The U.S. military has announced a reduction in troop levels in Europe and a simultaneous reduction in the scale of troops in other countries; it has significantly cut political and military aid to Ukraine; and its positioning within NATO's future framework remains uncertain, raising concerns. However, Europe is not yet prepared to independently shoulder its own security responsibilities.

Multiple overlapping crises have prompted the EU to fully promote strategic autonomy since 2016. The European Council has defined strategic autonomy as "the ability to act independently in necessary times and areas, and to act in coordination with partner countries whenever possible." Strategic autonomy is by no means a self-sufficient isolationist approach; Europe will continue to rely on external supplies. The concept of "open strategic autonomy" is based on this reality, pushing the EU to reselect its strategic partners.

The EU has reached multiple cooperation agreements with the Southern Common Market, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. If all are approved and implemented, they will completely reshape the EU's international relations landscape.

Former Italian Prime Minister and former President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi pointed out in May this year that Europe is currently mired in multiple dilemmas, including a fragmented capital market, insufficient energy integration, and a lagging industrial technology base. In his 2024 report on promoting strategic transformation, he estimated that an additional investment of 800 billion euros per year is needed, while the latest estimate has risen to 1.2 trillion euros. He concluded: "Europe is fully open to the outside world, but its internal unified market is not well constructed; it is overly dependent on external demand, with core technological capabilities in the hands of other countries; and its internal system is highly fragmented, making it difficult to mobilize local resources on a large scale." This is the core challenge that Europe urgently needs to address in promoting strategic autonomy.

Strategic autonomy is deeply tied to technological sovereignty. Everything in modern society relies on technology; if key core technologies cannot be mastered, even if higher costs are paid for technological products and services, strategic autonomy cannot be achieved.

To achieve technological autonomy, it is necessary to control the core elements of the entire industrial chain and break free from excessive reliance on third parties. Today, technological dependence has become a common means of exerting pressure on other countries in geopolitical competition. The core elements are as follows:

Master the core technological knowledge required for the research and development of high-end products and services. Technology has strong geopolitical value, and countries gain the initiative by controlling the flow of technology and restricting its diffusion. This is not simply about obtaining technology licenses, but about achieving technology transfers that have geopolitical strategic value. In most cases, complete sets of technological equipment are like "black boxes," and after procurement, they can lead to years of technological dependence.

Unrestricted access to raw materials, components, and production equipment necessary for product research, development, and manufacturing. The AI model Mythos developed by Anthropic for cybersecurity vulnerability scanning is a typical case: this tool was initially only available to U.S. institutions, with comprehensive restrictions on its use by European research units, clearly reflecting the passive situation brought about by technological dependence.

Build a secure, controllable, stable, and reliable global distribution network. Maritime shipping and undersea cables continue to face various security threats, shaking the old logic of globalization to its core. Even at higher costs, countries are pushing for nearshore production and localization of production by allies to replace the economic efficiency standards that have guided globalization for decades.

Rely on intelligent, automated, efficient factories to independently design and produce various technological products, maintaining industrial competitiveness. The extreme ultraviolet lithography machines produced by Dutch giant ASML can be used for both civilian and military chip manufacturing, but the equipment is equipped with U.S. components, and the U.S. has issued bans restricting ASML's exports to China, leaving European companies completely unable to make independent decisions.

Establish a comprehensive and intelligent legal and regulatory system for technology governance that can prevent risks, protect public rights, implement regulatory checks, and not stifle innovation vitality. Although the EU is considered a global giant in rule-making, it has repeatedly delayed the implementation of relevant regulations and postponed the effectiveness of supporting punitive mechanisms to avoid provoking strong countermeasures from the U.S.

Cultivate, attract, and retain high-end technical talent. There is a huge talent gap in multiple technical fields, while automation and artificial intelligence are causing structural unemployment; the EU's population share continues to shrink, making policies for talent introduction and the absorption of overseas technical experts increasingly critical.

By sorting out the six key elements of core technologies in digital services such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing, it is not difficult to find that in foundational underlying technology fields, the EU's technological sovereignty is severely lacking.

In the semiconductor field, European chips are highly dependent on overseas production capacity in Asia; while the AI tools and digital services required for research, operation, and maintenance mostly come from the U.S. This dual technological dependence brings extremely high geopolitical risks.

The dependency issues arising from the collaborative development of semiconductors and artificial intelligence are particularly prominent: Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are the core hardware for training large models and inference operations in large data centers, and this market is dominated by U.S. companies, with Nvidia holding an absolute leading position, and most GPU chips being manufactured in Taiwan. The investment in related industries in Europe is far less than that in the U.S. and China, making it extremely difficult to reverse the disadvantage.

Digital service platforms are also monopolized by U.S. giants, covering the entire spectrum of e-commerce, social media, cloud storage, and satellite services. Even if the EU introduces data protection regulations, data sovereignty remains limited, leading to ongoing policy friction with the U.S. and China.

The EU's strategic autonomy construction also needs to optimize internal decision-making processes. The ordinary legislative procedure for joint legislation by the European Parliament and the EU Council, as well as the requirement for unanimous agreement among countries in the fields of diplomacy and defense, greatly restrict rapid response capabilities. In the short term, it is difficult to modify the EU's legal framework, and it can only flexibly utilize existing systems to timely promote strengthened cooperation mechanisms, with the Eurozone and Schengen Area serving as precedents.

