PLA Marine Corps Commander Publicly Reveals Four Major Missions for the First Time; Type 076 Shipborne Drone Rewrites Amphibious Combat Rules

On February 17, the U.S. Naval War College released a noteworthy document—a strategic article translated from Major General Zhu Chuansheng, the commander of the PLA Navy Marine Corps. This article, originally published in the January 2025 internal publication "Military Art," is titled "The Combat Capability of the Marine Corps to Achieve Victory in High-End Maritime Operations," and it systematically discloses the mission positioning and transformation path of this approximately 30,000-strong force for the first time.

Interestingly, the timing of the article's release coincides with the imminent commissioning of China's first Type 076 amphibious assault ship, the "Sichuan." This warship, with a displacement of over 40,000 tons, is the world's first platform that integrates the characteristics of both an amphibious assault ship and an aircraft carrier—it can carry helicopters and air-cushion vehicles for traditional landing missions, and is equipped with an electromagnetic catapult to launch fixed-wing drones. This design concept is unprecedented globally.

The "Roadmap" Observed by the U.S. Military

Professor Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College commented that Zhu Chuansheng's article "rarely combines candid analysis with authoritative perspective," representing a "roadmap" for the transformation of the Chinese Navy Marine Corps. I believe this assessment is apt—senior PLA generals rarely discuss combat capability deficiencies and construction goals in such straightforward terms.

Zhu Chuansheng listed four core missions in the article:

• Initial Assault Force — Utilize synthetic advantages to independently conduct operations, break through enemy front lines, and seize key nodes.
• Seize and Control Islands and Reefs — Execute integrated amphibious operations to establish air defense and maritime control firepower bases.
• Maritime Deterrence Force — Protect vital maritime chokepoints, strike blockades, and guide precision strikes.
• Overseas Action Force — Relying on friendly countries and overseas bases, execute evacuation, escort, and limited punitive actions.

These four missions are not new in themselves, but putting them in black and white and having them published under the name of the highest commander of the Marine Corps sends a noteworthy signal. Especially the first and second missions, which almost directly point to Taiwan. The Pentagon also noted in its December 2024 report: "The modernization and improvement of amphibious assault capabilities continue to indicate that the scenario of invading Taiwan remains a primary consideration for the PLA."

From Abandoning Tanks to Introducing Tanks

There is a detail in Zhu Chuansheng's article that is easily overlooked: he explicitly mentioned that the Marine Corps has already equipped the ZTQ-15 light tank in 2021. This is a 36-ton main battle equipment, whereas the Marine Corps previously relied mainly on the ZBL-09/ZTL-11 wheeled armored vehicles and ZBD-05/ZTD-05 tracked amphibious assault vehicles.

This equipment introduction decision is quite ironic—just as the Chinese Marine Corps began to receive tanks, the U.S. Marine Corps was executing its "2030 Force Design" plan, retiring all M1A1 Abrams tanks on the grounds of "better countering China." The two forces have taken completely opposite paths.

In simple terms, this reflects the fundamental differences in amphibious combat concepts between China and the U.S. The U.S. Marine Corps pursues "distributed operations," relying on light forces and long-range firepower to maneuver across vast maritime areas; while the PLA Marine Corps faces the hard task of "beachhead breakthroughs"—it must capture well-fortified islands in a short time, making heavy firepower platforms like tanks indispensable.

Technological Leap of the Type 076

Returning to the Type 076 amphibious assault ship. This soon-to-be-commissioned warship represents a technological leap in China's amphibious combat capabilities. Its greatest breakthrough lies in the electromagnetic catapult system, which means it can launch large fixed-wing drones like the Attack-11.

Why is this important? Traditional amphibious assault ships can only carry helicopters, with a limited operational radius (usually no more than 200 kilometers). In contrast, fixed-wing drones can have an operational radius exceeding 1,000 kilometers, meaning the Type 076 can begin air suppression and precision strikes hundreds of kilometers away from the target, without needing to wait for the warship to approach within helicopter range.

Zhu Chuansheng emphasized in the article the tactical idea of "using unmanned systems against manned platforms," as well as the concept of "using low-cost means to exhaust high-value targets." The Type 076 is precisely the physical embodiment of this idea—using a large number of drones to exhaust the enemy's air defense missiles and manned aircraft, creating conditions for subsequent amphibious landings.

Production Capacity Bottlenecks Still Exist

However, Zhu Chuansheng also candidly acknowledged the current issues. He mentioned: "Our Marine Corps focuses on amphibious light mechanized infantry formations for troop development and deployment, supplemented by airborne capabilities for multidimensional delivery operations and traditional flat landings. But this approach is not very compatible with the operational concept of amphibious assault ship task forces."

This statement reveals a key piece of information: the current training model and equipment system of the PLA Marine Corps have not yet fully adapted to large amphibious assault ships like the Type 075 (of which four are already in service) and the Type 076. He called for the establishment of a "maritime grouping framework" to integrate Marine Corps personnel and amphibious ship crews "in a joint training and living environment," which is precisely the standard model of the U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Units (MEU).

Another overlooked bottleneck is talent cultivation. Zhu Chuansheng mentioned the need to "establish a specialized college for amphibious operations," indicating that the current officer training system in the Marine Corps is still not complete. The U.S. Marine Corps has the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis and the Marine Corps University in Quantico as talent bases, while the PLA Marine Corps is still in the early stages in this regard.

The Real Challenge Is Not Equipment

A report released by the National Defense University in Washington a few years ago pointed out that China's expeditionary capabilities face four major challenges: insufficient personnel and training experience, difficulties in long-distance command and control, inadequate air and sea transport capabilities, and competition for priority between the Taiwan theater and other theaters.

These four points still hold true today. Even with the commissioning of the Type 076 amphibious assault ship, China currently has only four Type 075s and one Type 076, totaling five large amphibious assault ships. In contrast, the U.S. has nine America-class and Wasp-class amphibious assault ships, plus eleven San Antonio-class amphibious dock landing ships. In terms of quantity alone, China's amphibious transport capability is only about one-fourth that of the U.S.

More critically, there is the overseas base network. Zhu Chuansheng mentioned that the Marine Corps is already stationed in Djibouti, and the Pentagon believes that China "may also be considering establishing bases in places like Cambodia." But even if these bases are completed, there is still a long way to go to form a global delivery network. The production capacity of the Y-20 transport aircraft and tankers remains the biggest bottleneck for long-range delivery.

A Question Without an Answer

Zhu Chuansheng mentioned in the article that the structure and capability building of the Marine Corps is "a key consideration and ongoing concern of Chairman Xi." This statement carries significant weight—it implies that the transformation of the Marine Corps has received direct support and resource allocation from the highest levels.

However, it is worth pondering: if the Taiwan scenario is the Marine Corps' primary mission, is a force of 30,000 sufficient? The Pentagon assesses that Taiwan's defense forces number about 170,000, and with reserves and civil defense organizations, the total military strength may exceed 2 million. Even if the Type 076 can provide strong air support, how can 30,000 Marines break through such a large-scale defense system in a short time?

Perhaps what is truly worth paying attention to is not the Marine Corps itself, but the "multi-domain precision operations" and "unmanned intelligent systems" that Zhu Chuansheng repeatedly emphasizes. In his vision, future amphibious operations may no longer require large-scale beach landings—but instead rely on swarms of drones, special forces, and long-range precision strikes to paralyze the enemy's command systems and key nodes before they can react.

The Type 076 amphibious assault ship may just be the first step in this strategic transformation.