Mali: The Offensive of April 25 and the Collapse of the North — A Strategic Turning Point in the Sahel

Saturday, April 25, 2026, will be etched in the recent history of the Sahel as the day when the security edifice built by the Malian junta around its alliances with Moscow collapsed in a matter of hours. At dawn, six Malian cities were simultaneously struck along a front of 1,200 kilometers, from Kidal in the north to Bamako in the west. Never, since the fall of Timbuktu in 2012, had the country experienced an attack of such magnitude.

The assault was launched at 5:30 AM by joint columns of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), the Sahelian branch of Al-Qaeda. Hundreds of fighters, mounted on armed pick-ups, armored vehicles, and motorcycles, breached the checkpoints scattered along the routes leading to the main military positions. The swiftness of the attack left no possibility for a coordinated response. Kidal, the symbolic city of the reconquest led by the junta in November 2023, fell within hours. FLA fighters raised the flag of Azawad at the central intersection, marking the return of independence forces to this strategic locality.

The hardest blow, however, occurred in Kati, the garrison located about fifteen kilometers northwest of Bamako, where the headquarters of the Malian armed forces is situated. General Sadio Camara, Minister of Defense and architect of the military rapprochement with Russia, was killed during the attack. At 47 years old, Camara was one of the most influential figures in the junta that has been in power since the coup d'état of 2020. His disappearance represents an irreparable loss for the regime of General Assimi Goïta, who had to wait three days before reappearing in public on April 28, during a meeting at the presidential palace in Koulouba with a Russian delegation led by Ambassador Igor Gromyko. A national tribute was paid to him on April 30, under high security.

The fall of Tessalit, confirmed on May 1, dealt an additional blow to the military credibility of the junta. This strategic camp, located near the Algerian border, was the most advanced base in the Sahara, equipped with a runway capable of accommodating helicopters and heavy military aircraft. According to local and security sources, the Malian army and its Russian allies from Africa Corps abandoned their positions without a fight, a surrender that speaks volumes about the state of disrepair of the military apparatus. The Aguelhok camp, 100 kilometers from Kidal, was also taken over by armed groups.

The alliance between the FLA and JNIM is the most significant development of this crisis. Until now, Tuareg rebel groups and jihadist organizations had maintained a certain operational distance. The coordination observed on April 25 reveals a strategy developed in utmost secrecy over several months, if not longer. The converging columns were deployed with remarkable logistical precision, circumventing Malian and Russian intelligence apparatuses. On Thursday, April 30, JNIM officially called for the formation of a "common front" to "end the junta," mentioning a "peaceful and inclusive transition." At the same time, the jihadists established a road blockade on several routes leading to Bamako, gradually suffocating the capital.

Assimi Goïta's response was part of a carefully orchestrated communication strategy. In a speech on April 28, he claimed that the situation was "under control," while acknowledging a moment of "extreme gravity." The FLA spokesperson, Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, categorically denied this assertion in an exclusive interview, stating that the regime "will fall, sooner or later." From Moscow, Russian authorities asserted that their forces would remain in Mali, rejecting the rebels' call for a complete withdrawal. This Russian position comes as the human toll of losses inflicted on Africa Corps contractors remains difficult to establish accurately, with several sources mentioning dozens of dead and wounded among Russian personnel.

The regional repercussions were immediate. In Ouagadougou, Captain Ibrahim Traoré immediately reinforced security measures in the Burkinabè capital, fearing a domino effect. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which includes Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, faced its first real test of credibility since its creation and proved almost entirely incapable of coordinating a common military response. The near-total silence of the AES during the first 48 hours of the crisis was interpreted by many observers as a sign of profound institutional paralysis.

The human toll of these attacks remains provisional. According to a hospital source, at least 23 people were killed during the assaults, but this figure likely does not reflect the true extent of military losses, both on the Malian and Russian sides. The abduction of Mountaga Tall, a lawyer and opposition figure to the junta, reported on May 3 in Bamako, further illustrates the deterioration of the internal political situation. Two loud explosions were heard near Bamako airport on April 28, fueling fears of a possible advance of armed groups toward the capital.

This crisis highlights the evident failure of the strategy deployed by the junta since the departure of French forces from Barkhane in 2022 and that of MINUSMA in 2023. The pivot towards Russia, materialized by the arrival of Wagner mercenaries and their transition to Africa Corps, has not stabilized the north of the country. On the contrary, the liberation of the security space once covered by UN and French forces has granted armed groups increased freedom of movement. The conquest of Kidal, presented in November 2023 as the triumph of the junta, turns out to have been merely a fleeting interlude.

The major question now is the survival of Goïta's regime. The unprecedented alliance between Tuareg separatists and Sahelian jihadists creates an unprecedented configuration, where the junta finds itself simultaneously confronted with a territorial rebellion in the north and a terrorist threat at the gates of its capital. The capacity of the AES to respond collectively, the Russian determination to maintain its engagement, and the reaction of the international community will determine the evolution of a crisis that now far exceeds the Malian framework to concern the entirety of Sahelian security.