PLA South China Sea Shows Its Sword: Liaoning Carrier Group's Deployment and Multidimensional Strategic Signals of YJ-20 Hypersonic Missile Test Launch

In late April 2026, a highly intense military game unfolded in the waters of the Western Pacific. As the U.S.-Philippines "Shoulder to Shoulder 2026" joint military exercise commenced, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) centered around the Liaoning aircraft carrier group conducted large-scale live-fire confrontation drills in the South China Sea and the waters east of Luzon Island. Simultaneously, the Type 055 destroyer Zunyi conducted a test launch of the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile, showcasing remarkable maritime denial capabilities. This series of actions is not an isolated military training but a systematic strategic response from China to the changing security landscape in the Indo-Pacific.

The immediate trigger for this military game can be traced back to April 17. On that day, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's Murakumo-class destroyer "Ikazuchi" (JS Ikazuchi, DD-107) transited the Taiwan Strait, completing the passage in approximately 14 hours. This marked the fourth time since September 2024 that a Japanese warship had passed through the Taiwan Strait, and it was the first since Prime Minister Sanna Marin took office. Even more infuriating for Beijing was that April 17 coincided with the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, which forced China to cede Taiwan to Japan. Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Zhang Xiaogang promptly issued a stern statement, while Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian characterized the transit as a "dangerous political scheme," asserting that the Taiwan issue is a non-negotiable "red line." The Chinese military also released footage of drones conducting close surveillance of the "Ikazuchi," and the Eastern Theater Command claimed to have implemented "effective control" over the Japanese vessel throughout its passage.

In response, Beijing took a series of punitive measures, including restrictions on the export of dual-use military and civilian goods to Japan, tightening travel restrictions for Chinese tourists and students to Japan, and formally protesting to the Japanese side. These actions indicate that Beijing views the passage of Japanese warships through the Taiwan Strait as a structural provocation rather than an isolated incident.

On the military front, China's countermeasures were even more striking. On April 20, the Liaoning aircraft carrier group transited the Taiwan Strait into the South China Sea, while another naval formation entered the Western Pacific through the Bashi Channel, creating a strategic situation of two-pronged advancement. According to satellite imagery analysis, as many as 14 large surface vessels participated in this operation, including multiple destroyers, frigates, supply ships, and amphibious assault ships. Analysis from Military Observer magazine pointed out that the surface formation led by the Zunyi (Type 055 destroyer) served as the command ship during this operation.

The timing of this deployment is no coincidence. The U.S.-Philippines "Shoulder to Shoulder 2026" exercise is the largest joint military exercise in the 75-year history of the alliance, involving over 17,000 troops, with additional forces from Australia, Japan, Canada, France, and New Zealand participating. Notably, this marks the first formal participation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in the "Shoulder to Shoulder" series of exercises, signifying an important turning point in Tokyo's military posture. The exercise area faces the South China Sea and Luzon Island—only 250 kilometers from Taiwan, with significant strategic implications.

Among the highlights of this operation is the live-fire test launch of the YJ-20 (Yingji-20) hypersonic anti-ship missile. According to a report from a social media account close to the PLA on April 25, the Zunyi launched the YJ-20 missile again in waters near the Philippines. While the specific launch time cannot be independently verified, it is confirmed that the PLA Southern Theater Command publicly acknowledged live-fire exercises, replenishment at sea, rapid maneuvering, and joint air-sea operations conducted east of Luzon Island and in the South China Sea.

The technical parameters of the YJ-20 represent the cutting edge of current naval anti-ship weaponry worldwide. The missile employs a boost-glide or quasi-ballistic attack profile, achieving a cruising speed of Mach 6, with terminal dive speeds reaching up to Mach 10 and a range of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers. This means that a Type 055 destroyer deployed east of Luzon Island could theoretically cover vast areas beyond the First Island Chain, posing a serious threat to carrier strike groups and expeditionary forces. Unlike traditional sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles, the hypersonic flight trajectory of the YJ-20 significantly compresses the enemy's reaction time, and its terminal maneuverability is specifically designed to counter Aegis combat systems, Standard series interceptors, and carrier escort air defense systems.

From a strategic perspective, the operational positioning of the YJ-20 is embedded within China's broader "Anti-Access/Area Denial" (A2/AD) system. By constructing a long-range kill chain through multi-layered missile systems, China is attempting to raise the political costs, operational risks, and strategic uncertainties associated with U.S. carrier operations. Notably, in December 2025, China publicly released video footage of the Type 055 destroyer launching the YJ-20, marking the transition of this capability from the research and development phase to operational use. The public unveiling of weapon systems often has a greater political deterrent effect than secret tests—especially when deployed near allied joint military exercises.

The cooperation between the Chinese and Russian navies is also a latent but significant dimension of this operation. According to reports from Japan's Ministry of Defense, in mid-April, a joint Chinese-Russian naval formation transited the southwestern waters of Japan into the East China Sea, indicating a deepening frequency and scale of maritime security cooperation between China and Russia. This cooperation has dual implications in the current geopolitical context: it serves as a counterbalance to the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance and as a strategic hedge against the U.S.-led "Indo-Pacific alliance system."

Another noteworthy clue comes from academia. On May 1, the U.S. Small Wars Journal published an in-depth analysis of the limitations of the PLA's non-commissioned officer system. The article pointed out that while the PLA has made significant progress in technical equipment and the professionalization of non-commissioned officers, command decision-making authority remains highly concentrated within the officer corps and is reinforced by a political oversight mechanism throughout the command chain. Drawing lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War, the article argues that in a real combat environment characterized by communication degradation and sharply rising battlefield uncertainty, the PLA's highly centralized command culture may become a bottleneck for its operational effectiveness. This analysis reminds us that advanced weapon systems require matching command flexibility to maximize their effectiveness—an ongoing structural challenge in the PLA's modernization process.

Overall, the large-scale actions of the PLA in the South China Sea convey multiple strategic signals. Tactically, the combination of the Liaoning carrier group and the YJ-20 hypersonic missile demonstrates the PLA Navy's capability leap in distant sea operations and precision strikes. Strategically, this is a direct response to the U.S.-led multilateral military alliance system in the Indo-Pacific—particularly in light of Japan's first participation in the "Shoulder to Shoulder" exercise and the symbolic events of Japanese vessels transiting the Taiwan Strait. China's message is clear: the security landscape in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait is being redefined, and any external military force attempting to change the status quo must contend with a regional power possessing hypersonic strike capabilities.

However, the real strategic test lies ahead. There remains a gap between advancements in equipment technology and real combat capabilities, and the security game in the Indo-Pacific is far from a simple military confrontation. In the complex interplay of economic interdependence, diplomatic maneuvering, and military deterrence, how all parties can maintain their security interests while avoiding misjudgments and escalation will be a key variable influencing regional stability in the coming years.