The Liaoning Aircraft Carrier Enters the Western Pacific for Routine Training, PLA Aircraft Carrier Operational Radius Continues to Expand

On October 15, the Liaoning aircraft carrier group entered the Western Pacific for training. The Chinese Navy stated that this is part of the annual routine training plan, aimed at testing the troops' readiness and operational capabilities, and is not directed against any specific country or target. This statement is not surprising; what is truly worth analyzing is the training area and timing of the operation: it occurs against the backdrop of ongoing activities around the Taiwan Strait, with Taiwan anticipating that the PLA may enter a peak exercise period from November to December this year.

What This Action by the Liaoning Carrier Indicates

Public information has not disclosed the specific vessels, aircraft numbers, and training subjects of the group, so one cannot directly equate this entry into the Western Pacific with "exercises around Taiwan." However, the fact that the Liaoning can enter the Western Pacific under fleet escort from nearshore at least indicates that the PLA Navy has incorporated long-range training for aircraft carriers into its routine arrangements. For an aircraft carrier, leaving the nearshore does not merely increase the range; it also means addressing a whole set of issues such as air early warning, fleet air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and at-sea replenishment, especially as support from land-based aviation gradually diminishes.

This is also where the Liaoning still holds value. It is not the latest Fujian carrier, and its ski-jump takeoff limits the use of fixed-wing early warning aircraft and heavy carrier-based aircraft. However, as a mature platform within the PLA's aircraft carrier training system, it can undertake continuous integration of carrier-based aircraft operations, fleet coordination, and long-range command processes. In simple terms, the combat capability of an aircraft carrier is not measured by docking at the pier but is honed through successive rounds of at-sea training that integrate personnel, aircraft, and escort vessels into a cohesive system.

Pressure in the Taiwan Strait Does Not Only Come from Aircraft Carriers

The Taiwan defense department reported detecting 15 PLA military aircraft, 10 naval vessels, and 7 government ships during the relevant period, with 13 military aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering Taiwan's northern, central, southwestern, and eastern air defense identification zones. The numbers themselves cannot prove that these forces belong to the Liaoning carrier group, but they indicate that the aircraft carrier's long-range operations are situated within the same strategic context as the air and maritime activities around the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan side also pointed out that Beijing has conducted at least one large-scale exercise around Taiwan each year since 2022, while no operations of comparable scale have occurred so far this year.

There is an easily overlooked change here: the PLA is placing long-range training for aircraft carriers, routine activities for military aircraft, and actions by coast guard and government vessels on the same "pressure curve." The aircraft carrier is responsible for demonstrating long-range presence and training penetration capabilities, military aircraft and naval vessels compress the warning and response space, while government vessels push friction below the threshold of military conflict. The combination of these three does not necessarily lead to immediate large-scale actions but can continuously deplete Taiwan's surveillance, standby, and decision-making resources.

Growth in Capability and Existing Shortcomings Coexist

The author believes that the greatest significance of this action by the Liaoning is not "the aircraft carrier surrounding Taiwan," but rather the PLA's gradual accumulation of repeatable long-range training. Repeatability means transitioning from a one-time demonstration to a combat system; however, public data still does not answer how long the group can continuously train in the Western Pacific, the efficiency of resupply, and how high the sortie rate of carrier-based aircraft can be under complex weather and conditions far from land-based support. These factors are more decisive for the actual combat capability of the aircraft carrier than a single exposure of its route.

Therefore, subsequent observations should not only focus on whether the Liaoning appears again but should also include whether the Fujian carrier joins training in more distant waters, whether the escort group becomes fixed, and whether the PLA can stabilize the networking of long-range aerial operations with land-based long-range strikes, reconnaissance satellites, and unmanned systems. The real question is whether, after this "routine training," the PLA can transform sporadic long-range presence into a sustainable operational rhythm throughout the year.

Sources

• Taipei Times, reports from October 15 and 16, 2026
• Taiwan News, public activity reports from Taiwan's defense department