PLA Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle Live-Fire Training at Sea on July 10: The Weakness of Beach Assault Is Not in Artillery

In a training photo released by the Chinese military network in late July, the most interesting aspect is not the amphibious infantry fighting vehicle firing itself, but its firing position: the vehicle is crossing the beach while simultaneously engaging simulated targets. The report states that this is an amphibious infantry fighting vehicle belonging to a certain brigade of the PLA Army, conducting live-fire training at sea on July 10 while navigating and striking targets.

Such images can easily be interpreted as "more powerful beach assault firepower." However, I believe this statement is only half correct. The vehicle's automatic cannon, co-axial machine gun, and anti-tank missiles are certainly important, but the real challenge is whether the vehicle can maintain formation and shooting rhythm while navigating from the landing ship, hovercraft, or water entry point to the beach under conditions of wave surges, smoke screens, communication interference, and anti-armor fire from the shore, and deliver the first wave of infantry on time.

This Is Not a Solo Performance

In the same batch of content released by the Chinese military network, several supporting signals can also be seen: an attack helicopter from a certain brigade of the Tibet Military District conducting live-fire training; the East Sea Fleet's 052C destroyer Changchun and 052D destroyer Xiamen conducting joint training at sea; a certain brigade of the Tibet Military District loading Hongqi-16 medium-range air defense missiles; and an Air Force aviation brigade's Y-9 transport aircraft performing flight training in early July. Each of these is an ordinary training photo on its own, but together they reveal that the PLA is integrating army assault, army aviation firepower, naval formations, air defense, and transport deployment into a single narrative.

In simple terms, beach assault is not as simple as driving armored vehicles onto the sand. The landing troops are most afraid not of the first vehicle's artillery caliber being insufficient, but of the chain of operations breaking down: if the ship's suppression is inadequate, helicopters cannot timely clear deep targets, air defense units cannot keep up, and transport aircraft and follow-up units cannot connect, the first wave of landing troops will become isolated.

The Technical Account of Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicles

The PLA's active amphibious assault platforms typically emphasize water speed, floating stability, and integrated firepower. Public information often considers the Type 05 amphibious vehicle family as one of the core equipment of the Chinese Marine Corps and Army amphibious forces, with the infantry fighting vehicle variant emphasizing troop transport and the assault variant focusing on larger caliber direct firepower. Detailed information on different models is limited, so one cannot directly determine a specific variant from a single training photo.

• Firepower Account: Shooting during navigation tests the stability of the platform, targeting, and crew training, not just the gun itself.
• Navigation Account: Higher water speed demands more from the engine, water jet propulsion, sealing, and maintenance.
• Coordination Account: Amphibious vehicles must synchronize with naval guns, unmanned reconnaissance, army aviation, electronic suppression, and air defense support on the timeline.

This number may seem small—one training event on July 10, one vehicle's image—but it points to the level of mass training. The current issue with Chinese military industry is often not "whether there are prototype vehicles," but whether enough brigades, battalions, and companies can repeatedly perform the same actions under complex maritime conditions. Amphibious operations are particularly brutal because if there is an error during the navigation phase, no matter how impressive the equipment's performance, it cannot be compensated for.

Why Look at Both the Plateau and Maritime Lines

Interestingly, this batch of public content also features attack helicopters from the Tibet Military District and Hongqi-16 air defense missiles. On the surface, plateau training and maritime landings seem unrelated; however, from a system construction perspective, they both address the same question: Can the PLA push heavier equipment, ammunition, sensors, and support units into unfriendly environments and maintain sustained operations?

Public information on the Hongqi-16 typically lists the range of the basic model at about 40 kilometers, with improved models exceeding 70 kilometers, and even higher data for export or further modified versions. There is no need to get caught up in which specific model appears in the images; the key point is that transitioning medium-range air defense from fixed positions to mobile support will impose demands on supply vehicles, lifting equipment, radar deployment time, and engine power at high altitudes. This is akin to equipping a landing spearhead with a shield; if the shield is too slow, the spearhead must wait.

Implications for the Taiwan Strait and the First Island Chain

When discussing the Taiwan Strait, external observers often focus on rocket force missiles, aircraft carriers, and stealth fighters. Li Minghui has always believed that what truly determines the lower limits of a campaign are these less eye-catching training activities: whether amphibious vehicles can move and fire at sea, whether helicopters can operate continuously in complex terrain, whether medium-range air defense can keep pace with mobile forces, and whether transport aircraft can deliver spare parts and personnel to the correct airfields.

This does not mean that the PLA has solved all the challenges of landing operations. The public images do not show nighttime maritime conditions, pressure from anti-drone measures, or threats from long-range precision firepower, nor do they reveal vehicle failure rates and repair speeds. There is very little public information on this point, and one can only speculate. I am more concerned about whether the next step will reveal a more complete composite exercise: from naval formation fire preparation to amphibious vehicles crossing water, followed by army aviation suppression, engineers clearing paths, and air defense units advancing. If it remains just a series of impressive training photos, it indicates that the real system account has not yet been laid out for the outside world to see.

Main sources: Images and text of the amphibious infantry fighting vehicle live-fire training, attack helicopter live-fire training, East Sea Fleet destroyer training, Y-9 flight training, and Hongqi-16 loading training released by the English version of the Chinese military network in late July; public equipment data used to verify the range and system composition of the Hongqi-16, with relevant parameters processed according to public estimates.