NATO's Turning Point: Europe's Defense Spending Rises by 20 Percent – The Long Road to Strategic Autonomy

The figures presented by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on March 26, 2026, in Brussels would have sounded like a utopia just a decade ago: European allies and Canada increased their defense spending in 2025 by a real 20 percent compared to the previous year. A total of 574 billion US dollars – approximately 500 billion euros – flowed into the collective security of the alliance. A record that also marks the end of an era: For the first time in the history of the alliance, all 32 members met the minimum target of 2 percent of gross domestic product agreed upon in Wales in 2014.

For analysts of European security policy, this moment is ambivalent. On one hand, it shows that the political will for burden-sharing can indeed be mobilized – if the pressure is high enough. On the other hand, a sober look at the numbers reveals how much catching up still needs to be done. The United States spent 838 billion dollars in 2025, despite a slight decline, accounting for 59 percent of total NATO defense spending, although its share has decreased from 64 percent the previous year. The asymmetrical burden-sharing thus remains structurally intact – it shifts, but it does not disappear.

Particularly instructive is the look at the leaders and laggards within Europe. Poland, the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as Denmark and Norway, even exceeded the U.S. quota of 3.19 percent of GDP in 2025. These countries, which are geographically and historically most exposed to Russian pressure, have transformed their defense investments into an existential strategic imperative. Germany, on the other hand, reported 2.39 percent of GDP – mathematically a doubling compared to the level of 2014, but still far from what Berlin could and should achieve given its economic size. Countries like Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and France barely reached the 2 percent mark, with values between 2.00 and 2.05 percent.

At the Hague summit in June 2025, the allies agreed on an even more ambitious target corridor: By 2035, at least 5 percent of GDP should flow into defense and security-related areas – of which 3.5 percent for core defense tasks and another 1.5 percent for civil resilience, critical infrastructure, innovation promotion, and the development of the defense industry. This goal is nothing less than a redefinition of NATO's security understanding: Defense no longer ends at the barracks' gate but encompasses the entire societal resilience.

The operational consequences of these increases in spending are already noticeable. Rutte pointed to two significant initiatives from 2025: Baltic Sentry for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea – a direct response to repeated sabotage incidents on cables and pipelines – and Eastern Sentry, which significantly strengthens forward defense along the eastern flank. Both programs signal that NATO is transitioning from reactive crisis management to proactive deterrence. The Joint NATO-Ukraine Technical and Engineering Centre (JATEC), the first joint operational center of its kind, and the so-called Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), through which billions in U.S. military equipment are financed by allied contributions, underscore the structural deepening of the alliance-Ukraine relations.

The geopolitical framing is unmistakable. Russia, Rutte stated, remains the most immediate and significant threat to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The war in Ukraine is entering its fifth year – and it has changed Europe. What was considered unthinkable in 2022 is now a security policy consensus: Europe must be enabled to defend itself without automatic American leadership. The new U.S. National Defense Strategy document from early 2026 sends unmistakable signals: Washington is not retreating, but the era of automatic American hegemony in Europe is over.

Rutte's annual report is thus not only an assessment but a call to action. The NATO summit in Ankara in July 2026 will show whether the political commitments can be transformed into lasting institutional structures. The strategic self-responsibility of Europe is not a given – it requires political courage, industrial capacities, and the willingness to invest long-term even when the immediate perception of threat diminishes in some capitals. History teaches that defense readiness is built in peace – not only when the fire breaks out.