M23 and Rwanda before the ICJ — 632 civilians killed in eastern Congo in 2026

In The Hague, on June 26, Kinshasa moved part of its eastern war from the hills of North Kivu to bring it before the International Court of Justice. The Democratic Republic of the Congo accuses Rwanda of violating several international conventions, including those related to genocide, torture, and racial discrimination. On the ground, however, the front line has not stopped to wait for the judges.

That same weekend, regional sources reported that the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) had documented at least 632 civilians killed in three months in North Kivu and Ituri. This figure must be handled with caution, as the areas of Rutshuru, Masisi, Lubero, and Djugu remain difficult to access. But it provides a scale. This is no longer just a diplomatic crisis between Kigali and Kinshasa. It is a war of attrition fought over roads, airports, mines, and villages.

Kinshasa's complaint changes the political landscape

According to reports by Reuters and Citizen Digital, Kinshasa is asking the ICJ to order Rwanda to cease its alleged violations and to pay reparations to Congolese victims. The Congolese government claims that crimes against civilians include massacres, extrajudicial executions, torture, sexual violence, forced displacements, and discrimination over several decades.

This is not the first Congolese attempt before the ICJ. A first case was abandoned in 2001. A second was dismissed in 2006 on jurisdictional grounds, with the Court determining that the legal conditions were not met against Kigali. The third attempt is therefore more than a symbolic gesture. Kinshasa wants to build a case that transforms the alleged support for the M23 into state responsibility.

Rwanda regularly denies supporting armed groups active in the DRC. But UN experts and several Western governments have already concluded that Kigali provides support to the M23. This is where the case becomes dangerous for the region. If the issue moves from the gray area of intelligence to an international judicial process, every convoy, every movement of artillery, and every city capture becomes a potential piece.

The M23 maintains an advantage on the axes

On the ground, the map remains more brutal than the law. The M23 has built its advantage around the axes connecting Goma, Rutshuru, Masisi, Sake, and Bukavu. In eastern Congo, holding a road is sometimes worth more than holding a provincial capital for a few hours. A controlled road allows for taxation, filtering, moving fighters, and cutting off markets.

The UN's pressure to reopen the airports of Goma and Kavumu must be read in this context. Goma is not just a border town facing Gisenyi. It is a logistical platform for humanitarian aid, personnel rotations, medical evacuations, and state presence in a fragmenting province. Kavumu, near Bukavu, plays the same role for South Kivu. Closing or neutralizing these points slows down any organized response.

From experience, a counter-insurgency operation that loses its landing strips and main roads quickly becomes blind. Congolese armored vehicles do not solve this problem if they cannot be resupplied, repaired, and coordinated. Armed groups know this perfectly well. They do not always seek the decisive battle. They seek the bottleneck.

632 civilian deaths and a war of villages

The figure of 632 civilians killed in three months in North Kivu and Ituri shows the other side of the conflict. International attention is focused on the M23 because this movement has military and political capabilities superior to many other groups. But Ituri also remains a theater of communal violence, armed predation, and attacks against isolated civilians.

The difference with the Sahel is instructive. In Mali or Niger, jihadists often seek to cut the state off from its peripheries by pressuring convoys and outposts. In eastern Congo, the logic is denser. The front lines intertwine with mines, farmland, smuggling networks, and old community fractures. Territorial control is measured less by flags than by the ability to impose a passage, a tax, or a fear.

We must also acknowledge what we do not yet know. The exact toll by responsible group remains incomplete. MONUSCO's aggregated figures do not always indicate what portion is attributable to the M23, other local militias, or reprisals related to regular forces. This uncertainty does not weaken the diagnosis. It merely reminds us that the Congolese war often produces more deaths in the margins than in the press releases.

Washington and Doha push for peace, but the ground resists

Diplomatic efforts around Washington, Doha, and regional mechanisms seek to maintain a trajectory of de-escalation. The UN envoy for the Great Lakes region has called on the parties to remain committed to peace in eastern Congo. This formula is necessary, but it is not enough. A negotiation that does not change the balance of power on the Goma-Rutshuru and Bukavu-Kavumu axes remains vulnerable to the next offensive.

The international trial, if it progresses, could increase pressure on Kigali. It could also harden positions. Kinshasa gains a legal and diplomatic weapon. Rwanda may see it as an attempt at political encirclement. The M23, for its part, may seek to improve its position before the diplomatic window closes.

The immediate risk is not a large announced battle. It is a succession of road closures, village attacks, and logistical blockages that make any ceasefire almost theoretical.

The next weak point

The point to watch is not The Hague, despite the importance of the complaint. It is the space between Goma, Sake, and the access routes to South Kivu. If the airports remain constrained and if the roads remain under pressure, the Congolese state will struggle to transform its diplomatic counter-offensive into real security for civilians.

The ICJ can name responsibilities. It does not reopen a runway, secure a convoy, or protect a village at night. In eastern Congo, the war of 2026 will still be played out over a few kilometers of road. That is where the M23 has built its advantage. That is where Kinshasa will have to break it, or accept that the legal process arrives too late for those who already live behind the lines.