Geran-4 and Geran-5 are Changing the Russian Air War in 2026

Russia has spent years transforming a cheap loitering munition into an independent operational pressure system. By the end of 2026, the discussion is no longer about copying the "Shahed," but about creating a set of aerial assets with varying speeds, altitudes, and payloads. This is why the nighttime attack on October 31, in which, according to the Ukrainian Air Force, 145 strike drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile were used, is important not for the number of targets shot down, but for the architecture of the threat. The Ukrainian side reported intercepting or suppressing 108 aerial objects. Official Ukrainian figures reflect the position of one side of the conflict and require cautious interpretation; however, the overall trend is confirmed by independent observations.

From Mass "Shahed" to Mixed Attack

The "Geran-2" model, created based on an Iranian design, was effective primarily due to its price and mass production. Its piston engine, relatively low speed, and long range allowed for the launch of dozens of devices, forcing Ukrainian defenses to expend time and munitions. However, this scheme had its limits: mobile fire groups, electronic warfare assets, and inexpensive interceptor drones gradually learned to exploit the predictable characteristics of the target.

The emergence of the "Geran-4" and "Geran-5" indicates a different approach. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, the "Geran-4" has received a turbojet engine, reaches speeds of up to 350 kilometers per hour, and has a claimed range of about 770 kilometers. For the larger "Geran-5," a range of about 1000 kilometers and a warhead of approximately 90 kilograms are mentioned. These are estimates from the Ukrainian side, not results from independent tests, but even with this caveat, the direction of development is clear: speed, range, and payload are becoming more important than the simplicity of design.

According to Defence Matters, Ukrainian sources estimated the production of jet "Gerans" at about 3000 units per month, with serial production being set up in Tatarstan. This figure likely includes projected capacities and is not equal to guaranteed monthly output. However, it illustrates the scale of the task facing Kyiv. Even if actual production is significantly lower, the jet drone can no longer be considered a rare experimental sample.

Why Speed is More Important than the Nominal Number of Intercepts

In air defense, it is not only the share of destroyed targets that matters. Detection time, tracking duration, and solution cost are important. A slow device gives the operator the opportunity to pass the target to a mobile group or to launch an inexpensive interceptor. A fast device reduces this window and increases the likelihood that the defense will have to choose between an expensive missile and the risk of missing an attack.

In this sense, Russia is not building "superweapons," but rather creating an unpleasant economic problem. A single raid can combine slow drones, jet "Gerans," decoys, cruise missiles, and ballistic assets. They require different sensors and different means of destruction. Slow devices overload the calculations and deplete munitions, while fast ones exploit the gaps that arise, and missiles force the preservation of the most expensive systems for the final stage of the attack. The goal becomes not the guaranteed passage of each missile, but forcing the defense into a resource allocation error.

In September 2026, Ukrainian representatives reported that Russia had used thousands of jet drones in a month, and President Volodymyr Zelensky ordered the acceleration of interceptor production for such purposes. This confirms that the problem has shifted from the realm of tactics to that of an industrial race. The interceptor itself must not only achieve high speed. It needs a stable control channel in the presence of interference, precise target designation, maneuverability, and a serial price that allows for mass deployment.

"Center-2026" as a Rehearsal of Doctrine

It is symbolic that Russian conclusions from the war are simultaneously being formalized into a training system. At the strategic exercise "Center-2026," according to Defence Matters, over 47,000 servicemen, more than 600 drones, and about 60 robotic complexes were involved. Jet "Geran-4" and "Geran-5," interceptor drones, electronic warfare assets, and ground robots were demonstrated at the training ground. Russian statements from the exercise cannot be automatically accepted as proof of real combat effectiveness, but the composition of the demonstration itself is more important than the advertised characteristics: drones have ceased to be an appendage to motorized rifle units and have become part of reconnaissance, strike, logistics, and air defense simultaneously.

Parallel CSTO exercises "Interaction-2026," "Search-2026," and "Echelon-2026" give this process a geopolitical dimension. The official website of the organization reported approximately 2000 servicemen and 350 units of equipment from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as extensive use of drones, robotic complexes, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and air defense. The wording "taking into account the experience of modern armed conflicts" effectively means the institutionalization of the Ukrainian experience within collective training.

Limits of Russian Adaptation

Nevertheless, the new serial production does not eliminate old weaknesses. The jet engine, optics, and protected navigation increase the cost of the product and complicate dependence on electronics. The foreign components reported by Ukrainian intelligence show that the sanctions resilience of Russian industry remains incomplete. Moscow has learned to compensate for shortages with quantity, parallel imports, and simplification of design, but this is not the same as technological autonomy.

There is also a military limit. The more diverse the strike package, the harder it is to plan, supply, and coordinate. A large mass of devices creates a burden on its own production lines and requires constant updates of routes, software, and methods to bypass electronic warfare. Ukraine, for its part, is already building a separate layer of fast interceptors and cheap missiles. If this layer is produced in sufficient quantities, the advantage of the "Geran" will begin to diminish again.

Forecast

In 2026, Russia did not achieve unattainable air superiority. It accomplished something more practical — it turned the air campaign into a constantly changing task for Ukrainian defense. The "Geran-4" and "Geran-5" are important not as individual models, but as elements of a mixed system, where speed, mass, and diversity force the opponent to expend expensive resources faster than they can replenish them. Russian adaptation will continue as long as the industry maintains access to engines and electronics. But its success will not be determined by the number of drones displayed at the training ground, but by the ability to sustain production rates for months while simultaneously withstanding the cost reduction of Ukrainian interception.

Sources: Ukrainian Air Force via NV.ua publication from October 31, 2026; Defence Matters on jet "Gerans" and the "Center-2026" exercise; official CSTO website on the "Interaction-2026," "Search-2026," and "Echelon-2026" maneuvers; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, loss statistics as of October 31, 2026.