“Oreshnik” over Kyiv 2026 — 600 drones and the cost of a demonstrative strike

The most important figure in the night strike of May 23–24 is not the speed of the “Oreshnik” or even its nuclear compatibility. More important is another aspect: Russia expended a package of approximately 600 strike drones and 90 missiles of various classes to achieve primarily a political-psychological effect. The Ukrainian side reported that air defense destroyed or suppressed 549 drones and 55 missiles; the Russian Ministry of Defense, on the other hand, reported hitting “all designated targets” — command points, airfields, and defense industry enterprises (AP, May 24; TASS, May 24, 2026). Between these two narratives lies not just an information war. There lies the main question of Russian military logic in 2026: how many expensive strategic signals is Moscow willing to buy instead of measurable operational results.

Composition of the strike and the role of the “Oreshnik”

According to Ukrainian and Western reports, the night package included strike UAVs of the Shahed/Geran type, air-launched, sea-launched, and ground-launched cruise missiles, ballistic “Iskanders,” “Kinzhal,” “Tsirkon,” and one confirmed “Oreshnik” in the area of Bila Tserkva in Kyiv Oblast. The Russian side confirmed the use of the “Oreshnik” along with the “Iskander,” “Kinzhal,” and “Tsirkon,” presenting the strike as retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on civilian targets in Russian or occupied territory. This is already the third combat use of the system in the war, if we consider Ukrainian and Russian statements since 2024. The very fact of its inclusion in a regular combined strike is significant: Moscow is turning a means of strategic demonstration into an element of a routine campaign of long-range fire pressure.

Technically, the “Oreshnik” remains a weapon with a not entirely transparent configuration. Western and Ukrainian assessments typically classify it as an intermediate ballistic category, close to the RS-26 “Rubezh,” with a separating warhead and very high speed in the terminal phase. Its military value against Ukraine is not that it can destroy more than a conventional ballistic munition. Against a stationary large-area target, the “Iskander-M” or X-101 often provides a more understandable cost-effectiveness ratio. The value of the “Oreshnik” lies in demonstration: it is meant to show Kyiv, Washington, and Europeans that Russia can introduce into the Ukrainian theater means that lie on the border between conventional warfare and a nuclear signal.

The economics of demonstration

Here, an unpleasant arithmetic for Moscow emerges. The Ukrainian agency ArmyInform, referenced by ISW, estimated the cost of the package on May 23–24 at approximately $361 million, including about $50 million for one “Oreshnik.” These figures should not be taken as the accounting ledger of the General Staff, but the order of magnitude is plausible: a mass strike, where hundreds of cheap drones cover dozens of expensive missiles, remains costly even for a military economy transitioned to a special mode. In the Soviet tradition, a demonstrative launch of a strategic system was part of political theater. In current Russian practice, it is becoming expendable material for a pressure campaign.

By comparison, the classic logic of the Soviet General Staff assumed that strategic weapons were used as a last resort or as a strictly measured signal. In the 1980s, even a test launch was viewed through the prism of the stability of the strategic balance. Today, Moscow uses the “Oreshnik” in a package with Shahed, “Geran,” and cruise missiles, meaning it is in the same operational line as munitions designed to saturate air defense. This is no longer pure strategic communication. It is a hybrid between a nuclear hint and a conventional campaign to exhaust Ukrainian air defense.

The reliability problem and the second possible launch

Particular attention should be paid to the ISW report from May 25: according to Ukrainian OSINT sources, Russia may have launched a second “Oreshnik” during the same package, but the missile likely malfunctioned and fell in occupied territory in Donetsk Oblast. This information requires caution; video materials and trajectories are not yet a full technical investigation. But if the version is confirmed, the conclusion will be heavy for the Russian defense industry: of the four known combat uses of the system, one failure is not the statistic of a serial mature complex, but a sign of accelerated political introduction of the weapon before full operational reliability is accumulated.

