Houthi Seizes Meiyun Island and Attacks Saudi Oil Pipeline, 2026 Red Sea and Gulf Defense Line Forced to Split
S.WHouthis Capture Mayun Island and Attack Saudi Oil Pipeline, 2026 Red Sea and Gulf Defense Line Forced to Split
[Amman, September 13, 2026] From September 11 to 13, Houthi forces simultaneously pressured the Saudi security system from two directions. First, Houthi troops captured Mayun Island (Perim), located in the center of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, covering an area of about 13 square kilometers, and took control of the entire Red Sea coastline of Yemen and the port of Mocha; second, Saudi Arabia reported that a batch of long-range drones launched from Iraq hit the east-west oil pipeline between Riyadh and Medina, with Iraq subsequently seizing the launch platform in Maysan Province. Meanwhile, artillery shells fired by the Houthis at Saudi Arabia's Jizan Province injured two people and damaged a mosque. Viewed separately, these events are several border news items; viewed on the same map, they represent simultaneous pressure on southern Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea, and energy export routes.
Mayun Island Changes the Military Geometry of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait
Mayun Island is not an ordinary deserted island. It is located in the center of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, dividing the shipping lane into two channels, and is very close to the Yemeni mainland, providing a forward base for observation, target designation, drones, and anti-ship weapons. Reports cited by the Peninsula Research Institute and the Associated Press indicate that a senior officer from Yemen's internationally recognized government and Houthi officials have both confirmed the fact of the island's capture. Previously, the Saudi-led coalition had maintained a presence on the island, and the UAE was also reported to have built an airport there; the actual status of the airport and defensive works is unclear after the UAE withdrew from the Yemen conflict at the end of last year.
From a purely equipment perspective, the Houthis do not necessarily need to deploy large missile forces on the island. As long as they can establish continuous reconnaissance, communication, and simple supply capabilities, they can turn threats that originally relied on long-range coastal weapons into shorter-range, harder-to-warn maritime ambushes. Controlling the island and the coastlines on both sides can also force merchant ships to increase vigilance, reroute, or pay higher insurance costs. The Houthis claim that ordinary merchant ships are safe and only block vessels related to Saudi Arabia; however, past incidents targeting vessels unrelated to the conflict have weakened the credibility of this commitment.
Pipeline Attack Exposes Saudi Arabia's Second Weakness
The east-west oil pipeline was originally an insurance route reserved by Riyadh to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. According to data compiled by Al Jazeera, this pipeline carries about 4% to 5% of the global oil supply, connecting the eastern oil-producing region with the Red Sea coast, and theoretically can redirect some exports to Yanbu when Gulf shipping routes are obstructed. After the drone attack on September 11, Saudi Arabia preemptively closed the pipeline; on the 13th, Iraqi security forces announced they had seized the launch equipment and stated they were still investigating the perpetrators through forensic and technical analysis.
The key to this incident is not whether the pipeline will be restored quickly, but that it proves bypassing Hormuz does not equate to being free from threats. Saudi Arabia can procure Patriot, THAAD, and a large number of anti-drone systems, but it cannot cover a long energy lifeline stretching hundreds of kilometers through populated and desert areas with fixed air defense positions. Iraq claims the attack site is in the Tayeb area of Maysan Province, near the Iranian border, about 1,100 kilometers from Medina and about 800 kilometers from Riyadh; if this assessment is ultimately supported by technical investigation, the attackers used not simple tactical drones, but systems with longer ranges and planning capabilities.
Capability Triangle Again Shows Gaps
When assessing Gulf military power, I always use a simple capability triangle: equipment, training, and systems. Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in the first aspect and has established a more mature force than a decade ago in the second aspect, but the third aspect—cross-regional intelligence sharing, border control, damage assessment, and joint command—remains the weakest link.
