Russia is laying down 28,000 new "Geran" drones per year — underground restructuring of the defense industry in 2026

The most important figure in the Russian drone campaign is currently not in the report on the number of nighttime targets. Russia is preparing to expand carbon fiber production in Tatarstan, which is capable of adding up to 28,000 strike drones of the "Geran" family per year. This is not a promise to deliver several new products to the front, but an attempt to restructure the industrial base of the war so that Ukrainian strikes on individual sites do not change the pace of the campaign.

From mass raids to an industrial system

According to the Institute for the Study of War's assessment from September 21, the Alabuga-Volokno enterprise, associated with the Russian state corporation "Rosatom," plans to increase the production of polyacrylonitrile carbon fiber by 500 tons per year by 2029. With the current setup, this could provide approximately 28,000 additional units annually, representing a potential production increase of about 78 percent. It is important to understand: this refers to production capacity, not a guaranteed number of finished drones in a calendar year. But it is precisely capacity that defines the limits of a prolonged war.

Carbon fiber is used in the bodies of "Geran-1," "Geran-2," "Geran-3," and "Geran-4," as well as in the fuselage, wings, and tail assembly of the jet "Geran-5." Thus, the bottleneck is no longer just the assembly shop or the supply of engines. The bottleneck becomes the material without which it is impossible to maintain the series. This is the classic logic of the military-industrial complex: wars are won not by the most impressive system, but by those who control the repeatability of production.

Underground workshop as a response to Ukrainian deep strike strategy

Satellite images cited in the ISW analysis, referencing Politico and Ukrainian sources, show the preparation of approximately 42,000 square meters of underground production space in the Alabuga area. If this data is accurate, Moscow draws a conclusion that is hard to call unexpected: geographical distance is no longer a sufficient protection. Ukrainian long-range drones have already turned the Russian rear, oil refining, and warehouses into part of the immediate theater of military operations.

Underground infrastructure addresses only one issue — the physical vulnerability of production. It does not eliminate the need for electronics, engines, optics, and skilled labor. Moreover, moving production underground increases costs, complicates logistics, and reduces the transparency of the technological process. But for the Kremlin, this is an acceptable price. The "Geran" remains a relatively cheap means of overloading Ukrainian air defense, and a protected production line creates asymmetry: one Ukrainian long-range strike must now not only hit a target but disrupt an entire supply system.

Chinese component and the limits of sanctions adaptation

In early 2026, a Chinese state company supplied Alabuga-Volokno with 46 tons of PAN precursors for carbon fiber production (ISW, September 21). This fact is more significant than the usual debates about whether the latest "Geran" is of Russian or Iranian origin. Russia is gradually localizing assembly and some materials, but its supply chain still depends on external access to industrial chemicals and equipment. Sanctions have not halted production, but they have made it more expensive, indirect, and politically dependent.

This highlights the difference between the tactical and strategic effects of the restrictions. Tactically, Moscow gains the ability to continue mass strikes. Strategically, it is building an industry where Chinese supply becomes part of the Russian military infrastructure, while Tehran remains a source of the original technological model and operational experience. This is not Soviet-style autonomy, where key components were produced within a single bloc. It is a dependent adaptation, masked by scale.

Why the diplomatic window did not stop production

On September 22, Russian forces attacked industrial and energy facilities in Ukraine with 212 drones, four cruise missiles, and, according to Ukrainian data, Onyx missiles and ballistic means. According to Ukrainian authorities, people were killed in the Dnipropetrovsk region, and nearly 100,000 consumers in the Chernihiv region were left without electricity. At the same time, Volodymyr Zelensky was in New York for the UN General Assembly and preparing for a meeting with Donald Trump.

This does not prove that every strike was directly synchronized with the diplomatic schedule. But the institutional logic is clear. While a moratorium on strikes against energy and civilian infrastructure is being discussed, Russia seeks to demonstrate that its military machine retains the initiative and can choose targets. The industrial expansion of "Gerans" reinforces this signal: Moscow is not counting on a one-time effect of a raid, but on accumulating pressure over months.

The Kremlin's calculation and its weak point

The Russian model is built on three assumptions. First — Ukraine will not be able to indefinitely cover all airspace with expensive interceptor missiles. Second — a mass cheap drone can tie up air defense forces, even if a significant portion of the units is destroyed. Third — protected production will allow surviving the Ukrainian campaign to defeat Russian oil refining and military facilities.

The weakness of this model lies in the fact that the number of airframes does not equate to the quality of military results. The "Geran" is effective against energy facilities, warehouses, and targets not protected by layered air defense, but its value depends on intelligence, navigation, warhead, and the ability to penetrate an evolving electronic warfare system. An increase in production by 78 percent will not proportionally increase the likelihood of hitting each target. Russia is not buying victory, but a higher rate of wear on Ukrainian defense.

Cold conclusion

Underground Alabuga is not a sign of the imminent collapse of the Russian defense industry, but it is also not evidence of its technological superiority. It is an industrial mobilization of a country that has learned to compensate for quality with quantity, and vulnerability with depth and concrete. If Chinese material supplies continue, and Ukraine cannot systematically disrupt the energy and logistics of the Tatarstan cluster, Russian strikes with "Gerans" will become more frequent in 2027–2029. The cost of this resilience will manifest later — depending on external suppliers, rising production costs, and gradual degradation of industrial independence. The Russian defense industry will survive, but it will be more evident underground how costly this survival is.

Sources

• Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2026.
• Politico, data on the expansion of carbon fiber production at Alabuga-Volokno.
• Al Jazeera, Russian strikes on Ukraine kill three as Zelenskyy in US for UN summit, September 22, 2026.