$38 Billion Ramstein Commitments — Why France's and Italy's Silence Reveals Europe's Structural Defenselessness

On February 12 and 13, 2026, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group announced a historic figure in Brussels: $38 billion in military support for Ukraine in 2026. However, behind this impressive sum lies a fundamental division in European defense policy, made visible by the demonstrative silence of two key players — France and Italy. These two states, which together represent nearly 40% of EU defense spending, refused to make concrete financial commitments for 2026.

The Arithmetic of Commitments — Who Pays, Who Remains Silent

Of the announced $38 billion, only $6 billion in concrete aid packages have been confirmed so far. The remaining $32 billion remain political declarations of intent without binding timelines or delivery commitments. The list of contributors is revealing:

• Germany: €11.5 billion (of which €1 billion for drones)
• Norway: $7 billion ($1.4 billion for drones, $700 million for air defense)
• United Kingdom: £3 billion (£500 million for air defense, £150 million for PURL)
• Sweden: €3.7 billion (24th aid package)
• Denmark: $2 billion
• Belgium: €1 billion
• Spain: $1.2 billion

France and Italy — two of the three largest economies in the EU — are completely absent from this list. As are Poland, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, and eight other EU member states. What superficially appears to be a large European solidarity coalition reveals itself upon closer inspection as an alliance of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic-Baltic states. The major Southern European and Eastern European players remain largely absent.

France's Strategic Alternative — Industrial Autonomy Instead of Arms Purchases

France's refusal to make a financial commitment is not a simple denial of aid, but an expression of a fundamental strategic divergence. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Paris proposed using funds not for arms purchases, but for building the European defense industry. This position was clarified on February 9, when France's Minister of Defense Catherine Vautrin signed a declaration of intent for joint arms production in Kyiv.

The French logic is clear: Why buy Patriot missiles from American stocks when one could create the capacity to produce SAMP/T systems or Crotale NG in Europe? Why import 155mm shells from the USA when NEXTER and Rheinmetall could jointly establish production lines in Ukraine?

However, this logic collides with the operational reality at the front. Ukraine needs immediately deployable air defense systems in 2026, not factories that could deliver by 2028. The conflict between long-term industrial autonomy and short-term military needs is the square of the circle of European security policy — and the Ramstein results show that Europe is still unable to address both dimensions simultaneously.

The PURL Trap — European Money for American Weapons

The symbolic irony of the Ramstein commitments is further amplified by the role of the PURL initiative (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List). Of the $6 billion in already confirmed aid, $500 million flows into this mechanism — a NATO program that allows European states to purchase American weapons for Ukraine.

The four largest PURL contributors — the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden — are financing Patriot missiles, artillery ammunition, and GMLRS from American production. The total amount that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte aims for PURL in 2026 is $15.5 billion. This means: A significant portion of the "European" military aid is effectively subsidizing the American arms industry.

Here lies the core of the French criticism. If European states can raise $38 billion for Ukraine, why not $20 billion for building European production capacities? The answer is as simple as it is frustrating: Because it is faster to buy existing American stockpiles than to build new European factories. Because political urgency demands short-term solutions, not long-term investments. And because European governments — with the exception of France — are largely unwilling to bear the political costs of an industrial autonomy strategy.

Italy's Silence — Between Atlanticism and Internal Party Fragility

Italy's abstention follows a different logic. While France pursues an alternative vision, Rome remains silent out of political caution. The Meloni government has demonstratively aligned itself with US peace initiatives — a code for "we do not want to be drawn into a military escalation that could be costly for us."

Italy's defense budget remains structurally underfunded despite formally meeting the 2% target, which manifests in an army with outdated equipment and chronic personnel shortages. A billion-dollar commitment for Ukraine would immediately raise the question domestically: Why can we finance Kyiv but not modernize our own armed forces?

What the Ramstein Numbers Really Mean

The $38 billion commitments are real — but they are not a European consensus decision. They are the sum of national decisions by a minority of European states, while the majority — measured by population and GDP — stands aside.

This fragmentation reveals three structural problems:

1. European defense aid is not European. It is German, British, Scandinavian, and Baltic. But it is not French, Italian, Polish, or Greek. This is not solidarity — this is a coalition of the willing within a theoretically common security architecture.
2. Commitments are not capabilities. $38 billion sounds impressive. But if only $6 billion are confirmed in concrete deliveries and the rest is supposed to arrive "throughout 2026," then the figure is primarily a political signal, not an operational guarantee.
3. Europe buys its security but does not build it. The dominance of the PURL initiative shows that even in a moment of seemingly massive European mobilization, the majority of funds flow into American weapon systems. The European defense industry remains a spectator of its own supposed renaissance.

The Real Question — Whose War Is This?

France's and Italy's silence implicitly raises a question that officially no one dares to voice: Is the defense of Ukraine a European joint project, or a German, British, and Nordic-Baltic special project to which the rest of Europe should only join when politically opportune?

The Ramstein commitments show that Europe still has not found a common answer to this question. As long as France prioritizes industrial autonomy over immediate arms deliveries, Italy prioritizes domestic political considerations over Atlantic solidarity, and Germany, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavia foot the bill while others watch — "European defense" remains an institutional fiction that is constantly denied by national preferences.

$38 billion is a lot of money. But it is not the answer to the question of how Europe wants to organize its own security. It is just another proof that Europe still cannot answer this question.