Moscow institutionalizes its presence in the Sahel — strategic agreement with Ouagadougou and AES ministerial format

On February 12, 2026, in Moscow, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, Karamoko Jean Marie Traoré, and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov signed an agreement titled "Foundations of Relations." This document replaces the old legal framework dating back to the Soviet era and formalizes a new strategic partnership focused on security, counter-terrorism, and coordination on international platforms. For Ouagadougou, this is a "historic" turning point. For Moscow, it is the institutional anchoring of a presence that no longer depends on precarious contracts with private military companies.

From mercenarism to state diplomacy

Since the arrival of Wagner in Mali in 2021, and then in Burkina Faso and Niger after the coups d'état of 2022-2023, Russia initially relied on a discreet and deniable military presence. The Russian "instructors" operated under the cover of the Wagner group, allowing the Kremlin to deny any direct involvement. That phase is over.

The agreement of February 12 marks a transition to state-to-state cooperation. Lavrov explicitly mentioned "continued support in the field of security" and confirmed that "the fight against terrorism in the Sahel remains a priority for Moscow." The translation on the ground: Russian forces, whether under the Ministry of Defense or reorganized structures post-Wagner, are now covered by a formal diplomatic framework.

This is new. And it is strategic.

The "Russia-AES" format: a regional architecture

Alongside the bilateral agreement, Moscow is institutionalizing its relationship with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — the bloc formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger after their break with France and ECOWAS. Two ministerial meetings in the "Russia-AES" format have already taken place. A third is scheduled for this year in one of the three countries, with Burkina Faso holding the rotating presidency of the AES.

This format resembles the cooperation mechanisms that Moscow has developed elsewhere — with the CSTO in Central Asia, with Syria and Iran in the Middle East. It is not about ad hoc deployments, but a regional architecture that allows Russia to coordinate its positions, harmonize its arms deliveries, and collectively influence international bodies, particularly at the UN.

The agreement explicitly provides for "coordination on international platforms" and "an expansion of cooperation in the media field to counter disinformation against AES countries." In clear terms: diplomatic support in New York, information warfare against Paris and Washington.

The void left by Barkhane

This Russian consolidation occurs in a context of near-total Western withdrawal. France evacuated its last bases in Niger at the end of 2023, after leaving Mali in 2022 and drastically reducing its presence in Burkina Faso. The United States is attempting a discreet repositioning in Nigeria, but its capacity for influence in central Sahel is largely diminished.

General Amadou Ibro, chief of staff to Nigerien President Abdourahamane Tiani, stated bluntly on February 11 in front of a packed stadium in Niamey: "We were not at war; it is now that we will enter into war with France." Paris described these remarks as "information warfare," but they reveal the irreversibility of the break.

This rupture directly benefits Moscow. Where France offered targeted counter-terrorism operations conditioned on adherence to democratic norms, Russia provides unconditional support — arms, training, intelligence, and diplomatic cover at the UN against Western resolutions.

An underestimated military presence

On the ground, Russian forces remain discreet but active. In Mali, they operate from the former French bases in Gao and Ménaka. In Burkina Faso, reports indicate regular rotations of instructors in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. In Niger, the situation is less clear since the closure of the American base in Agadez, but local sources mention a growing presence near Niamey.

The deployed capabilities include Mi-24 helicopters, Pantsir air defense systems, and — a crucial detail — electronic warfare means to counter jihadist drones. Since 2023, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group JNIM has conducted 69 drone attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso, according to open-source tracking data. AES forces, trained by France for ground operations, severely lack electronic countermeasures.

It is precisely in this gap that Moscow is stepping in.

A long-term strategy

Unlike Operation Barkhane, which was presented as temporary and conditioned on a "ramping up" of local armies, Russia does not set a withdrawal timeline. The February 12 agreement contains no time-limiting clause. The "Russia-AES" format is designed to last.

This approach carries risks. Russian forces in the Sahel are relatively limited — probably fewer than 2,000 men spread across three countries. They cannot, on their own, reverse the jihadist dynamic. But that is not the objective. Moscow seeks to secure its partners in power, maintain access to strategic resources (uranium in Niger, gold in Mali), and establish a permanent presence that gives it leverage in the competition with the West.

From experience, I know that Sahelian populations do not judge foreign partners by their statements, but by their ability to concretely improve security. However, despite the Russian presence, jihadist attacks have not decreased in Mali and Burkina Faso. They have even intensified in certain areas.

The question is not whether Russia is "replacing" France. It is to understand that it is pursuing a different strategy: not to win the war against terrorism, but to win the war of influence. And for now, it is winning.