The Iraqi government’s announcement of preventive sovereignty, promising not to allow its territory to become a platform for attacks on neighboring countries, and closing or inspecting several ports leading to Iran at Saudi Arabia's request, is a necessary political constraint and explains why Riyadh has not immediately retaliated against targets within Iraq. However, seizing a launch platform does not equate to dismantling a network; border militias, smuggling routes, commercial satellite imagery, and low-cost drones can continuously change nodes. What Saudi Arabia needs is not another expensive single procurement contract, but to integrate early warning, electronic warfare, short-range interception, and on-site vigilance into a unified energy infrastructure protection system.
Saudi Arabia's Choice Shifts from Deterrence to Crisis Management
The Houthi attack in Jizan has brought the threat directly back to Saudi territory. The organization claims the targets are military bases, weapon depots, and command centers in the Sharurah area of Najran Province; the Saudi civil defense department reported damage to civilian buildings in Jizan's Tuwal Province. There are discrepancies in the narratives from both sides, and casualties and hit effects should still be verified by independent investigation, but the military facts are clear enough: Saudi Arabia is facing not a single-direction ballistic missile attack, but a composite pressure from the Yemeni coast, Yemeni interior, and the Iraqi border.
Riyadh's request for Baghdad to investigate without immediately retaliating across the border indicates that its priority is to avoid expanding the Houthi battlefield into a Saudi-Iraqi-Iranian triangular war. This choice is diplomatically restrained but has military costs: if the adversary judges that Saudi Arabia will only intercept, protest, and wait for allies, then each low-cost attack can yield higher political returns. The U.S. and European navies can protect some shipping routes, but they cannot ensure the daily security of Saudi land energy facilities; the air defense systems purchased by Gulf countries in the past have also primarily been used to intercept incoming targets, rather than to prevent launch platforms from being deployed hundreds of kilometers away.
The True Meaning of the Red Sea Crisis
The value of Mayun Island lies not only in whether the Houthis can permanently hold it. Control of the island may change repeatedly due to airstrikes, counterattacks, or supply difficulties, but the Houthis have already proven that the Saudi-supported government forces and regional alliances cannot automatically prevent them from seizing key terrain. About 76,000 people have been displaced since July due to the Yemen conflict, with the International Organization for Migration stating that the number has sharply increased after the escalation of the conflict; about 1,400 Yemenis fled to Djibouti within 24 hours, indicating that this has simultaneously become a humanitarian crisis and a maritime security crisis.
For global shipping, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz now form a mutually amplifying pressure. One is pressured by Iran, and the other is controlled by the Houthis; even without a complete blockade, the costs of war insurance, charter fees, and rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope will rise first. For Saudi Arabia, the most difficult contradiction is the coexistence of strategic autonomy and security dependence: Riyadh can have the world's most advanced interceptors but still relies on external intelligence, maritime escort, and political mediation to ensure these systems function.
Military personnel know that capturing a position is often easier than holding it; but Gulf countries need to answer another question: when the enemy simultaneously attacks the strait, the border, and the energy pipeline, who is responsible for connecting equipment, training, and systems into a force that can sustain combat? Saudi Arabia can buy more weapons, but it cannot rely solely on procurement to solve this structural contradiction.
Sources
Houthi forces captured Mayyun Island from September 11 to 13, 2026, exerting pressure on Saudi Arabia's security. They also attacked oil pipelines between Riyadh and Medina using drones launched from Iraq. Concurrent artillery strikes in Jizan province resulted in civilian injuries and damage. This series of events highlights the escalating military threat to Saudi Arabia from Houthi forces and their capabilities.
- Houthi forces captured Mayyun Island, a strategic location in the Red Sea.
- Drones launched from Iraq targeted Saudi oil pipelines between Riyadh and Medina.
- Houthi artillery attacks in Jizan province caused injuries and damage to civilian structures.
- Saudi Arabia temporarily closed the attacked oil pipeline as a precaution.
- The situation indicates a complex military threat to Saudi Arabia from multiple fronts.