Joint Operations Command Training for FY2026 to Validate Island and Amphibious Operations on June 29

In the announcement from the Joint Staff Office dated June 19, what first caught my attention was the listing of training locations. Japan Self-Defense Force facilities, Nakadomari Town and Minamitane Town in Kagoshima Prefecture, and the surrounding maritime and airspace areas of our country. More than a grand slogan, this lineup of place names speaks volumes about the current practicalities of Japan's defense.

According to the Joint Staff Office, the FY2026 Joint Operations Force Organization Training will be conducted from June 29 to July 3. The purpose is to exercise and validate the integrated operations of the Joint Operations Force, aiming to maintain and enhance integrated operational capabilities. The main training items are land operations and amphibious operations, with participating units including the Ground Self-Defense Force, Northern Army, Western Army, Maritime Self-Defense Force, various regional forces, Information Operations Group, Air Self-Defense Force, Air Support Group, Space Operations Group, Air System Communications Unit, Joint Operations Command, and the Cyber Defense Force.

The Focus of Island Defense is Not Just Combat

This training is not merely a depiction of landing and recapture. The explicit mention of Nakadomari Town and Minamitane Town suggests an intention to simultaneously address troop deployment in the southwestern region, air and maritime transport, rear support, and communication maintenance. Amphibious operations tend to attract attention for their visually striking landing scenes. However, in reality, transportation planning, supply, medical evacuation, coordination with civilian airports and ports, and command communications in an electromagnetic environment are what determine success or failure.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Information Operations Group, Space Operations Group, and Cyber Defense Force are listed together in the same announcement. This indicates that island defense is not merely a matter of lining up land, sea, and air units, but has shifted to the issue of how to consolidate satellite communications, network protection, and detection information from unmanned aerial vehicles and vessels into the Joint Operations Command.

The Training Environment Created by Chinese Coast Guard and Drone Activities

This training announcement should not be read in isolation from the situation around the Senkaku Islands. According to updated materials from the Japan Coast Guard and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard have been entering the contiguous zone almost daily, except during inclement weather, and have repeatedly intruded into territorial waters several times a month. According to the RIPS East Asian Maritime Security Newsletter, on June 10, four Chinese Coast Guard ships, numbered 2501, 2301, 2303, and 2304, entered Japanese territorial waters around Uotsuri Island and navigated for about 90 minutes.

In the same week, pressure continued in the air domain. In a June 12 announcement from the Joint Staff Office, Chinese Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft and TB-001 reconnaissance attack drones flew from the East China Sea towards the southern Daito Islands and off the coast of Okinawa, prompting the Air Self-Defense Force to scramble fighter jets. On June 11, it was also confirmed that the Chinese Dongdiao-class intelligence-gathering ship 796 advanced eastward through the Osumi Strait from the west of Kuchinoerabu Island and exited into the Pacific Ocean.

Coast guard ships, intelligence-gathering vessels, and drones may each appear to be limited incidents when viewed in isolation. However, when they overlap in timing, they create a structure that places a burden on the surveillance network, air bases, ports, and communication lines of the southwestern islands from peacetime. It is highly likely that the Joint Operations Force Organization Training is keeping such complex pressures in mind.

The Need for Rapid Integration in the Japan-U.S. Alliance

This announcement does not explicitly mention U.S. military participation. Nevertheless, the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance remains. In actual southwestern defense, the integration of U.S. military intelligence, transport, supply, and air and maritime capabilities is unavoidable. If the Joint Operations Command cannot increase the speed of coordination within the Self-Defense Forces, the overall response speed of the alliance will not improve.

During the Cold War, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force could relatively clearly delineate its role-sharing with the U.S. Navy centered on SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) defense. In the current southwestern region, that delineation is not straightforward. Responses to coast guard ships involve the Japan Coast Guard, airspace incursions involve the Air Self-Defense Force, cyber and space obstacles involve specialized units, and troop deployments to remote islands involve both the Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces. Before political decisions, on-site information must not be delayed.

The Overlooked Danger is Small Delays

In my view, the value of this training lies not in flashy combat scenarios but in how much the procedures for troop organization can be shortened. The five-day period from June 29 to July 3 is not long. Therefore, it is meaningful to verify who makes the first judgment, what information reaches the command, and which units move first when transitioning from peacetime monitoring incidents to near-emergency joint operations.

Equipment shortages can be somewhat compensated for by budget. However, small delays in reporting, judgment, orders, and supply are difficult to detect except through training. The true weakness of southwestern island defense often manifests not in missile range but in the density of integrated command during the first few hours.

Main sources: Joint Staff Office announcement dated June 19, 2026, Japan Coast Guard materials on the waters around the Senkaku Islands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs updated materials from June 3, 2026, RIPS East Asian Maritime Security Vol.47.