R-60 Missile on "Shahed" Drones — Evolution of Tactics or Sign of Desperation

The third confirmed case of the use of the "Geran-2" drone equipped with the R-60 air-to-air missile was recorded on February 8, 2026. The Ukrainian interceptor STING from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Regiment shot down a modified drone, hitting precisely the tail section of the Soviet missile — the turbo-generator and the PRD-259 cruise engine. This episode deserves detailed analysis not so much from the perspective of the tactical success of Ukrainian air defense, but as an indicator of changes in the Russian approach to the use of strike UAVs.

Soviet-Era Technical Solution in Modern Warfare

The R-60 missile was adopted by the Soviet Air Force in 1973. It was designed for close air combat for the MiG-21, MiG-23, and Su-17 fighters — machines, most of which have long been decommissioned or transferred to third-world countries. The infrared homing head, launch range of 7–8 kilometers, and a warhead weight of about 3 kilograms are characteristics that were considered sufficient half a century ago to destroy a maneuvering fighter. Now this missile is being mounted on a drone with a cruising speed of 180 km/h and a wingspan of just over two meters.

According to Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR), the standard aviation launch system APU-60-1MD, adapted for the drone platform, is used for launching. The drone is equipped with two video cameras — in the nose section and behind the launch system — as well as a Chinese mesh modem from Xingkay Tech XK-F358 for transmitting video signals and control commands. If the operator detects a Ukrainian helicopter or light aircraft, he remotely gives the command to launch. After that, the infrared homing head of the missile autonomously locks onto the target.

From Attack to Defense — Shift in Priorities

The first cases of detecting "Shaheds" with R-60 missiles (December 2025 — January 2026) recorded missiles directed forward along the flight vector. The logic was clear: to turn the slow strike drone into a kind of "trap" for Ukrainian helicopters and light aircraft that patrol the flight routes of the drones. However, in the latest cases, including the February episode, the missiles were deployed backward — against pursuing interceptors.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in Washington noted this evolution: "Russian forces likely initially used drones with forward-facing R-60 missiles to seek out and engage Ukrainian aviation. Now they apparently employ rear-facing missiles to protect the drone when encountering a Ukrainian aircraft, while allowing the UAV to continue moving toward its original target." In other words, the priority has shifted from "hunting" to "survival."

What Lies Behind This Decision

This modification indicates several important trends. First, Ukrainian air defense demonstrates high effectiveness against "Shaheds" — according to official data from Kyiv, on the night of February 9, 116 out of 149 launched drones were neutralized. Russia is forced to seek ways to increase the percentage of target achievement. Second, the stockpiles of Soviet R-60 missiles in the Russian Ministry of Defense's warehouses are evidently large enough to allow for such experiments — these missiles have long been unused on modern fighters and are essentially outdated munitions.

Third — and this is perhaps the main point — this decision is a typical example of "improvisational engineering," which characterizes the Russian defense industry in the context of a protracted conflict. Instead of developing specialized self-defense systems for UAVs, what is available in warehouses is used. Instead of new missiles with modern homing heads — a design from half a century ago. Instead of an integrated control system — Chinese modems and British Raspberry Pi 4 single-board computers found in the electronics of downed drones.

Effectiveness in Question

How justified is this modification from a military standpoint? Three confirmed cases in three months is too small a sample to draw conclusions about mass application. But even if we assume that modified "Shaheds" make up only a few percent of the total number of launched drones, they create an additional threat for Ukrainian pilots. A Mi-8 helicopter or a light aircraft approaching for visual detection and destruction of the drone now risks being hit by a missile with infrared guidance.

However, the emergence of Ukrainian interceptor drones like the STING partially mitigates this advantage. The interception of "drone by drone" eliminates the risk to the crew and, as demonstrated in the February case, allows for the destruction of modified "Shaheds" along with their "defensive armament."

Conclusions

Equipping "Geran-2" drones with R-60 missiles is not a technological breakthrough, but rather a forced adaptation to the realities of aerial warfare over Ukraine. It demonstrates that the Russian side is seeking asymmetric solutions to increase the effectiveness of its mass strikes, but is doing so within strict limitations — outdated munitions, imported electronics, and makeshift system integration. This tactic may create localized problems for Ukrainian air defense, but is unlikely to change the overall picture of the aerial confrontation, where the key factor remains the quantity, not the quality, of launched "Shaheds."