Various socio-economic industries in the EU all have technological shortcomings, with the dependency issue in the defense sector being the most challenging. As geopolitical conflicts evolve, dual-use and emerging technologies have become core supports for military advantages, and the strategic impact of related shortcomings continues to amplify.

In just a few years, the battlefield has become fully digitalized and is continuously evolving towards intelligent combat systems, relying on artificial intelligence algorithms to assist command decision-making, with a large number of autonomous combat equipment integrating intelligent systems. The conflict in Ukraine has fully demonstrated that victory or defeat no longer simply depends on the scale of tanks, aircraft, and artillery; sensors, software, drones, robots, and space intelligence are the core combat power. The iteration speed of related technologies is extremely fast, and civilian technologies can quickly adapt to military needs.

Timely mastery of key defense technologies has become a core strategic variable. Therefore, it is crucial to clarify the shortcomings of European technological sovereignty and identify weak links.

First, the supply of key raw materials necessary for military manufacturing is constrained by gallium, aluminum, beryllium, cobalt, germanium, graphite, lithium, manganese, platinum, tungsten, titanium, and 17 rare earth elements, which are widely used in all categories of radar, aircraft, ships, satellites, and missiles. The production of a submarine requires over 4,000 kilograms of rare earths, while a fighter jet requires about 500 kilograms. Over 90% of rare earth mining and refining capacity is concentrated in China. Reducing dependence in this area is a core strategic task for the EU across various fields.

Second, semiconductor manufacturing capabilities are weak, with significant shortcomings in silicon-based chips and gallium nitride chips. Almost all military equipment integrates dozens to hundreds of chips, and currently, Europe has no large advanced silicon-based chip factories (Germany is building one), while gallium nitride production capacity is dispersed and highly dependent on imported refined gallium materials.

Finally, the supply chain for imported advanced military equipment must have the ability to withstand geopolitical risks. The EU purchases over 40 billion euros worth of military products from the U.S. each year. To diversify risks, the EU is increasing military procurement from countries such as the UK, Turkey, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Ukraine.

The speed of technological iteration in the military industry is rapid, and the EU must establish research and development centers and supporting infrastructure focused on emerging technologies to keep pace with innovation and accelerate the deployment of disruptive technologies, covering unmanned swarms, land and naval military robots, intelligent agent systems, sensor networks, quantum technology, and more. The starting disadvantage is evident, as EU defense R&D investment is only one-tenth of that of the U.S., and R&D efforts are dispersed among countries, leading to project duplication.

The operation of the innovation system relies on high-end technical talent. Estimates show that by 2030, the European defense industry will face a shortage of 600,000 specialized technical personnel, necessitating a comprehensive reform of immigration policies and talent training systems.

An even greater challenge is to build a unified and balanced European defense market, resolving the fragmentation and inefficiency issues in R&D caused by differing national interests and industrial contradictions. Major reform measures need to be introduced to improve the European defense innovation ecosystem, along with intelligent regulatory laws that adapt to military R&D and procurement in a hybrid confrontation environment. Currently, there are specific digital military control laws globally for nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, but there are no dedicated regulations for dual-use composite military digital technologies, making implementation of related controls extremely difficult.

The industrial sector also needs to popularize digital engineering tools, including simulation platforms, digital twins, additive manufacturing, and automated code generation, and deeply connect R&D engineers with the military to accelerate the iteration of military equipment. The conflict in Ukraine has proven that the R&D cycle for dual-use technologies can be compressed to months rather than years, making the promotion of this efficient and flexible R&D model urgent.

If the above measures are accompanied by the simplification of EU administrative processes, the relaxation of restrictions on joint weapon R&D and procurement, military mobility deployment, and cross-border military enterprise mergers and acquisitions, it will be possible to create a European domestic defense industry ecosystem with global competitiveness. Relevant reforms are urgently needed.

In summary, the EU must promote large European joint strategic defense projects funded by multiple countries and supported by the EU budget. However, past practices have proven that coordinating the differing interests of various countries is extremely difficult. The joint next-generation fighter project between France, Germany, and Spain, as well as the Franco-German European main battle tank project, have both encountered industrial disagreements, resulting in cost overruns, delays, and even the risk of project suspension.

The overall budget of the EU is insufficient to support large strategic defense projects. The negotiations for the multi-year financial framework from 2028 to 2034 present an opportunity to reduce Europe's dependence on foreign defense technology, but it is unlikely to completely reverse the existing pattern. Member states are unwilling to significantly increase the total EU budget, and the vast majority of defense funding is still independently allocated by each country.

Even so, the European Commission has proposed the establishment of a European Competitiveness Fund, with a total scale of 400 billion euros. Of this, 130.7 billion euros is specifically allocated for defense and security; the new "Horizon Europe" program (2028 to 2034) has a budget of 175.3 billion euros, focusing on supporting the R&D of dual-use technologies; and an additional 56.8 billion euros is earmarked to accelerate digital transformation. The European Competitiveness Fund will become a core tool for enhancing European technological sovereignty.

In the coming years, major global powers will not slow down their investments in dual-use technologies and weaponry R&D. In the face of this situation, the EU must coordinate political will, increase defense technology investment, break down industrial fragmentation, improve intelligent regulatory systems, and promote comprehensive integrated construction.

If all measures are effectively implemented, Europe will possess a unified external discourse power that combines soft and hard strengths, overcoming current capability shortcomings, solidifying its position, safeguarding technological sovereignty, and avoiding marginalization in the geopolitical landscape. (Translation by Han Chao)