ISWAP deploys 100 fighters to Mali and 50 to Nigeria — the African front of the Islamic State expands in 2026

In Ménaka, in eastern Mali, the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISSP) is no longer holding its position as it would like. According to information gathered by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) from defectors and fighters still in contact with the group, the shura council of the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) has reportedly decided to send 100 men to this border area of Niger. At the same time, 50 fighters are said to have departed for Nasarawa State in central Nigeria. This is not just a simple tactical reinforcement. It is the first public indication of organized mobility between two theaters that security agencies continue to treat separately.

A movement in two directions

The choice of Ménaka is revealing. The area, located near the Malian and Nigerien borders, is more of a hub of paths than a city to defend. The ISSP has retreated there as Malian forces attempted to regain the initiative, but the group retains rural depth and circulation relays. Sending men from the Lake Chad basin would allow for the rebuilding of units after losses incurred and the transfer of skills, particularly in the laying of explosive devices, observation, and the use of drones.

The announced deployment to Nasarawa responds to another logic. This state in central Nigeria is very far from ISWAP's strongholds in Borno. However, it offers forests, trade routes, and proximity to transit areas to the northwest. The ISS is already reporting a dormant cell in the state, comparable to that in Kogi, which had been linked to the attack on a church in 2022 and the escape from Kuje prison. Fifty men do not constitute an army. However, they are sufficient to train recruits, finance a network, and test the response times of the federal police.

American pressure is not enough to cut the network

This dispersion comes after a difficult year for ISWAP. In May, a joint American-Nigerian operation killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki and several of his lieutenants in the Lake Chad basin, according to the governments of both countries and the BBC. The operation disrupted a chain of command and financial circuits. It did not eliminate the island sanctuaries or the skills accumulated by the surviving cadres.

The group's reactions also show an organization under pressure, but not disorganized. Sources cited by the ISS report a 50% increase in taxes imposed on cattle and fishing in areas controlled by ISWAP, as well as a lowering of the minimum recruitment age from 17 to 15 years. The group is also seeking to bring in foreign trainers, particularly for anti-aircraft weapons. These elements come from indirect intelligence sources and need to be confirmed, but their operational coherence is concerning: when strikes reduce revenues, the organization expands both its collection and its recruitment space.

The real advantage is the fragmentation of states

In January, ISWAP and ISSP fighters reportedly cooperated in attacks against Diori-Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101 in Niamey. According to ISS sources, the ISSP had conducted reconnaissance before the arrival of elements from the Lake Chad basin. Nigerien forces were caught off guard despite signs of movements to the west. The problem was therefore not the total absence of intelligence, but its lack of circulation between commands.

On the ground, the map does not behave like organizational charts. Fighters cross borders through corridors of traders, fishermen, and traffickers. The states, on the other hand, have separated responsibilities between the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel States Alliance, and national agencies. The juntas of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have broken with ECOWAS and reduced their institutional exchanges. They have created a joint force, but it does not yet have a proven mechanism to transmit a real-time alert from Maiduguri to an isolated post in Ménaka.

The important figure is not 150 fighters. It is the number of administrative borders they can cross before a command center reacts.

A risk of splintering, not yet a continental offensive

It would be premature to speak of a unified African caliphate. Islamic State groups are competing for resources, recruits, and routes. The ISSP needs help because it is facing difficulties in Ménaka; ISWAP, for its part, is looking to compensate for military pressure in Lake Chad. Their cooperation can therefore be transactional and reversible.

But this distinction should not reassure the military staffs. A lasting alliance is not necessary to produce strategic effects. A few instructors, a local guide, and a radio transmission are enough to move an attack method from one theater to another. Nigeria will need to monitor Nasarawa and the routes to Kogi without diverting all its forces from Borno. Niger must treat the Lake Chad-Niamey axis as a single theater of operations. Finally, Mali cannot consider Ménaka as an isolated pocket.

The next alert will be concrete: the appearance of drones, coordinated ambushes, or simultaneous pressure on remote checkpoints. If these signals appear in central Nigeria and in the Ménaka region at the same time, it will no longer be a simple movement of fighters. It will be proof that the Islamic State has begun to export a lightweight command chain across the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin.

Sources

• Institute for Security Studies — Fragmented security allows terrorists’ cross-mobility across Lake Chad and Sahel
• BBC — Senior IS leader killed in joint operation, US and Nigeria say
• The Guardian — Al-Qaida and IS-linked violence in Africa’s Sahel belt