Sahel: The Race for Joint Forces Against the Jihadist Escalation

The Sahel States Alliance (AES) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are simultaneously deploying joint military forces in a region where the jihadist threat has reached unprecedented levels. This parallel mobilization illustrates the deep political fracture now dividing West Africa, while revealing the extent of the security challenge facing the Sahel in March 2026.

The Unified Force of the AES, officially launched in December 2025 in Niamey, brings together 6,000 soldiers from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This initiative marks the third attempt by Sahelian states to create a joint security mechanism, following the failure of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which disintegrated between 2022 and 2023. Unlike its predecessors, this new force benefits from enhanced political cohesion among three military governments sharing a common vision of sovereignty and security autonomy.

The unified command, based in Niamey, has complete operational authority over the deployed troops, allowing their movement without prior approval from national headquarters. This strategic flexibility represents a significant advantage over the G5 Sahel Force, whose battalions were confined to designated geographical sectors with pursuit rights limited to a radius of 100 kilometers on either side of national borders. The units of the Unified Force theoretically operate across the entire territory of the three member countries.

However, funding remains a major challenge for the AES. The G5 Sahel Force had failed partly due to chronic underfunding, with its annual budget of 423 million euros far exceeding the contributions of its member states. To avoid this external dependency, the AES is mobilizing domestic resources through three mechanisms: the Patriotic Support Fund of Burkina Faso, the Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland in Niger, and the Fund for Supporting Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects in Mali. On March 28, 2025, the three countries established an import tax of 0.5% to finance the confederal institutions, including the Unified Force.

The diversification of military partnerships also allows the AES to avoid dependence on a single external actor. Russia, through its Africa Corps, remains the preferred security partner, although the terms of engagement vary significantly. In Mali, Russia provides military equipment and directly participates in combat operations. In Burkina Faso and Niger, the engagement is primarily limited to training. Equipment and armaments are acquired from Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China.

Recent operations demonstrate an intensification of fighting. Between February 21 and March 6, 2026, the armed forces of Mali and Burkina Faso conducted massive airstrikes in the Sikasso province and the Djibo region, neutralizing over a hundred jihadist militants. The Burkinabè army launched a major counter-offensive against jihadist groups, including a blockade operation in the city of Djibo in the northern Sahel region. These tactical successes are part of the continuity of the tripartite Yereko 2 operation, conducted between February and March 2025 in the Liptako-Gourma area where the borders of the three countries converge.

At the same time, the Islamic State continues its expansion. The Islamic State - Sahel Province has attacked military positions in Dosso and Tahua in Niger. The most spectacular attack remains that against the international airport of Niamey at the end of January 2026, claimed by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), demonstrating the ability of jihadist groups to strike at the heart of capitals. Furthermore, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the main faction affiliated with Al-Qaeda in West Africa, has maintained a blockade on fuel supplies to Bamako since September 2025, paralyzing mobility and essential services in the Malian capital.

In the face of this escalation, ECOWAS is mobilizing its own regional force. At a meeting of military chiefs in Sierra Leone in early March 2026, the bloc decided to activate an intervention force initially comprising 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026. This decision comes after the announcement in September 2025 of the deployment of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel. The ambitious project announced in August 2025 envisioned a counter-terrorism force of 260,000 men, although this figure now appears unrealistic.

The fracture between the AES and ECOWAS significantly complicates regional coordination. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger officially left ECOWAS in January 2025, rejecting what they perceive as Western interference, particularly from France, in their security affairs. The three countries accuse ECOWAS of prioritizing political and electoral considerations over the fight against terrorism. Mediation attempts by Senegal, which maintains cordial relations with the Sahelian states, have not led to significant rapprochement.

This division weakens the effectiveness of the regional response to jihadist groups that operate precisely in border and cross-border areas. Illicit supply networks for operational resources – weapons, motorcycles, fuel, drones – cross multiple borders in the region. The experience of the Tarha Nakal exercise, conducted in May 2024 in Tillia (Niger) by the armed forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Togo, demonstrated the ability of states to pool resources and operational coordination despite political divergences.

The African Union appears as a potential mediator capable of resolving tensions between the AES and its West African neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea. A pragmatic cooperation between the ECOWAS anti-terrorist force and the Unified Force of the AES, facilitated by the AU, could include intelligence sharing, joint surveillance, and coordinated missions.

Nigeria, traditionally the main contributor to ECOWAS missions with 75% of the personnel, faces economic and security constraints that limit its projection capacity. The Nigerian economy, weakened by mismanagement that generated high inflation in 2023, is slowly recovering. Nigerian defense forces are simultaneously combating jihadist groups in the northeast, criminal gangs in the northwest and central-north, and separatist movements in the south. This dispersion of resources reduces the capacity of the West African "giant" to finance and deploy troops massively within the framework of ECOWAS.

The jihadist threat in the Sahel involves at least eight distinct armed groups, including JNIM (5,000 to 6,000 members), the Islamic State Sahel Province (over 400 fighters according to 2018 estimates), ISWAP (3,500 to 5,000 fighters), and Boko Haram (about 1,500 fighters despite the weakening following the death of its leader Abubakar Shekau in 2021). These groups use forested areas as refuges and corridors, making conventional operations particularly complex.

The effectiveness of the dual ECOWAS-AES mobilization will ultimately depend on the ability of both entities to transcend their political divisions to adopt a coordinated approach to a common threat. The Sahelian crisis requires not only a military response but also social interventions in rural areas where jihadist groups recruit by offering security, agricultural resources, and basic services. Without rebuilding trust between the AES and ECOWAS, the region risks perpetuating a counterproductive competition between two parallel security architectures in the face of a common enemy that precisely exploits this fragmentation.