Fujian Ship's First Round of South China Sea Training After Joining the Fleet in 2026: J-35 and KJ-600 Test the PLA's Three Aircraft Carrier System

What caught my attention was not the Fujian Ship's commissioning in Sanya itself, but rather that it was almost immediately placed in a more complex position: between the training chains of the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Western Pacific. The South China Morning Post cited Xinhua News Agency, stating that the Fujian Ship has been commissioned in Sanya, Hainan, and Xi Jinping boarded the ship to receive reports on electromagnetic catapult and carrier-based aircraft combat capabilities; The Diplomat noted that on June 23, the Fujian Ship crossed the Taiwan Strait, with Taiwan's defense department monitoring it using joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. When these two details are viewed together, it indicates that this ship has transitioned from a simple sea trial platform to a stage where political display and combat training overlap.

Three Types of Carrier-Based Aircraft Are More Critical Than the Hull Itself

The technical focus of the Fujian Ship is not its displacement, but whether the J-15T, J-35, and KJ-600 can operate stably within the same electromagnetic catapult, arrestor recovery, and deck scheduling system. Xinhua News Agency previously disclosed that the three types of carrier-based aircraft have completed their first catapult launches and landings, and stated that the Fujian Ship has initially achieved full deck operational capability. This statement needs to be unpacked. The J-15T addresses the issue of heavy load operations, the J-35 addresses stealth penetration and air superiority, and the KJ-600 addresses long-range early warning and air situation organization. If any one link is missing, the Fujian Ship resembles a large training vessel; only when all three are present does it approach the appearance of a complete carrier air wing.

The Cost of Electromagnetic Catapult Is Not Just in the Catapult

Electromagnetic catapults are often described as a technological breakthrough, but the real challenge lies in day-to-day reliability. The experience of the U.S. Ford-class has already proven that electromagnetic catapults and advanced arresting devices are not mature just because they are installed; they involve power supply, thermal management, software control, deck safety processes, and spare parts turnover. The Fujian Ship's ability to demonstrate launching the J-35 and KJ-600 indicates that it has passed the adaptation threshold; however, to transform this into combat readiness, we need to see how many sorties can be stably launched in a day, the failure rate after several weeks of continuous at-sea training, and whether recovery can maintain rhythm during nighttime and in complex sea conditions. In simple terms, successful launches are the first question of the final exam, not the entire test paper.

The Weaknesses of the Three Carrier Era Are in Personnel and Maintenance

It is easy for outsiders to group the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian ships together and conclude that China has entered the era of three aircraft carriers. I believe this statement is only half true. The number of hulls has indeed reached three, but the carrier-based air forces have not naturally transformed into three mature combat systems. Public information shows that the Shandong has been under long-term maintenance at the Yulin base in Sanya earlier this year; the Liaoning primarily undertakes long-range training and signal display; the Fujian is in the stage of synchronizing the new aircraft carrier, new catapult system, and new carrier-based aircraft. The real bottleneck may not be whether the shipyard can build more ships, but whether pilots, landing signal officers, deck handlers, aviation maintenance personnel, and ammunition support teams can expand at the pace of three aircraft carriers.

• The J-15T is suitable for heavy load anti-ship and air superiority missions, but its platform foundation still comes from the heavy carrier-based fighter route, which carries a significant maintenance burden.
• The deployment of the J-35 will enhance stealth penetration capabilities while also introducing new requirements for stealth coatings, hangar support, and low detectability maintenance.
• The KJ-600 amplifies the Fujian Ship's long-range operational radius, but training, spare parts, and crew training cycles for carrier-based early warning aircraft are longer.

Crossing the Taiwan Strait and Training in the South China Sea Are Connected

The Fujian Ship's southward journey to Sanya after crossing the Taiwan Strait should not be understood merely as a show of presence. A more practical explanation is that the PLA Navy is linking the northern construction and repair system, the political pressure points in the Taiwan Strait, the Hainan aircraft carrier support base, and the training waters of the South China Sea into a cycle. Once this cycle runs smoothly, the Fujian Ship can accumulate experience in launching carrier operations in an environment close to domestic air defense, supply, and maintenance networks, while also conveying a sense of continuous presence to Taiwan, the Philippines, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

My judgment is that the current most valuable aspect of the Fujian Ship is not how many aircraft it can carry at once, but whether it can institutionalize the training of the J-35, KJ-600, and electromagnetic catapult into a repeatable, maintainable, and personnel-replaceable process.

There is also a question that currently has no answer: if the Fujian Ship begins higher-intensity long-range training within the next year, will the PLA prioritize increasing the number of J-35s or first train the KJ-600 and deck support teams? These two choices will truly reveal the speed at which China's aircraft carrier construction transitions from the demonstration phase to the combat phase.