Niger Under Double Pressure: 36 Soldiers Killed in Makalondi, Russia Intervenes in Niamey

Makalondi, Tillabéri region, February 4, 2026, 6:30 PM. A Nigerien military position is overwhelmed by JNIM fighters. Thirty-six soldiers killed, at least twelve armored vehicles captured. Five days later, the Nigerien Chief of Staff visits the site. The losses are such that they must be assessed visually.

This is not an ordinary ambush. It is a sign that Niger — caught between unstable Mali and fiery Burkina Faso — is becoming the new hunting ground for Sahelian jihadist groups.

Two Fronts, Two Threats

Niger is facing unprecedented tactical pressure. On one side, JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, is ramping up offensives along the border with Burkina Faso. On the other, the Islamic State in the Sahel is striking at the very heart of the capital. On January 28, Niamey's Diori Hamani International Airport was attacked by EI-Sahel fighters. Twenty assailants were killed, including a French national. Four Nigerien soldiers were injured. One plane was set on fire.

This attack on Niamey is rare. It demonstrates a new tactical audacity.

According to analysts cited by Al Jazeera, the sophistication of the assault — the possibility of drone use, coordinated timing, knowledge of the terrain — suggests internal support. Jihadist groups are no longer content to control rural areas. They are testing their ability to strike strategic infrastructures.

The Russian Response

Niger has officially acknowledged Russia's role in defending Niamey airport. Moscow confirmed it: the "African Corps" (formerly Wagner) and Nigerien forces jointly repelled the assault. General Abdourahamane Tchiani, head of the Nigerien junta, visited the Russian military base in Niamey to express his "personal gratitude."

This gesture is highly symbolic. It formalizes what was already known: France is gone, Russia is here.

Since the end of Operation Barkhane in 2022 and the definitive withdrawal of French troops from Niger in 2023, a security vacuum has emerged. The military juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — grouped in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — have called on Moscow to fill this void. However, the results on the ground remain mixed. Russian paramilitary groups provide sporadic tactical support but do not replace a coherent counter-insurgency strategy.

American Concerns

The United States is closely monitoring this development. Mike Waltz, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, expressed Washington's concern last week regarding the "expansion" of JNIM and EI-Sahel. He highlighted their increasing use of kidnappings for ransom, commercial technologies (satellite communications, cryptocurrencies), and their ability to exploit instability.

Washington recently deployed a small military team to Nigeria — the first official acknowledgment of a U.S. ground presence since the airstrikes of Christmas 2025. General Dagvin RM Anderson, commander of AFRICOM, stated in Dakar that this team brings "unique capabilities" to address the terrorist threat in West Africa.

But this presence remains modest. The United States has neither the intention nor the means to replace France.

The Trap of Makalondi

Back to Makalondi. This border locality is strategically exposed. It is located in the Tillabéri region, which has been the scene of clashes between security forces and armed groups for years. JNIM has strong logistical networks, community relays, and perfect knowledge of the terrain there.

The attack on February 4 is not isolated. It is part of a broader campaign by JNIM aimed at weakening the military capabilities of the AES states. Between January 29 and February 3, JNIM also launched coordinated assaults against pro-government Dozo militias in Mali (Ségou and Mopti regions). According to Malian security sources, the militias had requested the intervention of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), but no rapid response came.

JNIM is now blocking supply routes to Bamako and besieging villages linked to the Dozo militias. This is a war of attrition strategy. The goal: to force political concessions, erode state authority.

A Jihadist Continuum from Mali to Nigeria

The expansion of JNIM into central Nigeria (Kwara State, Kaiama attack on February 3, over 160 civilian deaths) and military losses in Niger reveal a tactical reality: we are witnessing the formation of a continuous jihadist corridor from Mali to Nigeria, covering several thousand square kilometers.

The military campaigns conducted by the juntas — sometimes with the support of Russian paramilitary groups — have indeed inflicted losses on the jihadists, but they have also made certain operational areas more costly to maintain. Jihadist groups are adapting. They exploit the weaknesses: low military presence, community tensions, absence of local governance.

Outlook

The human toll is rising. The 36 soldiers killed in Makalondi add to an already tragic count. But beyond the numbers, it is the ability of Sahelian armies to hold the ground that is in question. Russian support, while symbolically important, does not compensate for the lack of an integrated counter-insurgency strategy.

The United States expresses its concern, but its engagement remains limited. France is out of the game. The military juntas of the AES speak of "regained sovereignty," but their armies are suffering record losses.

One thing is certain: the Sahel remains an unstable theater of operations, where jihadist groups continue to demonstrate their tactical resilience. And for now, no one has found the solution.

Note: Information on military losses in Makalondi is partial. Nigerien authorities have not published a complete official report. The figures cited come from local security sources and specialized media.