Sahel 2026: The Aftermath of Western Withdrawal and the New Geopolitics of Terror

On April 25, 2026, the Sahel was the scene of an unprecedented offensive. Armed groups launched near-simultaneous attacks against military installations and strategic sites across Mali, from Bamako to Gao, passing through Kidal, Sévaré, Kati, and Bourem. Claimed by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and conducted in coordination with the Tuareg separatist forces of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), these synchronized strikes mark a change in nature in the Sahelian conflict. It is no longer about isolated incursions but a conventional war led by non-state actors with remarkable planning and operational coordination capabilities.

The geographical scope of these attacks is revealing. By simultaneously targeting sites hundreds of kilometers apart, the armed groups demonstrated a logistical and command capacity that far exceeds the traditional insurgent model. This evolution is the result of a continuous degradation of regional security that Western governments have observed from an increasing distance over the past three years.

The systematic withdrawal of Western forces from Central Sahel constitutes the immediate context of this deterioration. French forces left Mali in 2022 after the expiration of Operation Barkhane, and then Burkina Faso in 2023. The United States completed its withdrawal from Niger in September 2024, abandoning essential drone bases and intelligence centers after the Nigerien military junta denounced the bilateral agreement. In December 2025, Mali and Burkina Faso imposed reciprocal travel bans on American citizens in response to expanded American restrictions against the two countries. This Western eviction from the Sahel is the result of the intersection of political, security, and governance challenges that foreign powers failed to anticipate.

The counterpart to this security vacuum has been the arrival of the Russian Africa Corps, which has replaced the Wagner Group as the main external security partner of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. On January 21, 2025, the three countries of the Sahel States Alliance (AES) announced the creation of a joint armed force of 5,000 soldiers aimed at combating regional jihadism. The AES flag was officially unveiled on February 22, 2025, in Bamako. In January 2026, former Burkinabé President Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was extradited from Togo to Ouagadougou, accused of attempted coup, illustrating the juntas' willingness to consolidate their power in the face of any internal opposition.

Yet, the results of this new security architecture remain contested. Data from the Global Terrorism Index 2025 are unequivocal: the Sahel recorded 9,826 deaths related to militant groups in 2025, representing 51% of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide according to the Council on Foreign Relations. The overall toll of violence in the region is now approaching 24,000 dead. JNIM-related attacks on the Benin-Nigerian border increased by 86% between 2024 and 2025, rising from about 150 to 280 incidents according to ACLED data. Civilian deaths in the Nigerian border states (Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Kwara) and Beninese regions (Alibori, Borgou) surged by 260%, exceeding the threshold of 1,000 victims.

JNIM's economic strangulation strategy has become systematic. Since September 2025, the group has maintained a blockade on the western corridors of Mali, targeting supply routes to Mauritania and Senegal. In October 2025, JNIM expanded into Kwara State in Nigeria, marking the first confirmation of its presence as close as the West African coast. The large-scale attack on the Beninese military base in April 2025, which caused significant losses, marked a turning point in coastal states' perception of the threat.

The rivalry between JNIM and the Islamic State's Sahel Province (ISSP) has exacerbated violence in the tri-border areas. ACLED data report a 262% increase in violence in these regions in the second half of 2025, reflecting a competitive militarization of border routes by both groups.

In response to this deterioration, the coastal states of West Africa have initiated a security realignment. On January 1, 2026, Benin and Nigeria signed a border security agreement in Cotonou, including joint patrols, shared intelligence platforms, and cross-border monitoring mechanisms. The presence of French observers during the initial consultations suggests possible technical assistance in surveillance and logistics. On April 18, 2026, Togo hosted a strategic summit in Lomé with the AES confederation, marking an unprecedented attempt at dialogue between coastal states and Sahelian juntas.

These developments raise fundamental questions about the future of security in West Africa. The collapse of the G5 Sahel in 2025 left an institutional void that neither the AES nor emerging bilateral arrangements have been able to fill. The recommendation from the Nigerian Centre for Crisis Communication to intensify recognition and monitoring along border corridors, to strengthen regional cooperation through the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Accra Initiative, and to develop advanced operational bases reflects the awareness of the inadequacy of purely national responses.

The current situation is the direct result of a counter-terrorism approach that has favored kinetic engagements at the expense of addressing the governance conditions fueling the insurgency. Poverty, lack of public services, and endemic corruption remain the structural drivers of jihadist recruitment. With the prospect of state collapse in Mali now tangible, and the emergence of sustainable insurgent sanctuaries, the need for a fundamental recalibration of security strategy in the Sahel is becoming increasingly urgent. The events of April 25, 2026, are not an isolated incident but the logical culmination of a trajectory of deterioration that international and regional actors have allowed to deepen.