Geraniums and Mobilization in Russia After the 2026 Elections — War Approaches NATO's Borders
Dmitri VolkovGeraniums and Mobilization in Russia After the 2026 Elections — War Approaches NATO's Borders
The Kremlin denies preparations for a new mobilization at the very moment when the Russian recruitment system is already lagging behind the pace of losses. This is not a paradox, but a political calculation. After the parliamentary elections on September 18-20, the authorities seek to maintain a sense of control, while the front demands more and more personnel, and the use of drones is gradually turning the Ukrainian war into a problem for the entire eastern border of NATO.
Denial of Mobilization as a Military Measure
On September 18, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated that a covert mobilization is not planned. However, the Institute for the Study of War points to a fundamentally important circumstance: the current pace of losses in the Russian army exceeds the pace of recruitment by thousands of servicemen each month, and even at this cost, Moscow is not achieving its operational goals (ISW, September 18, 2026). Therefore, denial is not evidence of the absence of a solution. It is an attempt to buy time.
In 2022, the forced conscription of reservists led to the departure of hundreds of thousands of citizens and became one of the most painful political episodes of the war. Today, the Kremlin is trying to avoid a repeat of this effect. The system relies on high regional payments, contract recruitment, and administrative pressure, but each of these tools has its limits. Regional budgets are not limitless, monetary bonuses lose their appeal amid inflation, and coercion undermines the very social loyalty that the state seeks to demonstrate during elections.
Why Elections Do Not Mean a Pause on the Front
Russian elections have not merely a decorative but a functional significance for military policy. They give the Kremlin an opportunity to gauge the level of societal fatigue, redistribute resources among regions, and form a mandate for unpopular decisions. In this sense, high voter turnout is more important than real competition: it should show that society is still politically mobilized and has not transitioned to mass apathy.
But for this reason, an immediate announcement of a new wave of conscription would be irrational. Authorities first seek formal confirmation of public support, then attempt to present future measures as a continuation of existing policy rather than as an acknowledgment of the failure of voluntary recruitment. This resembles late Soviet practices of managing statistics: bad news does not disappear if its publication is postponed to the next quarter.
ISW also reports alarming signals among Russian officials and military recruiters. According to Bloomberg, some are preparing foreign bank accounts and sending relatives abroad due to fears of a new conscription. This information cannot automatically be considered evidence of a decision made, but it shows that within the apparatus, the scenario of mobilization is perceived as real.
“Geraniums” Become a Problem Not Just for Ukraine
At the same time, Russia is expanding the use of rocket variants of drones like the “Geranium.” Their higher speed reduces the reaction time of neighboring states, even when the device is initially aimed at a Ukrainian target. The Polish Air Force acted preemptively in the country’s airspace on September 17 amid Russian strikes on central Ukraine; Warsaw is also increasing patrols using F-16s and helicopters (ISW, September 18, 2026).
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that intelligence sees a risk of future drone and missile strikes against states on NATO's eastern flank. The likelihood of intentional attacks is not the only concern. Moscow may use a combination of random violations, navigational errors, and limited provocations, maintaining space for denial. French President Emmanuel Macron on September 18 described the Russian hybrid threat to Europe as intensifying and linked it to sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, and the risk of strikes on infrastructure.
The military-operational effect of such a strategy is measured not by the number of destroyed drones. Each sortie of a Polish fighter jet means fuel consumption, engine wear, strain on technical personnel, and the need to keep air defense units on alert. Russia forces NATO to pay for uncertainty. Even without intentionally crossing the border, drones test detection speed, rules of engagement, and the political readiness of allies to invoke Article 5.
The Strategic Limit of the Russian Model
A war of attrition requires not only munitions but also sustainable reproduction of personnel, commanders, and repair capacities. The Russian army is currently able to maintain pressure through numerical resources and industrial production of drones. However, the gap between the pace of losses and recruitment is gradually turning a military problem into a budgetary and demographic one.
The Kremlin can postpone mobilization, change its legal form, or replace the word “conscription” with an expansion of contract coercion. None of these options eliminate the causes of the deficit. Moreover, increased air activity at NATO's borders raises the geopolitical cost of the war and compels European states to accelerate air defense purchases, which diminishes the effect of Russian coercion.
The Russian system is still capable of waging war, but it can no longer do so without constantly shifting the costs onto society, regions, and neighboring states.
Conclusion
After the elections, Moscow will likely continue to deny mobilization until voluntary recruitment becomes clearly insufficient or until the front situation requires a sharp increase in numbers. The “Geraniums” and other drones provide the Kremlin with a cheaper tool for pressure on NATO, but do not resolve the army's personnel problem. The Russian military machine will survive into 2026 if it maintains its current level of funding; the cost of this survival will be expressed not only in new losses but also in the gradual depletion of the state, which increasingly compensates for the lack of personnel with technology and political denial.
Sources
Russia is denying plans for mobilization while facing high casualty rates that exceed recruitment, particularly after the parliamentary elections in September 2026. The Kremlin aims to maintain a sense of control as the front lines demand more personnel. Poland has increased its air patrols in response to potential drone threats from Russia, indicating heightened military readiness in the region.
- Russia is experiencing a high rate of military casualties exceeding recruitment rates.
- The Kremlin is denying any plans for mobilization despite increasing demands for troops.
- Poland is enhancing its air patrols in response to potential drone threats from Russia.
- Russian drones are becoming a concern for NATO's eastern flank.
- The political implications of the upcoming elections are influencing military decisions.