Germany's First Military Strategy: The Turning Point of European Defense

On April 22, 2026, Germany took a step it had avoided since the founding of the Federal Republic: Defense Minister Boris Pistorius presented the first independent military strategy of the Bundeswehr — a foundational document signed by Inspector General Carsten Breuer that articulates nothing less than the ambition to build the conventionally strongest army in Europe by the year 2039. The document encompasses five elements: an independent military strategy, a new capability profile, a personnel growth plan, a revised reserve strategy, and an agenda for the bureaucratization and modernization of the armed forces. It is the clearest expression to date of the turning point that Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared three days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which is now being consistently pursued militarily under Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

The numbers are ambitious and indicative of the scale of the catch-up challenge facing the Bundeswehr. Currently, the force has around 185,400 active soldiers. The target strength is set at 260,000 active personnel plus 200,000 reservists — totaling at least 460,000 personnel. This corresponds to more than a doubling of the current personnel count. Defense spending is set to rise this year to around 108 billion euros and is expected to grow to 153 billion euros by 2029. These amounts exceed anything that has been spent on armament investments in the post-war history of the Federal Republic by far.

Strategically, the document explicitly names Russia as the main threat and notes that Moscow is already operating below the threshold of war — through hybrid attacks, disinformation campaigns, and the constant testing of European defense mechanisms. The Bundeswehr is to deter potential adversaries and, should that fail, be capable of waging war. The strategy is structured in three tiers: in the short term, it focuses on defense and resilience, in the medium term on capability growth in all dimensions, and in the long term on technologically superior armed forces. New capabilities such as Deep Precision Strike are explicitly mentioned. The lessons learned from the Ukrainian theater of war — where innovation-driven weapon systems become outdated within weeks — are to form the foundation of a fundamentally reformed procurement policy. The recent order of kamikaze drones of the type FV-014 from Rheinmetall indicates that initial practical consequences have been drawn.

The historical significance of this document cannot be overstated. Since 1949, Germany's military policy has been characterized by a conscious restraint that was deeply rooted in political consensus. The Bundeswehr always planned and operated within the framework of NATO guidelines; there was no independent national threat analysis or military planning. The Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 and the dramatically changed security situation since then have profoundly shaken this consensus. The special fund of 100 billion euros from the previous traffic light coalition marked the financial breakthrough; the Military Strategy 2026 now provides the strategic framework.

However, it is noticeable that the strategy adopts a distinctly national perspective. The German Society for Foreign Policy noted in an analysis on April 23 that Germany is taking responsibility for Europe, but not necessarily with Europe. There is hardly any mention of harmonizing procurement with European partners, interoperable systems, or joint command structures. The development of expensive systems — strategic airlift, space-based reconnaissance — would be significantly more efficient in European cooperation. Berlin's preference for a national solo effort has caused some partners to feel uneasy. At the same time, the signal is unmistakable: as the largest economy on the continent, Germany is ready to take on the military leadership responsibility that corresponds to its economic strength.

The strategy gains additional urgency from the parallel debate about the future of the European mutual defense clause. As reported by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on April 23, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides attempted for the first time in March to activate Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty following Iranian drone attacks on his country — with disappointing results. No one in Brussels could tell him how the promised assistance should be practically organized. There is neither a procedure nor a role for EU institutions, let alone troops on high alert or joint command staffs. The EU military staff comprises just 120 employees. EU foreign affairs representative Kaja Kallas is now to develop proposals for three scenarios: hybrid attacks below the Article 5 threshold, simultaneous activation of NATO and EU mutual defense clauses, and attacks on EU states that are not NATO members.

The background to this debate is the growing uncertainty about the reliability of the American security guarantee. Donald Trump's repeated threats to leave NATO and his comments about a possible military confrontation over Greenland have left a trust deficit in European capitals that cannot be repaired. The Brussels think tank Bruegel is now discussing the idea of a European NATO — utilizing the existing NATO command structure but staffed exclusively with European military personnel. The protocols would remain intact, but at the top would be a European general. It is a thought that would have been unthinkable just two years ago.

For the Bundeswehr itself, the question remains whether the ambition can be realized. The personnel target of 460,000 forces assumes that Germany will ensure stable political majorities for the corresponding budgetary resources for decades. The experiences of recent years — from disastrous procurement policies to chronic personnel shortages — urge caution. Christian Mölling, one of Germany's most renowned security experts, called the strategy an important first step that should not be confused with a moment after which everything changes overnight. The coming years will show whether Germany will follow its words with actions — and whether it will do so in a European context or as a national power projection.