Nigeria 2026 — the death of Abdussamad Ohida reveals the southern expansion of ISWAP

In the Owo forest, in southwestern Nigeria, an operation conducted over the weekend killed Abdussamad Ohida, alias Anwar, described by security services as a key figure of the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP). The raid involved the Department of State Services (DSS), the Nigerian army, and the Amotekun Corps, the security force of the western part of the country. This is not just the elimination of a leader. It is confirmation that the Nigerian branch of the Islamic State is now operating beyond its historical theater in Borno.

Initial information comes from security sources cited by Punch and several Nigerian media outlets. These reports should still be treated with caution, particularly regarding the exact number of fighters killed and the operations Ohida may have been planning. However, his background is well-documented enough to give this matter real operational significance.

A command that had already changed theater

Ohida was the deputy of Abu Ikrimah, also known as Abu Uwais, who was arrested by the DSS in 2023. After this arrest, he reportedly took over ISWAP's activities in parts of central and southern Nigeria. Nigerian authorities accuse him of coordinating several attacks, including the assault on the Ipele police station in Ondo State on December 31, 2025, as well as operations against police stations and a military checkpoint in Kogi and Niger States.

Geography matters here more than the victory statement. Owo is far from the Lake Chad basin. Between the two areas, the roads, markets, forests, and Muslim or Christian communities of the Middle Belt offer very different opportunities for movement and concealment. A group that can move a cadre, weapons, or recruits from the Niger-Kogi axis to the west of the country is not necessarily looking to conquer a city. It is primarily seeking to create pockets of mobility.

This is exactly the logic of jihadist organizations when they shift from visible territorial control to control of corridors. In the northeast, ISWAP imposes taxes, passes, and traffic rules around Lake Chad, according to a recent investigation by TruthNigeria. In the southwest, the forest and criminal networks can serve a different but complementary function. It is not about reproducing Marte in Owo. It is about connecting spaces where the state only appears to control the road, the market, or the border.

The Owo forest raid does not solve the problem

The intelligence that led to the operation is the most important point. According to sources cited by Punch, the interrogation of Abu Uwais reportedly helped identify Ohida's plans, possibly with assistance from British partners. Authorities claim he was preparing mass attacks against civilians during the holiday season and wanted to disrupt the general elections of 2027. These elements are official allegations, not independently established facts. However, they do show that Nigerian forces no longer view the southern ISWAP as just a dormant cell.

On the ground, the operation also demonstrates the limitations of the Nigerian security model. It required the combination of domestic intelligence, regular troops, and regional force to strike a cache in a forest in Ondo State. This integration is useful, but it remains sporadic. A cleared forest is not a controlled area. As long as secondary roads, livestock markets, and local relay points are not sustainably monitored, a cell can reconstitute itself elsewhere, under another name and with another leader.

In operations, killing the leader reduces decision-making capacity. It does not eliminate the network that provided him with weapons, guides, and safe havens.

The line between insurgency and crime

Southwestern Nigeria complicates the work of security forces because the threat does not always present itself in the form of a jihadist column. Kidnappings, arms trafficking, self-defense groups, and local conflicts create an environment where an ISWAP cadre can buy discretion without administering territory. This gray area is precisely what allows an organization to survive after the loss of a commander.

The United Nations' findings align with this perspective. In July, the head of UNOWAS warned that the threat remained acute in the central Sahel and northern Nigeria, while rapidly spreading to the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Armed groups combine coordinated attacks, cross-border crime, modern communication tools, and the pursuit of economic control. Nigeria is therefore not facing two separate wars, one in Borno and the other in the Middle Belt. It is facing a theater of operations that is branching out.

The next test will be continuity

The death of Ohida is a tactical success for Abuja. It removes an experienced cadre from ISWAP and may disrupt a campaign prepared in several states. But the decisive question is that of succession. If a successor takes over Ohida's contacts, weapons, and routes in the coming weeks, the raid will have been a temporary decapitation. If Nigerian services exploit the captured intelligence, protect informants, and maintain a presence on the Owo–Akure and Kogi axes, the operation can become a real breakthrough.

Three concrete indicators should be monitored: attacks on police stations and checkpoints, kidnappings in the Middle Belt corridors, and the emergence of ISWAP propaganda claiming a foothold in the south. The first signal will indicate the capacity for harm, the second the capacity for funding, and the third the willingness to transform an infiltration into a territorial brand.

The Owo forest is not Lake Chad. But if ISWAP learns to use both spaces with the same chain of command, Abuja will have a problem of distance, time, and trust. A unit can retake a camp in one night. It cannot control 500 kilometers of roads with a statement. This is where the next phase of the war will be played out.

Sources : Punch Newspapers, October 6, 2026 ; TruthNigeria, October 6, 2026 ; United Nations, UN News, July 2026.