In Russian military culture, such things are usually concealed behind the term “fine-tuning.” The problem is that fine-tuning during war has a different cost. The failure of an intermediate ballistic missile not only loses money. It creates the risk of falling on one’s own or controlled territories, complicates escalation management, and provides the enemy with material for analyzing trajectory, design, and launch procedures. When the Kremlin uses an expensive system as a political microphone, it forgets that microphones sometimes explode in one’s hands. This is not a journalistic metaphor, but an engineering reality.

Why the strike was made right now

The Russian diplomatic framework was built in advance. On May 25, the Russian Foreign Ministry recommended that foreign citizens and diplomatic missions leave Kyiv, and Sergey Lavrov separately drew the attention of the U.S. to this recommendation in a conversation with Marco Rubio. At the same time, Moscow presented the strikes as a response to Starobilsk. ISW rightly points out that such rhetoric poorly explains the speed and scale of the package's preparation: a salvo of 600 drones and 90 missiles cannot be assembled as an emotional reaction in a day. It is logistically planned, distributed across airfields, launch areas, naval carriers, and UAV crews. Le Monde, in its analysis of the logistics of Russian strikes, emphasizes that such operations require complex coordination of strategic aviation, the navy, missile troops, and hundreds of drone operators.

In other words, “retaliation” is a convenient political packaging for a pre-prepared pressure campaign. Its true function is to return to the Kremlin a sense of initiative against the backdrop of three uncomfortable processes: the slowdown of Russian advances on the front, the increase in Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian energy and military infrastructure, and the need to explain to the domestic audience why the four-year war has not ended in either “demilitarization” or the capitulation of Kyiv.

Operational effect and strategic limit

From a military point of view, the strike of May 23–24 showed that Russia retains the ability to form large combined packages and synchronize different carriers. This should not be underestimated. Ukrainian air defense, even with a high interception rate, is forced to expend missiles, overload mobile groups, and keep aviation and radar systems in constant tension. The use of the “Oreshnik” adds a layer of psychological pressure: an ordinary urban resident sees not the technical class of the missile, but falling fiery blocks and burning buildings.

But the operational effectiveness of such a strike is limited. If the goal is to destroy Ukrainian command, there are no confirmed signs of systemic paralysis. If the goal is to break Kyiv's will, the experience of 2022–2026 shows the opposite: mass strikes on the capital usually accelerate Western decisions on air defense and long-range systems. If the goal is to force the West to be cautious, then the “Oreshnik” works both ways: it indeed reminds of the risk of escalation, but at the same time strengthens the argument of those European politicians who consider the Russian threat not hypothetical, but current.

Conclusion for Russian military doctrine

The May strike shows not strength, but a contradiction in Russian doctrine. Moscow still knows how to produce fear, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to turn fear into a manageable strategic result. The “Oreshnik” as a symbol was meant to say: Russia is raising the stakes. However, in conjunction with hundreds of Shahed, it also says: even a strategic symbol has to be hidden within mass saturation because a single gesture no longer changes the course of the war.

My forecast is cautious. Russia will continue to episodically use the “Oreshnik” or threaten its use, especially when frontline results lag behind political expectations. But the more often the system is used in conventional warfare, the faster it loses its demonstrative value and the higher the likelihood of technical or political failure. The Soviet school called this the depletion of deterrent resources. In Russian, it is simpler: you cannot endlessly shoot symbols and expect them to remain symbols.

Sources

• TASS — statement from the Russian Ministry of Defense on the use of the “Oreshnik,” May 24, 2026
• Associated Press — data on 600 drones and 90 missiles, May 24, 2026
• ISW/CTP — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2026
• ISW/CTP — assessment of a possible second launch of the “Oreshnik,” May 25, 2026
• Associated Press — warning of new strikes on Kyiv, May 26, 2026
• Le Monde — the logistics network of Russian long-range strikes, May 25, 2026